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The primary aim of this thesis is to establish that the central tenets of
conventional social theory cannot be sustained in the light of modern
evolutionary biological theory (the theory of inclusive fitness). In
particular, it is argued that the central social scientific assumption of a
radical separation between biology and culture raises insuperable problems
for the formulation of the motivation of action, when the logical
consequences of modern Darwinian biology are fully considered. At the
same time, however, it is argued that recent attempts to apply
evolutionary theory to the direct analysis of human social behaviour -
human sociobiology - have been fundamentally unsuccessful,
theoretically, but above all, empirically.
The central problem which the thesis formulates, therefore, is of how to
conceptualize human action as motivated in accordance with the
expectations of evolutionary biology, whilst recognizing that such action
does not necessarily conform either in its immediate subjectivity, or in its
objective distal consequences, to the predicted patterns of inclusive fitness
theory. The solution to this problem is sought through an analysis of the
level of phenotypic selection at which explanations should proceed; it is
concluded from this that the appropriate level must be . that of
psychological mechanism, and that the sociobiological emphasis on overt
behavioural pattern crucially ignores the interactive nature of the gene-
environment relationship. Accordingly, it is argued that only by
proceeding at the level of psychological mechanism, can the motivation of
culture in general, and in particular maladaptive behaviour, be
understood in terms of evolutionary theory.
Through an examination of the evolutionary logic of psychological
models, it is argued that evolutionary theory strongly suggests a model
which resembles, in important respects, that advanced by classical
psychoanalytic theory. In particular, it is argued that the psychoanalytic
conception of motivation, and the special relationship which Freud
conceived between instincts and objects permits an analysis of empirical
behavioural variation - even maladaptive variation - in full accordance
with the expectations of evolutionary theory. The final chapters of the
thesis illustrate the method of analysis proposed with reference to the
example of apparently maladaptive variation in human sexual behaviour.
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It is the possession of a common culture and the
ability to communicate and pass it on to others
that distinguishes the human being from other
animals. Humans are human because they
share with others a common culture, a culture
which includes not only the artefacts of its
living members but also those of members of
past generations. This is the heritage awaiting
those as yet unborn. Human beings are able to
develop and pass on their culture by means of
language, which is, of course, itself a product of
culture. Language has to be learned in the same
way as other elements of a culture and once this
has been accomplished, the individual can
acquire the rest of his or her culture (Bilton et al,
1981, p.10).
This passage, taken from a popular introductory text in sociology, is a
telling summary of some of the most fundamental assumptions in
modern social theory. This is a thesis about these assumptions, and
specifically the implications for them of modern evolutionary biology.
My central purpose is to demonstrate that the validity of such
assumptions is now irrevocably damaged by modern evolutionary
insights. At times, readers familiar with the received wisdom of the social
sciences will find it difficult to believe that it has been written by someone
who has been trained, first and foremost, as a sociologist, and who is
employed to teach that subject. The conclusions which I subsequently
reach are, after all, effectively a catalogue of what are generally accepted to
be grave sociological vices: the "naturalistic fallacy", essentialism,
psychologism and so on. Yet vices though they may be, I hope I
demonstrate in the following pages that the time has now come for social
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scientists to seriously re-evaluate them in the light of the very impressive
new evidence provided by evolutionary theory.
Because this thesis has been written by a sociologist (who, despite
appearances, still uses that name), principally for other sociologists and
closely related disciplines, I have attempted to keep the biological
discussions as free from technical detail as possible. Furthermore, because
the subject of evolutionary biology is one of which most social scientists
are proud to remain ignorant, it has been necessary to devote a part of
chapter one to a fairly straightforward explication of the state of modern
evolutionary biology. I have concentrated on general principles only, as it
is a misunderstanding of these which, I believe, has led to both the
unjustifiable rejection of evolutionary biology by conventional social
scientists, and its mis-use by many "sociobiologists". In addition to this
basic exigesis, however, I have attempted to address a number of criticisms
levelled at evolutionary theory by both non-biological critics, but also by a
number of leading biologists.
In the second chapter, I have advanced a critique of the most prominent
attempts so far to utilise evolutionary theory in the understanding of
human social behaviour: that is, human sociobiology. Whilst it is argued
that the tendency of social scientists to reject sociobiological explanations -
such as those put forward by E.O.Wilson (1975, 1978) and Lumsden &
Wilson (1980, 1983) - on the grounds of their imagined political
implications is untenable, it is agreed that there are certain empirical
objections to sociobiology, which in fact raise an insurmountable obstacle
to the approach's successful application. In particular, it is argued that the
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insistence of sociobiologists to determine any particular trait's current
adaptive value, prevents the empirical recognition of either behavioural
variation or maladaptive behaviour.
The third chapter examines the alternative position advanced by
"conventional" social theorists. I am aware that some readers may object
to my grouping so many diverse traditions under this heading, and of
course for some purposes this objection is quite legitimate. Nevertheless,
for the purposes of my argument the grouping is justifiable, since I am
concerned here only with the extent to which various theoretical models
incorporate biology into their explanations of human behaviour. In this
respect, it can be seen that even apparently diverse theoretical positions
share a common disregard for biological factors in their analyses. It is
argued that this disregard, whilst considered self-evidently justifiable by
most social scientists, cannot be sustained when the central insights of
modern evolutionary theory are considered. It is therefore the aim of this
chapter to establish that whilst social scientific explanations of human
behaviour do have certain empirical advantages over the crude
sociobiological approaches discussed in chapter two, their reliance on the
biology-independence of the source of human motivation renders them
ultimately untenable. Chapter three thus concludes with a paradox: if
approaches to human behaviour which adopt an evolutionary biological
stance are unable to explain critical empirical realities, but that non-
biological alternatives are theoretically untenable, how exactly can human
social behaviour in all its variety in fact be explained?
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The following chapter attempts to resolve this paradox by considering the
possibility that biologically determined traits could be explained as the
products of natural selection whilst displaying no current adaptive value.
It is argued that this could occur as the result of evolutionary time-lags;
that is, differences between the environment in which the trait in
question evolved and that in which it now develops, which produce
different phenotypic outcomes. This principle is then applied to the
problem of human behavioural variation and maladaptive behaviour,
and it is suggested that only by focussing on the motivation of action can
these difficulties be resolved. Before moving on to a precise examination
of the model of motivation which this analysis implies, however, the
question of the nature of mind which is suggested is addressed, and the
argument made for taking what many may regard as the potentially
unfruitful decision to reduce analysis to this level.
Once I have established that this level of analysis is indeed legitimate and
fruitful, the following three chapters are devoted to the elaboration of the
implications of evolutionary theory for the mind, motivation and the
meaning of action. Chapter five is principally concerned with the
relevance of the model of mind, and theory of motivation offered by
classical (that is, orthodox Freudian) psychoanalytic theory, and reaches
the conclusion, following an examination of key environmentalist
modifications of this position, that Freud's original formulation of these
issues has considerable significance in the present context. In particular, it
is argiied that Freud's often missed, but nonetheless crucial, emphasis
upon the deep, phylogenetically determined content of the mind and its
processes, together with his fundamentally individualistic conception of
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motivation are uniquely relevant to the theoretical problems outlined
earlier.
This observation is further explored in the chapter which follows through
an examination of the general question of human consciousness and its
relationship with the evolutionary process. I am well aware that the
evolutionary analysis of consciousness and perhaps especially self-
consciousness is a controversial undertaking: after all, it is precisely the
supposed uniqueness of human consciousness which is generally held up
as the chief justification for the assumption of the biology-independence
of human motivation. Nevertheless, I have attempted to demonstrate
that despite the wide acceptance which this position has gained, it is
impossible to maintain in view of modern evolutionary theory. This is
because, it is argued, to acknowledge that a human capacity has an organic
base - as it must, by definition - then one must also acknowledge that the
characteristics of the capacity in question were shaped by the normal
processes of organic evolution. Thus, far from providing the ultimate
justification for the removal of human behaviour from the biological
sphere, the existence of human consciousness must in fact itself be
subjected to evolutionary biological analysis. In chapter six, therefore, the
evolutionary significance of consciousness is examined, and it is
concluded that concsiousness, far from providing the ultimate data of
motivational reality, is in fact only explicable as part of a self-deceptive
mechanism, which serves, much as classical psychoanalytic theory always
maintained, to exclude certain motivational realities from awareness.
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The argument developed in chapter six, however, does raise an important
problem: whilst it is quite explicable in evolutionary terms for an actor to
deceive themself about their own motives - in the interests of better
deceiving others - it remains to be explained why actors should on
occasions evidently deceive themselves about the motives of others. In
other words, the argument is faced with yet another formulation of the
"problem of altruism". If culture, as social scientists use the term, may be
loosely defined as a collective consciousness, or se//-consciousness, then
how can a theory based upon individual genetic interest explain the
motivated acceptance of other unrelated actors' deceptions? The solution
which in chapter seven is offered to this problem returns to the
fundamental principles of evolutionary biology outlined in chapter one,
and relates to the phenomenon of kin altruism; that is, the evolution of
altruism on the basis of genetic similarity. Since, however, modern
manifestations of cultural identity do not correspond to actual genetic
relatedness, this analysis also offers an important illustration of the effects
of evolutionary time-lags, as discussed earlier.
The final two chapters offer an illustration of the main theoretical points
made in earlier chapters through an examination of certain aspects of
variation in human sexual objects and practices. I have chosen to use this
particular example for a number of reasons. First of all, because this is an
area of human behaviour which, from the point of view of evolutionary
theory, one would expect to be most strictly under genetic control, but
which in reality appears very frequently to exhibit characteristics which are
entirely counter-adaptive. Secondly, this is an aspect of behaviour which
is, empirically, relatively resistant to analysis of the conventional
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sociological kind, and which therefore highlights, as clearly as possible, the
weaknesses which I am suggesting exist with this form of analysis.
Thirdly, although sexual behaviour per se can be seen as a relatively
discreet aspect of human behaviour, the theory advanced here, which
supports in many respects that advanced by Freud, recognizes the absolute
centrality of sex to all forms of behaviour, since as I repeatedly stress, it is
ultimately reproductive success, and that alone, which determines the
success or failure of any genetically determined trait.
The analysis which, in the last two chapters, is offered of these
phenomena is, of course, by no means exhaustive. Whilst it is my hope
that what I have to say will contribute in some way to the debates which
are currently taking place in this field, and perhaps especially to the whole
question of the evolutionary psychology of sexual commitment and
deception, it is primarily intended to illustrate some of the theoretical
points made in earlier chapters. As chapter one makes clear, the details of
any evolutionary analysis must inevitably often be speculative in nature,
simply because reliable data upon the outcomes of particular genetically
based adaptations in past environments will rarely be available. The
crucial point is however, as I attempt to demonstrate, that whilst the
details of the analyses offered here will (I hope) be the subject of further
debate, they rest on a fundamentally sound theoretical base, and can thus
make a legitimate claim to serious attention.
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CHAPTER ONE
An Outline of Modern Evolutionary Biology
My aim in this chapter is to outline as clearly as possible those features of
modern evolutionary biology which are fundamental to the argument I
shall subsequently develop. I shall begin by considering certain rather
general points about the nature of Darwinian evolution , and then move
on to examine the specific formulation central to the modern theory - the
theory of inclusive fitness, as proposed by W.D.Hamilton. In the course of
this examination, I shall consider a number of objections which have been
raised against both the specifics of Hamilton's model, and perhaps more
importantly, against Darwinian evolutionary theorising in general.
Although I shall have something to say about specifically biological issues,
I shall avoid lengthy discussions about the more technical details of
genetics, substituting them where possible with appropriate references. I
shall instead be mainly concerned with a number of epistemological
objections to evolutionary biology, and in particular the charges that it is
necessarily tautological and hence in Popper's terms unfalsifiable, and
related to this, that it is guilty of following what Lewontin (1978) calls an
"adaptationist program". I shall conclude this chapter by considering the
implications of these arguments for the form and status of evolutionary
explanations.
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Natural Selection: First Principles
It is helpful to begin this discussion of modern evolutionary biology with
some rudimentary observations about the fundamental process of natural
selection, as first proposed by Darwin, since not only is this central to the
argument I shall develop in later chapters, but as I shall later show, its
consequences have often been seriously misunderstood. Darwinian
evolution is generally characterised as involving three distinct
components (See Lewontin 1978). First is the principle of variation, that
is, individuals within a species display differences from one another.
Second is the principle of heredity, that is, the variations manifested are
capable of biological transmission. Third is the principle of natural
selection, which holds that given natural limits on resources, those
individuals possessing variations which enable them best to survive and
reproduce will leave more offspring than others; the most successful
variations will thus come to dominate. As I shall show later in this
chapter, it is this last component of the Darwinian theory which has been
subject to most debate and disagreement, but for the present let me
emphasise some basic points about the first two.
The first and second components, the principles of variations and
heredity, necessitate an important distinction between the biological,
heritable basis of a particular trait and the trait itself. In the language of
modern biology, these are termed the genotype and phenotype
respectively. The importance of this distinction lies in the fact that an
observed variation may be the consequence of factors other than genetic
variation, and thus it would not be heritable by biological means. An
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obvious example of this would be variations in the height of plants,
brought about by differential exposure to sunlight; systematically in¬
breeding the taller plants would not lead to a positive shift in the mean of
the height distribution, because the taller plants, despite their observed
variation, are genotypically identical to the shorter plants. Evolution,
then, presupposes a linkage between genotype and phenotype, and it is
because of the effects of the phenotype that the genotype is maintained.
A further point which needs to be made in this regard is the source of
variation in the genotype on which selection acts. There are only two
means by which variation can occur in the genotype: mutation and
recombination. The first refers to randomly occuring failures of DNA to
replicate exactly, with the effect that the genotype passed on to the
offspring differs from that which would be expected under normal
circumstances. In by far the majority of cases such mutations are
deleterious; in the rare cases when mutations confer a positive phenotypic
benefit to their bearers, they are selected. Recombination refers to the
emergence of new genotypical forms which result from the reshuffling of
chromosomes which normally occurs betwen generations. It is therefore
the process by which most variation occurs, but the ultimate source of
such variation remains mutation. Interestingly, it is the fact of
recombination which provides the strongest answer to the apparent
Darwinian paradox of the evolution of sexual reproduction. Sex seemed
to be such a paradox because its effect is to reduce the chances of any
heritable variation being passed on through the very process of
recombination. Yet, since it also provides the source of much of the
variation on which selection acts, it is now understood as a mechanism
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with a very clear selective advantage (See Trivers 1985, Ch.13 for a
summary of these arguments).
Perhaps the most obvious point to notice about the source of genetic
variation - and one which is frequently misunderstood - is that it is
entirely random, and therefore non-directional. The name
"Lamarckism" is conventionally given to the opposing view,after the 19th
Century biologist Lamarck, and generally involves a belief in the
inheritance of acquired characteristics. For example, giraffes have
elongated necks as a direct result of the stretching behaviour of their
ancestors; or human beings are developing, and transmitting to their
offspring, alternative morphologies as a consequence of their sedentary
lifestyles. This view thus assumes that the genetic material which is
transmitted through reproduction is capable of modification as a result of
environmental changes acting on the phenotype for which it codes.
Lamarckism is therefore entirely at odds with everything that is known
about the mechanism by which genetic material is translated into cellular
development and morphology; DNA is a strictly irreversible code. (For a
clear account and refutation of recent attempts to ressurect a form of
Lamarckism, see Dawkins 1982 pp.164-178; see Trivers 1985, Ch.5 for a basic
summary of the genetic processes involved.)
Units of Selection: Groups, Individuals or Genes?
The final feature of the Darwinian explanation, the principle of natural
selection, whilst at first sight perhaps uncontroversial, has provoked the
greatest debate of all. The focus of this debate has been the question of
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what should be taken as the primary unit of selection; that is, the basic
unit for whose reproductive benefit selection acts. The principal
contenders in this debate have been the the group or species, the
individual organism and the individual gene. Although it is clear that
Darwin himself assumed that selction occurred at the level of the
individual (Darwin, 1859; see also Ruse 1989, pp.34-54), a number of
theorists subsequently proposed that selction operates at the level of the
group (most notably, perhaps, Wynne-Edwards, 1962). Clearly, the
consequences of such a claim for the nature of evolution are far reaching :
behaviour selected for its contribution to the reproductive success of the
group to which the individual belongs will be different indeed from
behaviour selected for its contribution to the reproductive success of the
particular individual. In order to demonstrate the importance of this
issue, it will be helpful briefly to summarize the thrust of the group-
selectionist argument as represented by Wynne-Edwards.
Wynne -Edwards' central argument was that the principal survival
problem facing any species is a tendency to reproduce beyond available
resources. In response to this, he argues, mechanisms will be selected
which enable individuals within the population to homeostatically
control their own population densities - by means of reproductive
restraint - in relation to variable food resources. Much animal behaviour
was thus characterized by Wynne-'Edwards as examples of epideictic
displays; a term coined to mean behaviour which is adapted to give
conspecifics an immediate estimate of local population density, and thus
trigger reproductive behaviour appropriate for the survival of the
population.
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In this sense, Wynne-Edwards was advancing a theory which predicted
the selection of reproductive altruism (defined in biology as any
behaviour which enhances the reproductive success of another individual
at the expense of the actor). His argument assumed that because the
availability of food resources is something which affects the entire
population, slection acts upon collective responses to the problem. He
therefore suggested that because extinction is the greatest threat to a
population, mechanisms which serve to avert this possibility will be
selected, even if this is achieved at a cost - as would almost always be the
case - to personal reproductive success. In other words, populations
which evolved ways of preventing themselves from going extinct, by
avoiding the chief cause of extinction - that is, reproduction beyond
available resources - would survive and reproduce more effectively than
those lacking such adaptations. In this way, selection is held to operate at
the level of the group.
At first sight Wynne-Edwards' theory looks convincing. As he shows,
there are many examples of such apparent reproductive altruism amongst
animals, and perhaps not least, amongst human beings. Nevertheless,
following the publication of Wynne-Edwards' work, an enormous
amount of theoretical (and empirical) criticism emerged, which lay bare
the fundamental flaws underlying his theory. One of the chief oponents
to Wynne-Edwards was the ecologist David Lack, who, using the example
of clutch size in birds, sought to demonstrate that such apparent altruism
was quite explicable from the point of view of individual selection (Lack,
1966). Lack makes the point that for any species of bird, there must exist
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an optimal clutch size, that is, the number of eggs which the female bird
needs to lay to yield the maximum number of offspring. Clearly, since the
resources available to individual mothers is limited by ecological
circumstances and carrying capacity , there will be individual reproductive
costs in the form of inadequately provisioned offspring associated with
excessive egg production. Reproductive restraints, therefore, may be quite
explicable in terms of the benefits conferred to individual reproductive
success by only hatching the number of offspring which available
resources can support. In terms of selection, therefore, it can be seen that
individuals who possess the means to maximize the number of survivng
offspring, will leave more copies of this trait in future generations than
individuals who possess traits which cause them to reproduce at a lower
rate than is ecologically feasible.
It is worth briefly considering the conditions which would be necessary for
selection to operate at the level of the group. Essentially, for group
selection to occur, the rate at which groups go extinct would have to be
comparable to that of individuals within groups, so that groups
containing; only altruists reproduce at a faster rate than those lacking
altruists. Yet for this condition to be satisfied, it needs to be assumed that
individuals within a group whose numbers were approaching extinction
level, could not be selected to migrate to areas of lower population density,
before extinction occurred. Thus, the theory would require the presence of
homogeneously altruistic groups as a starting point, and not a
consequence of selection. The problem with such an approach is obvious:
those individuals within the group who are most adept at selfishly
exploiting available resources to maximise their own reproduction - and
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one such strategy could certainly be migration - will reproduce faster, and
come to dominate the group (see Wilson, 1975 for an account of models of
group selection).
It would not be an exaggeration, however, to say that the definitive
solution to the level of selection argument came with the publication in
1964, of William Hamilton's papers "The Genetical Evolution of Social
Behaviour" (Hamilton,1964a,b; see also Trivers 1985, Dawkins 1989, 1982,
1986. Barash 1977). The central contribution made by Hamilton was to
focus attention on the role of genes in the selection process. In particular,
he pointed out that since genes are the basic units of heritable material,
genes which promote their bearers to behave in such a way as to increase
the number of copies of themselves in future generations would be
selected. From this he reasoned that since related individuals share genes
with calculable probabilities, selection would favour genes which
promoted not merely the survival and reproduction of their individual
bearers, but also that of relatives who also possess the gene in question.
This extended notion of individual fitness became known as "inclusive
fitness".
The most obvious implication of Hamilton's insight concerned the
circumstances under which altruism could be selected. Thus, a gene
promoting an altruistic action towards an unrelated individual would
suffer a net disadvantage, because the reproductive advantage conferred to
that individual would not result in copies of the gene in question being
transmitted to future generations. A gene, on the other hand, which
promoted an altruistic action towards a relative who had a 50% probability
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of also possessing that gene would enjoy a net advantage, but only when
the cost of the altruistic act to the actor equals less that half the benefit it
confers to the recipient. This situation admits of representation by the
formula:
Br>C
where, B is the benefit to the recipient, C is the cost to the altruist, and r is
che degree of relatedness between altruist and recipient.
Hamilton's model is therefore based upon the principle that the basic unit
of selection is not the group, or even the individual organism, but the
gene. The fundamental reason why genes should be treated as the basic
unit of natural selection is that unlike individual organisms, and the
groups in which they sometimes live, genes possess the capacity to make
faithful replicas of themselves. As Richard Dawkins has so clearly
expressed it (Dawkins, 1982, 1989), the organisms in which genes are
present, are merely temporary "vehicles" which facilitate the process of
replication1: unlike individual organisms, genes have the potential to be
immortal. Their immortality or otherwise will of course depend upon the
way in which they cause their vehicles to behave, but the vehicles
themeselves could never be the unit of selection, for the very simple
reason that they are always mortal.
It is with the foregoing observations in mind, that I wish now to turn to
some of the criticisms which have been made of the approach I have
outlined.
1Unfortunately, as we shall see in later chapters, Dawkins' vivid mataphor leads him into
a serious theoretical error when dealing with culture.
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Function, Teleology and Tautology in Darwinian Explanations
As the summary of the modern evolutionary theory which I have
presented should have made clear, evolutionary explanations derive their
force from the consequences which the phenomenon in question has for
the spread of the genes which determine it. In this respect evolutionary
explanations are quite explicitly functional in structure: phenotype x exists
in a species because it has the effect of making relatively more copies of
the genes which code for it than other phenotypes. It is important,
however, to distinguish this type of reasoning from the various
illegitimate uses to which teleological explanation is sometimes put.
Explanantions are generally considered to be teleological when the cause
of an action or event is given in terms of its consequences (see Cohen
1968, p. 47). Thus, to say that a man crosses a road in order to reach the
other side is a teleological explanation, because the consequence of the
action - reaching the other side - is here given as a cause.2 In this case the
explanation is quite admissable because of the legitimate imputation of
purpose to the actor. Yet if the purpose of the actor could be shown to be
unconnected with the consequences of his actions such a mode of
explanation is not acceptable. Thus, if a man, aiming towards the the goal
of reaching the opposite side of a road, is struck by a piece of falling
masonry which he could not have foreseen, it would be obviously
^Strictly speaking, it is the aim of reaching the other side which causes his action, but
since we can assume that the actor believes his aim will be realized, the distinction can be
ignored for these purposes.
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ludicrous to give the consequence of being struck by masonry as the cause
of his crossing the road.3
Teleology, then, in evolutionary explanations is quite legitimate, because
it is quite demonstrable that genes survive as a direct result of the
consequences their actions have for their survival. The difference
between this and the sort of conscious teleology or purpose which is
usually attributed to human actors, is captured by the distinction made by
biologists between proximate and ultimate causation. Ultimate causes are
always the same: the phenomenon in question exists because of its
relatively superior ability to reproduce the genes responsible for it.
Proximate causes, however, are the ontogenetic means by which ultimate
causes are realised. Thus, for example, the proximate cause of the human
eye is the complex series of biochemical stages which runs from DNA to
RNA to proteins to embryological development and so on. The ultimate
cause of the eye, however, is the contribution it made, during its
evolution, to the inclusive fitness of its bearers.
In this way, ultimate causation is always teleological; the proximate cause,
however, may or may not involve teleology. For instance, in
evolutionary terms, the teleology of human action is not an ultimate
explanation for why a man crosses the road. Whilst it certainly gives a
description of the immediate mechanism which led to the action, the
ability to act teleologically (and, as I shall argue later on, the content of
such an action) must itself be explained in ultimate - that is, teleological -
3I add the clause "which he could not have foreseen" to eliminate the possibility that he
could have been acting with an unconscious purpose: the significance of this will become
clear much later on.
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terms. It is because of the tendency to confuse the teleology which is
inevitable in evolutionary explanations with purposive human conduct,
that some biologists prefer to distinguish the two by using the term
"teleonomy" to refer to the evolutionary process (Pittendrigh, 1958; see
also Williams, 1966).
Whilst it is clear that such teleological (or teleonomical) reasoning is a
logically admissable, and indeed necessary, feature of evolutionary
explanations, it has led to a number criticisms centring around the charge
that such explanations are, because of their teleological nature,
unacceptably circular. I shall deal here with two main variants of this
charge; first that evolutionary explanations are unscientific, because they
are untestable, or, in Popper's terms, "unfalsifiable" (Popper, 1962), and
secondly that the teleological reasoning involved leads inevitably to an
"adaptationist program"(Lewontin 1978; Gould & Lewontin, 1979), in
which the a priori necessity to assume an adaptive function for observed
traits results in an absurd "Panglossian optimism", identifying adaptive
purpose where none exists.
The claim that evolutionary biology cannot be considered scientific
because it is formally unfalsifiable, can be disposed of with relative ease. It
is clear that a phrase such as Spencer's "survival of the fittest", where "the
fittest" are defined as "those who survive" is an unfalsifiable tautology for
the obvious reason that by defining its terms as equivalent, the statement
becomes by definition true. Yet there is nothing about the theory which
this phrase is sometimes held to describe that is itself tautological. At its
simplest, modern evolutionary biology states that genes which produce
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phenotypes which have the effect of producing relatively more copies of
themselves than others, will come to dominate. Phrased in this way, the
theory certainly appears to be an unfalsifiable tautology. Since the mere
existence of any trait is hereby considered to be adequate evidence for its
relative evolutionary adaptedness, no trait could, in principle, be found
which would lead to the rejection of the hypothesis that all traits are
selected because of their relative evolutionary adaptedness. Yet this only
holds if it is accepted that the only form in which the theory can be tested
is that given above. Plainly this is not so.
In fact this way of expressing the theory is little more than a summary of
the conclusions of a series of antecedent stages of reasoning, each of which
is perfectly amenable to falsification. Thus, once it is established that
populations exhibit genetic variability, that this variability is ultimately
the product of random mutation, that genes are replicators, and finally
that genes are systematically linked to the production of phenotypes, the
evolutionary hypothesis stated above follows by simple deductive logic.
Quite clearly, were any of these falsifiable conjectures actually falsified,
then so, deductively, would be the entire evolutionary theory. But since
none have been, despite rigorous attempts to do so, we must conclude that
the modern evolutionary theory is far indeed from being unfalsifiable; it
merely remains unfalsified.
The claim that evolutionary biology is guilty of "Panglossian optimism",
or an unwarranted adaptationism is more complex, but does not seem to
pose the difficulties which critics such as Lewontin and Gould (1979;
Lewontin 1978) imagine. Essentially this argument holds that like
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Voltaire's Dr Pangloss,who considered that the nose is the shape it is so
that one can rest one's spectacles on it, modern evolutionary biologists are
so preoccupied with the notion of adaptation as the only cause of
evolution, that they relentlessly attribute often quite spurious adaptive
significances to traits which simply have no significance. I have already
argued that there is nothing logically wrong with assuming that observed
traits exist by virtue of the purpose they serve, and that such an
assumption can be legitimately deduced from a series of strictly falsifiable
biological premises. However, against this, a minority of biologists have
suggested various processes by which traits may come to exist
independently of their adaptive significance.
The first of these which I shall consider, is the possibility of mutations
occurring which have no consequences for inclusive fitness, of either a
positive or a negative kind (see Dawkins 1982 p.32 for a discussion, and
distinction from a rather different and, for these purposes, unrelated
debate in molecular genetics). Clearly such "neutral" mutations could not
be selected by the process assumed by evolutionary theory, as they confer
no adaptive benefits to their bearers. Similarly, however, they could not
be removed from the gene-pool by this process, since they do not harm
their own chances of survival: they are simply neutral as regards selective
pressures. The problem with this argument is that whilst it is
theoretically possible for a trait to occur in this way, in practice its
consequences must always be negligible. This is because, as mathematical
models of evolution have shown, even "obviously" insignificant traits,
magnified over evolutionary time, can confer decisive benefits to the
inclusive fitness of their bearers (Haldane 1932). Similarly, even if such a
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trait could be identified, it would have by definition to be so insignificant
to the overall physiology and behaviour of the organism, that it would
almost certainly not warrant any detailed analysis.
A second supposedly non-adaptive path to the fixation of a trait, is the
existence of "pleiotropy". Whilst evolutionary biologists, in the interests
of clarity, generally speak of genes as though they exerted a single effect
upon a single trait, the reality is more complex. In fact, genes are usually
pleiotropic, that is, influence more than one phenotypic effect. The
principal difficulty for adaptive explanations which is raised in this
connection, is the possibility that any observed trait may in fact be a
deleterious side-effect of pleiotropy. In other words, the trait may exist
purely because it is genetically linked to another adaptive trait, and so any
adaptive "significance " which the adaptationist finds for it must be
spurious (Lewontin, 1979).
Again, this path to fixation is theoretically possible, but could only be
considered empirically significant if certain features of the relationship
between genes and their phenotypic effects are ignored. A gene does not
produce a phenotypic effect in isolation. Rather, it does so in an
environment of other genes, all of which affect the embryological context
of its development. Since this context is obviously vital for the
development of any phenotypic effect - genes for eyes are of little value
without also genes for eye-sockets - selection will strongly favour genes
which promote adaptive phenotypic effects of other genes if these are
necessary for their own survival. One mechanism by which this process
occurs is the selection of "modifier" genes, which have the effect of
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modifying the phenotypic effects of other genes, such that the deleterious
pleiotropic side effects of an adaptive phenotype can be either reduced, or
decoupled altogether (see Fisher 1930 for an early statement of this
principle; see Dawkins 1982, Ch.8 for a more detailed discussion of its
relevance to modern evolutionary theory). In this way, pleiotropy could
only represent a significant path to the existence of non-adaptive traits if it
could be assumed that such modifications in phenotypic effects by genes at
other loci could not occur.
Whilst alternative, non-adaptive paths to trait fixation seem unlikely to
be significant, there are a number of more pertinent issues which the
charge of adaptationism raises. These are what Richard Dawkins calls
"constraints on perfection" (Dawkins 1982, Ch.3), that is, reasons why
evolutionary biologists should be wary of assuming that any observed trait
represents the optimim solution to the adaptive problem in question. In
fact, I shall argue in subsequent chapters that it precisely a failure to
recognize one of these constraints - namely the effect of "time lags"
(Dawkins 1982 p.35) - which has made most attempts to apply
evolutionary biology to human behaviour fundamentally unsatisfactory.
Time is an important constraint on perfection because ecological time and
evolutionary time are not necessarily the same. Whilst traits take many
generations to evolve and become fixed, the environments in which they
operate can undergo rapid change in very short time periods, even within
single generations. This means that an organism can, in theory, exhibit
traits which under current environmental conditions do not maximise its
inclusive fitness, because the trait in question evolved to maximise fitness
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under quite different circumstrances (see Maynard Smith, 1976 for an
attempt to quantify such effects).
Whilst, as Dawkins points out (Dawkins 1982 p.35), this reasoning can
provoke accusations of invoking post hoc rationalizations for the failure
of an hypothesis to resist falsification, such accusations rather miss the
point. The principal reason for this is that the isolation of a trait which is
not adaptive is not sufficient grounds to reject the evolutionary
hypothesis. This is for the reason advanced above, that the "evolutionary
hypothesis" is not an hypothesis at all, but a conclusion logically deduced
from a series of other unfalsified hypotheses. Thus, by the same
reasoning, the acceptability of the claim that an observed trait is not
adaptive under current circumstances, rests entirely upon the adequacy of
the premise that evolutionary change does not necessarily occur in
parallel with ecological change. Since this premise is not in doubt, there is
no good reason to object to the time lag explanation. Indeed, time
constraints such as this should be recognized as an essential feature of any
coherent evolutionary explanation.
Another compelling reason why it would be foolish to expect evolution to
produce adaptive perfection is the constraint imposed by available genetic
mutations. Clearly the basic prerequisite for the selection of any trait is the
emergence of that trait, which we can assume is a random affair. For this
reason, some critics have attacked evolutionary explanations because they
run the risk of attributing the absence of certain characteristics in
organisms to their adaptive liability, rather than to the fact that
appropriate mutations never occurred. As Lewontin (1979) has put it:
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"Thus, although I might argue that the possession of wings in addition to
arms and legs might be advantageous to some vertebrates, none has ever
evolved a third pair of appendages, presumably because the genetic
variation has never been available."
This is certianly one possible explanation for the absence of wings in some
species, but has no more a priori force than the hypothetical adaptationist
argument that some animals never evolved wings because they did not
confer any selective advantage. More basically, however, it needs to be
emphasised that the "lack of available variation" argument could only
explain the absence of certain characteristics. All it means in the case of
characteristics which do exist is that they must have conferred a selective
advantage on their bearers, relative to other available variations. This is
certainly no challenge to evolutionary biology; indeed to argue the
reverse, that a species had reached a state of adaptive perfection, would
involve the implicit denial of the very evolutionary process which
produced this situation.
One final point which needs to be made in relation to constraints upon
adaptive perfection is that evolution generally acts, by necessity, upon
mutations which produce relatively minor phenotypic improvements in
the organism. This means that any evolutionary change is necessarily
constrained by those which have preceded it to produce the organism in
its pre-mutant form. Considered in this light, far from expecting adaptive
perfection, one may well wonder why animals are not, as Dawkins has put
it "risible monstrosities of lashed-up improvisation, top-heavy with
grotesque relics of patched-over antiquity" (Dawkins 1982, p.40).That they
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are not is obvious. But it is also important, since it gives a clear indication
of the degree of perfection which we are justified in expecting, and
furthermore, is a graphic illustration of the degree of available mutation
which it is reasonable to expect.
The Scope and Limits of Evolutionary Biology
I have tried, in this chapter, to give an outline of the basic theoretical
premises of modern evolutionary biology, and have considered a number
of arguments which, it has been claimed, limit its accuracy and
explanatory value. I wish now to conclude this discussion by
summarizing the implications of this for the nature of evolutionary
explanations, and in particular those which I shall develop in later
chapters.
I think it is now beyond dispute that the existence of biologically based
traits is ultimately explicable only in terms of the contribution they make
to the inclusive fitness of their bearers. Unfortunately, it is equally clear
that this fact raises a number of difficulties for the formulation of
evolutionary explanations. The first of these is the "time lag" question
which I have discussed above. Since adaptations will very often have
been selected for the advantages they confer in an environment different
from that in which they currently exist, the certainty with which
particular significances can be ascribed to currently observed traits will
necessarily be restricted. This problem is of an essentially empirical
nature, since its seriousness rests entirely upon the quality of data
available for the particular environment in question. The difficulty is
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especially acute, however, in the human case, where it is virtually
impossible to be certain about the exact conditions for which selection
took place. Nevertheless, as I shall later show, there now exists sufficient
evidence of various kinds to considerably increase our confidence in
certain general features of this environment.
Related to the problem of certainty about the environment of
evolutionary adaptedness, is the difficulty which time lags pose for the
testability of suggested adaptive functions. In the event that we could be
certain that the current environment is that for which a particular trait
was selected, evolutionary functions could in principle be tested, by , for
example, making predictions about the relative reproductive success of
those individuals possessing the trait. Since, however, the trait in
question could be the result of an adaptation for a quite different
environment, such testing would yield unreliable results. In fact, it is a
central strand of the argument developed in subsequent chapters that
much contemporary human behaviour is the result of just such
circumstances.
What all of this means, then, for evolutionary explanations - and
especially those concerned with human behaviour - is that a degree of
ultimate uncertainty is inevitable, and, given the nature of the constraints
upon certainty I have outlined, must surely be desirable. This is far
indeed, however, from advocating random speculation. Rather, it
suggests that a recognition of the limits to our certainty should lead us to a
methodology which replaces groundless dogmatism with a plausible
coherence with that which is certain.
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It is with these observations in mind that I now wish to turn to the
evolutionary explanation of human behaviour, and first of all to the
emergence of human "sociobiology".
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CHAPTER TWO
The Sociobiologv of Human Culture.
The second half of the 1970s saw a major growth in attempts to apply the
principles of evolutionary biology to the explanation of human social
behaviour. Perhaps the single most important catalyst in this
development was the publication in 1975 of E.O.Wilson's massive,
(
Sociobiologv: The New Synthesis (Wilson 1975). This was followed by a
series of attempts to utilise the central theme of this work - that human
social behaviour is explicable in terms of the central theorem in
evolutionary biology - and develop a thorough and sophisticated
biological understanding of human culture. My aim in this chapter is to
consider the success of this enterprise, and to raise some of the problems
which it poses. Before progressing to this, however, it is important to
emphasise my reasons for considering only the explanatory success of
human sociobiology, and to distinguish my analysis from the politically
motivated attacks which followed the publication of Wilson's work.
The years following the publication of Wilson's book saw a number of
attempts to discredit the enterprise of sociobiology by equating it with a
wholesale endorsement of everything critics perceived as wrong with the
status quo. One reviewer characterised sociobiology as:
The latest attempt to reinvigorate these tired
theories [which] provided an important basis for
the enactment of sterilization laws and the
restrictive immigration laws by the United
States between 1910 and 1930 and also for the
eugenics policies which led to the establishment
of gas chambers in Nazi Germany (Allen et al,
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in Caplan 1978, p.260).
Similarly, it was claimed that sociobiology is nothing more than a
reflection of the dominant Western capitalist ideology, devoid of any
serious scientific merit or purpose (see for example Sahlins 1977). It is my
contention that these arguments are not merely completely irrelevant to
an assessment of the explanatory claims of sociobiology, but that if taken
seriously, they deny in principle that such an assessment is possible.
The first point to be addressed in this connection, is the relationship
between a scientific theory, no matter how ludicrous, and the actions
which are performed on its basis. Unfashionable though such a point of
view may be, it is undeniable that there exists a logical gulf between the
claims of a theory and the policies which are enacted on the basis of such
claims (see Weber 1949). Scientific theories figure in human actions only
insofar as all actions are grounded in relevant assumptions about the
nature of reality, and any given scientific theory constitutes such an
assumption. In this way, scientific theories are instrumental in the
formulation of policies in that they provide a means to predict the
outcomes of proposed courses of action, and can thus predict the efficacy of
a given policy in, and even suggest alternative policies which would be
more efficacious in, reaching a given aim. To illustrate this we could take
two hypothetical policy-makers who wish to devise a policy to promote
social cohesion. Let us also suppose that a sociobiological hypothesis that
human beings are more likely to be altruistic towards individuals who
resemble themselves is true. The policy-maker who accepts this
hypothesis, and builds his policy on this assumption will obviously have
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greater success than the one who ignores it as mere ideology. The theory
does not dictate what is desirable - by definition - it merely alerts the
policy-maker to the most efficacious means to achieve the desired goal.
Science can thus impinge upon policy decisions only insofar as it
determines what is possible, and in this it can be either right or wrong.
There is however a more serious objection to those who reject theories on
ideological rather than scientific grounds, which has to do with the
problem inherent in all forms of epistemological relativism. It has been
claimed, for example by Marshall Sahlins (1977), that sociobiology is
merely a reflection of the ideology of advanced laissez-faire capitalism.
Similarly an article by the "Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the
People" (reprinted in Caplan 1978) claims that Wilson's Sociobiology is a
"manifesto of a new, more complex, version of biological
determinism"(p.281) and that such theories "all describe a particular
model of society which corresponds to the socioeconomic prejuduces of
the writer" (p.280).
Unfortunately, these objections are irreconcilably incoherent. The reason
for this is that they are not grounded in a principled distinction between
theories which are mere ideological reflections, and those which are
correct. In fact they are little more than a crude popularization of the sort
of argument found, for example, in the work of Paul Feyerabend (1975), in
which the possibility of culture transcending truth is in principle denied.
The objection to this is well-known: if no statement can claim any more
objective truth than any other, then this proposition must itself be
rejectable on these grounds. Thus, in the present case, for the claim that
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sociobiological theories are mere cultural artifacts to be true, it would also
have to be true that this claim is a mere cultural artifact, and hence, in
principle, no truer than the sociobiological claims which it seeks to
dismiss.
When one examines the grounds on which sociobiological theories are
distinguished from these claims about them, a rather extraordinary
conclusion emerges. If it is claimed, as in the quotation above, that
sociobiological theories merely "correspond to the socioeconomic
prejudices of the writer", then in the absence of any other distinguishing
grounds, we must also assume that the same is true of claims about
sociobiological theories. All that is thereby left, however, to distinguish
the two statements is a basically aesthetic judgement about the
socioeconomic prejudices underlying each. And since aesthetic
judgements must also be the product of socioeconomic prejudice - because
on this view science and aesthetic judgement are the same - they cannot
simultaneously be grounds for assessing the impact of such prejudice.
None of this is to deny that theories, including sociobiology, may yield
correct information which many find unpalatable, and which many
would prefer was not the case. But this is no more true of sociobiology
than it is of medical oncology. Similarly, it does not deny that a factual
understanding of the reality of a particular phenomenon may enable
individuals so minded to successfully perform acts of unimaginable
destruction and harm. Again, this is no more the case for sociobiological
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theories than for any other.1 Finally, it does not deny that incorrect
theories can be utilized in policy-making of both desirable and undesirable
kinds, and that great harm can come of the application of incorrectly
understood principles. This, once more, is not special to sociobiologists,
but rather highlights the importance of the rigorous assessment of all
scientific claims, and the real harm which can result from the denial of
this enterprise.
The Claims of Human Sociobiology
It is my intention in this chapter to offer a critical examination of the
enterprise of explaining the contents of human culture in ultimately
adaptive terms. I shall not, therefore, be concerned for the time being with
the work of those biologists - for example Dawkins (1982, 1989), and Boyd
& Richerson (1985) - who have sought to explain human culture in terms
independent of its biological foundations; the underlying assumptions of
this approach do not differ from those of conventional sociology and
anthropology, which will be examined in the next chapter. Instead I wish
to illustrate the difficulties involved in the formulation of a sociobiology
of human culture with reference to the work of P.L.van den Berghe, on
human families (1979), and especially to the work of E.O.Wilson and
C.J.Lumsden (1980, 1983), which is perhaps the most thorough and
sophisticated attempt to offer an ultimately adaptive account of human
culture, and especially cultural change, to date.
1 It is instructive that Noam Chomsky has pointed out that extreme environmentalism, if
an accurate theory of human behaviour, "removes all barriers to coercian and manipulation
by the powerful" (Chomsky, 1975, p.132)
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The most obvious and perplexing fact which has distinguished the study
of human behviour from that of all other species, is the human capacity
for behavioural variability. It is quite clear that any attempt at explaining
human social behaviour must take the explanation of this variability as
among its central tasks, and in this, evolutionary biology is no exception.
But evolutionary biology faces an additional problem: not only must it, in
common with other approaches, satisfactorily explain the variability of
human behaviour, but must show how such variability can be explained
within its central premise, the theory of inclusive fitness.
One approach to this problem, and the one which plays a major role in the
work of P.L.van den Berghe (1979) on human families, is to emphasise not
the variability of human behaviour, but its underlying similarity. Thus,
on the theme of sex-roles he writes:
Notwithstanding Margaret Mead's (1935, 1949)
unconvincing attempt to support the thesis that
all or nearly all differences in temperament and
behavior between males and females are the
product of arbitrary socialization, and that
cultures vary randomly in the roles they assign
to each sex, the ethnographic data clearly show
the opposite (D'Andrade 1966; Stephens
1963;van den Berghe 1973). There is some
variability in the details of what is considered
feminine and masculine in different cultures,
but there are also fundamental consistencies
(van den Berghe, 1979, p.63).
Similarly, any evidence which appears to contradict the conclusion that:
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Given the consistency in cultural norms accross
a wide range of societies, it is far more plausible
that the norms reflect biological differences than
they should cause behavioral differences (ibid,
p.64, itlaics in original).
is dismissed as the result of rare or exceptional circumstances which
prevent the expression of the expected biological universals. Thus, for
example, the apparent problem posed by variability in human sex objects
is explained as follows:
Like all other animals, we are selected to mate
with "sex objects" with whom we are likely to
produce offspring. If we are male, that means
women past menarche and before menopause.
If we are female, that means men, preferably
young and vigorous ones, though an older one
will do if he has valuable resources to offer. In
the absence of any such sex objects as will
increase our fitness, we may satisfy our urge
through masturbation, homosexuality,
pederasty, even bestiality, but these are pis-aller;
they are poor substitutes for the "real thing"
(ibid, p.42, italics in original).
It is not difficult to see that an approach such as this, which attempts to
deny the importance of both variation and maladaptive variation, cannot
continue for long without having to face serious empirical obstacles. The
last quotation from van den Berghe clearly illustrates the difficulties
which must be faced. First, and most obviously, there is no evidence that
sexual deviants are merely satisfying a fundamentally "normal"
heterosexual reproductive desire, in the absence of an appropriate object.
Case studies of fetishists, for example, which are discussed in later
chapters, show that many such individuals have ample opportunity for
reproductive sex, but simply prefer to engage in the deviant paractice.
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Secondly, although van den Berghe certainly has a point when he accuses
relativistic anthropology of exaggerating variation (see for example
Freeman 1983), the force of this criticism is lost entirely when it is noticed
that he merely replaces the exaggeration of one feature, with the
exaggeration of another. Thus:
...human systems of kinship and marriage
conform to only a few basic types. Underlying a
great deal of variety in detail, human societies
share much of their basic structure of kinship
and marriage (ibid. p.87).
Perhaps the greatest difficulty, however, with this approach, is the need to
regard such variation as does exist as adaptive. Thus van den Berghe
writes immediately after the above:
The variations, while they attest to our
versatility in adapting to a wide range of
environmental conditions, are themselves not
random but adaptive (Ibid).
Whilst I shall argue later that it is certainly correct to claim that variations
are not random, the claim that cultural variations are adaptive is
impossible to sustain. Indeed, it is precisely this insistence which leads, in
sociobiological explanations, to the sort of exaggerations of cultural
similarity which we saw above. To further illustrate this difficulty, I wish
now to turn to probably the most sophisticated attempt to date to give a
biological explanation of cultural variation, Lumsden & Wilson's theory
of gene-culture co-evolution.
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Lumsden & Wilson's approach (1981, 1983) can be seen, at least in part, as
an attempt to reconcile evolutionary explanation with the difficulty posed
by significant cultural variation. They begin their analysis with the
explicit recognition that their approach is intended to go beyond
traditional sociobiology and "take account of the free-ranging activities of
the mind and of the diversity of cultures created by them"(1981, p.2). The
principal concept they employ to assist them in this task is the "culturgen"
which is defined as follows:
a culturgen is a relatively homogeneous set of
artifacts, behaviors or mentifacts (mental
constructs having little or no direct
correspondence with reality) that either share
without exception one or more attribute states
selected for their functional importance or at
least share a consistently recurrent range of such
attribute states within a given polythetic set
(Lumsden & Wilson 1981, p.27).
The significance of this concept, is that in principle at least, it accords a
greater independence to culture than can be found in previous
approaches. Indeed, it is this concept which enables Lumsden & Wilson to
characterize the "central problem" in sociobiology as "the relation between
genetic and cultural evolution" (1983, p.49), thereby further attesting to the
importance in their model of recognizing the relative autonomy of
culture. Culturgens, however, are not arbitrary; more precisely existing
culturgens are not arbitrary.
For Lumsden & Wilson, actors face choices between culturgens, and these
choices are made according to predisposing genetic factors: the "epigenetic
rules" of mental development. Because cultural choices are ultimately
37
regarded in this model as the product of biological predisposition, it is
argued that culture is kept on "an elastic but unbreakable leash" (1983,
p.60) in the following way: as new culturgens emerge - presumably as the
result of random biological mutation - they either die out or spread
depending upon how far they enhance the inclusive fitness of those with
the predisposition to adopt them. In this way, culturgens ultimately owe
their existence to the contribution they make to the inclusive fitness of
those with predispositions to adopt them, and so are not treated in any
way differently from any other phenotypic effect.
Lumsden & Wilson juxtapose this mechanism against two other models
which they argue are extremely unlikely to evolve. The first is pure
cultural transmission, of the sort typical of sociological models, in which
any cultural artifact is as likely as any other to be adopted. The second is
pure genetic transmission, in which all behaviour is rigidly programmed
genetically, and in which no independent existence at all is accorded to
culture. Their reasoning behind their avowed rejection of these models
appears to be sound. Actors predisposed to make behavioural decisions
which enhance their inclusive fitness will have selective advantages over
those who do not, and so it would be difficult to imagine circumstances
under which individuals could evolve to make either adaptively neutral
or maladaptive choices,which presumably would happen if there were no
predisposing factors involved. Similarly, actors who approached all
situations with a rigid biological predisposition to act in certain ways,
would be in danger of being far too inflexible to cope with the
unpredictable and novel in physical and social affairs. Further
consideration, however, of the mechanism by which coevolution takes
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place, reveals that the model is not as successful in accounting for cultural
variation as its authors would claim.
Lumsden & Wilson claim that their model occupies a central position
between rigid envirionmental determinism, and rigid biological
determinism. To illustrate how this process is said to occur - what they
term the "leash principle" (1981, p.13) - it is worth quoting their example
of the evolution of the avoidance of brother-sister incest:
The epigenetic rules that turn the mind away
from incest lead also to cultural patterns which
reinforce the rules - taboos and frightenng
mythological stories. The coevolutionary
process is set in motion: persons who conform
to the aversion and the taboos leave more
healthy offspring; the genes underwriting the
avoidance of incest remain at a high level in the
population; and the predisposition is sustained
as one of the epigenetic rules. The two
inheritence systems have evolved in concert -
the genes that create the epigenetic rules and the
culture which offers the choices on which the
rules act. All of the events are linked in a circuit
of causation, running from the genes to the
rules of mental development to culture, and
back to the genes again (1983, p.119).
The length of the biological leash which is said to restrain culture can be
seen in the authors' concept of the "thousand year rule", which is
regarded as the time necessary for "substantial genetic evolution., [to].,
occur in the epigenetic rules of cultural transmission, resulting in such
effects as the genetic assimilation of culturgen preference and the
assimilation of bias towards specific decision heuristics" (1981, p.295). In
other words, Lumsden & Wilson argue that the genes which prescribe
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culturgen choice can change radically in as short a time as one thousand
years, or fifty generations.
Unfortunately this approach to culture is far indeed from satisfactory.
Although Lumsden & Wilson clearly intend to accord to culture some
independence from biology, in fact this is not achieved. Ultimately,
culturgens are explained only in terms of epigenetic rules which promote
their adoption, and because these epigenetic rules owe their existence to
the contribution they make to inclusive fitness, culture is thereby
explained only in terms of its contribution to inclusive fitness. In this
respect, then, the coevolutionary theory does not offer any improvement
upon the "cultural adaptationsism" which we observed in the work of
van den Berghe. This leads again to the necessary adoption of the general
strategy of systematically understating the significance of maladaptive
cultural variations.
Furthermore, because the coevolutionary theory is constrained by time -
in the form of the thousand year rule - it becomes impossible to recognise
as significant the rapid emergence of novelty, with the effect that
behavioural changes not ascribable to biological change tend also to be
understated. This is illustrated by the following example:
The innate tendency for human beings to learn
one thing as opposed to another, in other words
gene-culture transmission, is perhaps most
dramatically illustrated by the phobias. These
are the extreme fears into which people are
plunged - stricken by nausea, cold sweat and
other reactions of the autonomic nervous
system. Phobias typically emerge full-blown
after only a single unpleasant experience, and
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they are exceptionally difficult to eradicate, even
when the victim is carefully reassured and
coached by a psychiatrist. It is remarkable that
the phobias are most easily evoked by many of
the greatest dangers of mankind's ancient
environment, including closed spaces, heights
thunderstorms, running water, snakes and
spiders. Of equal significance, phobias are rarely
evoked by the greatest dangers of modern
technological society, including guns, knives,
automobiles, explosives and electric sockets,
Nothing could better illustrate the peculiar and
occasionally obsolete rules by which the human
mind is assembled, or the slowness of man to
adapt to the dangers created by his own
technological triumphs (1983, p.70).
In fact, nothing better illustrates the drawbacks of maintaining a direct
functional link between biology and culture. Statements such as "phobias
are rarely evoked by the greatest dangers of modern technological society"
are not just meaningless, they are simply incorrect. Even a cursory glance
at case-studies of modern phobias, from Freud to the present day, reveals
that almost any modern phenomena can become the object of a phobic
reaction, and most certainly does not have to have been one of "the
greatest dangers of mankind's ancient environment". Moreover, this
functional analysis massively distorts the actual experience of phobic
individuals, many of whom are obliged to go to ludicrous lengths to avoid
contact with the phenomenon in question. Certainly Lumsden &
Wilson's characterization of the functions of phobia : "better to crawl away
from a cliff, nauseated with fear, than to casually walk its edge" (1981, p.85)
bears little relationship to the reality of phobia, which not infrequently can
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reach such heights of obsession that the most basic and routine of tasks is
rendered impossible for fear of contact with the object of phobia. 2
The difficulties to which the "leash priciple" inevitably leads can best be
seen by considering its implications for the explanation of rapid social
change. In particular the difficulty centres around the issue of how it
becomes necessary to define similarity and difference. Ultimately, as we
have seen, culture is reduced in the coevolutionary theory to biology;
cultural forms can only become dominant if the majority of individuals in
the population possess epigenetic rules favouring their adoption, and this
can only come about by the ordinary processes of biological evolution.
That is, a dominant cultural form must either be explained by the
statistically impossible process of mass parallel mutation, or by the gradual
effects of the reproductive advantage conferred on descendants of the
bearer of an original mutation. Since the former can be discounted, we are
left with the latter as an explanation of the process of cultural change. The
flaw is obvious: such a process cannot account for significant cultural
change between single generations, or indeed within generations. The
consequence of this is that if the theory were to be retained, we would be
left with no choice but to regard such apparent cultural changes as cultural
continuities, and thereby deny them any significance whatsoever.
2 The more debilitating and maladaptive recognised phobias include "kinesophobia",
defined as "the morbid fear of making any kind of movement for fear of self-injury, even
where no danger exists", and "barophobia" defined as " morbid concern over the force of
gravity, manifested by a sensation of weightlessness and a fear that one will fall into
space", (from Chambers's Dicitionary of Psychiatry, 1967)
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To illustrate this problem we might consider the effects of treating - as the
above definition suggests we should - as two alternative culturgens, the
phenomena of anti-Semitism, and racial toleration in twentieth century
Germany. Now, whilst it is of course true that neither all Germans in the
period 1918 - 1945 were anti-Semitic, nor all Germans in the period after
1945 have practised racial toleration, most scholars of this period would
wish to recognize that there had been a significant shift in the proportion
of German citizens taking each position. From the point of view of the
Lumsden - Wilson coevolutionary theory, however, there would appear
to be no way of recognising this apparently cultural shift, without making
some extraordinary assumptions. It would be necessary to argue, for
instance, that the intergenerational shift in opinion was brought about by
the absence of epigenetic rules promoting anti-Semitism in the second
generation, and that this was occasioned by the massive under-
reproduction of anti-Semitic Germans active in the 1930s. Moreover, the
rise of Nazism in the 1930s would itself need to be explained by the oner-
reproduction of an earlier generation of individuals possessing the
epigenetic rules which predisposed them to manufacture or adopt anti-
Semitism.
The consequence of not making*these somewhat far-fetched assumptions,
but still retaining the theory, is that that shift in question could not be
recognised as significant, and therefore could not be accorded the status of
a phenomenon to be explained. In other words, we would have to deny
these phenomena - contrary to the definition offered by the authors - the
status of independent culturgens. Of course it is, in terms of the theory,
logically possible to do this, but such an admission would seriously affect
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the explanatory power of the theory. Indeed, it would not be an
exaggeration to say that by defining away problems in this manner, the
theory is incapable of offering any explanation of social change
whatsoever.
Similarly, the theory faces serious difficulties when called upon to explain
behavioural changes which occur during the lifetime of an individual.
For example, a sudden religious conversion in middle age, after a youth of
strident atheism, would seem to qualify as a shift in culturgen choice, and
one which might well have serious implications for the inclusive fitness
of the individual in question. In terms of the theory it would be necessary
to assume that co-existent in the same individual were epigenetic rules
promoting competing and mutually exclusive culturgen choices. Again,
this may be logically admissable, but such an argument would be in danger
of denuding the concepts involved of any real meaning. This is because,
ultimately culturgen choice can only be considered to be evolutionarily
significant because it entails the selection of adaptively superior culturgens
over adaptively inferior culturgens. It would only be possible to accept the
coexistence of two alternative culturgens in the same individual if it was
also argued that they possessed identical adaptive values. Doing this
however, would lead to exactly the same difficulty as that advanced above;
namely that the differences between culturgens - which we wish to
recognize as empirically significant - could not, in terms of the theory, be
so recognized, and so the event in question could not be explained.
Indeed, exactly as with ven den Berghe's approach, the co-evolutionary
theory cannot ultimately recognise cultural variations which are not
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directly attributable to biological evolution, and so must ultimately fail as
a serious challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy of the social sciences. It is
precisely this failing which led to the most damaging critiques, by
conventional social scientists, of the entire sociobiological enterprise, and
the consequent reassertion of the central dogma of traditional social
theory.
The Cultural Critique of Sociobiology
One of the leading critics of attempts by sociobiologists to offer biological
explanations of human culture was Marshall Sahlins (1977). Although
Sahlins' critique emerged before the publication of the works discussed in
this chapter - indeed in many ways they constitute a response to Sahlins -
his work still represents one of the most forthright and unambiguous
statements of the conventional social scientific response to sociobiology,
and as I have suggested, co-evolutionary theory does not significantly
depart from the fundamental assumptions of this discipline. Before
moving on, in the next chapter, to examine the assumptions underlying
the conventional position on the relationship between biology and
culture, I wish to conclude the present discussion with a brief outline of
Sahlins' argument against the biological analysis of culture.
The starting point of Sahlins' critique is the failure, discussed above, of
sociobiology to account for the empirical realities of human societies. Thus
he writes of his central example, kinship systems:
...no system of human kinship relations is
organized in accord with the genetic coefficients
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of relationship as known to sociobiologists
(19T7,p.57).
Yet it is important to realise that his critique goes beyond the empirical
failings of sociobiology; it is based equally upon the a. priori
conceptualisation of culture as a fundamentally irreducible determinant of
human action. At the heart of Sahlins' analysis is the assumption that
The reason why human social behavior is not
organized by the individual maximization of
genetic interest is that human beings are not
socially defined by their organic qualities but in
terms of symbolic attributes (ibid. p.61).
These "symbolic attributes" - or culture - are, for Sahlins, the ultimate
determinants of all human reality, even biology:
..the objectivity of objects is itself a social
determination, generated by the assignment of a
symbolic significance to certain "real"difference
even as others are ignored..(ibid, p.62)
And
...the biological givens such as human mating
and other facts of life, come into play as
instruments of the cultural project, not as its
imperatives (ibid, p.63).
In this way, Sahlins effectively replaces the ultimate reduction of culture
to biology, with its reverse: the ultimate reduction of biology to culture.
Thus, whereas the conceptual assumptions of sociobiologists make it
impossible to recognise the normality of cultural variation and
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maladaptive behaviour, Sahlins appears to be endorsing a point of view
whose assumptions make it impossible to recognise the normality of
cultural universals, and adaptive behaviour. This is because for Sahlins,
culture - as a final determinant of all reality, including human action -
must be ultimately arbitrary, and so any cultural form which does
correspond to the predictions of inclusive fitness theory, does so by pure
chance.
Considered in this way, we can see that Sahlins' critique of human
sociobiology, whilst partially grounded in a justifiable objection to its
empirical inadequacies, proceeds as it does by virtue of its underlying
assumptions about the nature of human culture. In short, the alternative
explanation of human behaviour which Sahlins proposes depends utterly
upon his contention that culture can legitimately be regarded as the
ultimate and irreducible determinant of human action. It is this claim -
fundamental, I believe, to conventional social theory - that I wish to
examine in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
Biology and Social Theory
Social theory is characterized by diversity. Yet there is one point on which
all traditions appear to be united: the necessity of offering explanations at a
level independent of biology. This fact of the irrelevance of biology is
routinely stated in the first few pages of most introductory texts in
sociology, and in more advanced statements of theory is generally taken to
be so self-evident that to explicitly state it would be to insult the
intelligence of the reader. My aim in this chapter, however, is to examine
the precise nature and implications of this premise. I propose to do this
by, first of all, considering the exact role which biology has conventionally
been allowed to play in social theory. I do not intend to offer an
exhaustive account of the formulations of each major theorist; such an
exercise would be rendered redundant precisely becuase the role of biology
is an issue on which social scientists are fundamentally agreed. Instead I
wish to examine the role which biology necessarily plays in the conception
of social theory as a distinct enterprise. Secondly, I wish to consider the
adequacy of this typical formulation in the light of the earlier discussion of
modern evolutionary theory.
The Basis of Social Theory
There seems little doubt that a fundamental rationale for social theory lies
in the apparently self-evident inadequacy of biological theory in
accounting for great behavioural diversity in the human species. That
which is universal in human behaviour is all that can reasonably be
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attributed to biology, and so everything about it which is interesting to
social scientists - that is, its diversity - must be explained according to other
factors. In this way, the conventional social scientific approach begins
from a specifically anti-biological stance. It is important, however, to
consider exactly what role biology does play in such explanations.
At the most basic level, the mere recognition that human behaviour is
distinctly human, involves the implicit recognition that it is defined by a
biological characteristic. Yet, ironically, it is exactly this biological
characteristic - humanness - which is held to justify the isolation of
human behaviour from biological explanation. The chief characteristic of
this biological humanness, which is thought to justify the separation, is
the human capacity for symbolic communication. As Sahlins has put it:
In the symbolic event, a radical discontinuity is
introduced between culture and nature. The
isomorphism between the two required by the
sociobiological thesis does not exist. The
symbolic system of culture is not just an
expression of human nature, but has a form and
dynamic consistent with its properties as
meaningful, which make it rather an
intervention in nature (1977, p,13).
Thus, the capacity to communicate symbolically, which is biological,
merely permits the operation of a higher level process, which is not
referrable to the biological level. It is this assumption which permits the
sui generis analysis of the social; that is, as constituted by its own processes
and possessing its own dynamic. This relationship has been explicitly
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articulated by Talcott Parsons, one of the few major theorists to address the
issue:
...there can be no one-to-one correspondence
between the properties of an organism and the
personality's internalized contents of normative
culture, and social role expectations (1977 p.172).
This analysis also presupposes - as well as the symbolic faculties - the
biological capacity to internalize normative culture. Again, however, the
assumption of this capacity, which in Parsons' later work is couched in
terms of the Freudian super-ego (a claim to which I shall return), does no
more than permit analysis to proceed at a higher level, and in a way
entirely unconnected with, the capacity in question. In other words, once it
is accepted that human biological apparatus exists which enables members
of the species to use symbolic communication (including symbolic
thought), and to internalize normative orientations, analytical focus falls
exclusively upon the particular symbols and normative orientations in
question.
It is perhaps something of a simplification, but I think a justifiable one, to
say that debate amongst social theorists has been almost entirely about the
relative importance of, and the differing contents of, symbols and the
internalization of normative orientations. Thus, for instance, Marxist
analysis differs from the structural-functionalism of Talcott Parsons, in
that for the former the content of symbols which are internalized as
normative orientations are determined by economically constituted social
relations, whilst for the latter by the equilibrating processes of the social
system and its various sub-systems. Although the differences between the
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two are obviously fundamental, they have in common the assumption of
these basic biological capacities which permit sui generis analysis at non-
biological levels. Similarly, "structural" social theories such as these differ
from phenomenological sociology, including symbolic interactionism, in
the degree of social structural determination accorded to the content of
symbols, their integration into larger coherent systems, and thus the
importance of direct internalization. Taken for granted, however, is again
the purely facilitating nature of these underlying biological capacities.
Social theory has thus generally been conceived as having a relationship
with biology analogous to the relationship between biology and physics or
chemistry. Thus Sahlins writes of the example of the relationship
between gravity as a physical law and the biological process of natural
...gravity constitutes a limit to biological forms:
every stage in the life history of every species
has to conform to it, and any mutation that
might seek structurally to do otherwise does so
at its peril. But a limit is only a negative
determination; it does not positively specify
how the constraint is realized. Within the
limits of gravity, every stage of every species has
developed; hence such limits explain nothing of
the differentia specifica of life forms, but only
the failure of any of them to exceed certain
tolerances. Going still farther, it is possible to
say that physical or chemical properties, such as
gravity, are means employed by the biological
forms in the production of the organism
(1977,p.64, italics in original).
In exactly the same way it is argued that biological "laws" - such as those of
evolutionary biology - can explain nothing of the "differentia specifica" of
selection:
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human behaviour, merely that such laws provide basic conditions or, if
we wish to go farther, "means" for the organization of such behaviour at
higher levels. Thus whilst Sahlins is quite prepared to grant that "cultural
life must conform to natural laws" (p.65), this is immediately qualified as
follows:
But a law of nature stands to a fact of culture
only as a limit does to a form, a constant to a
difference, and a matrix to a practice. It will
never be possible to explain the cultural
properties of any such fact by referring to the
underlying contents of a different order (p.66).
He then concludes:
How then does biology figure in culture? In the
least interesting ways as a set of natural limits
on human functioning (p.66).
Sahlins thus captures the essence of the social scientific position on
human biology. Of course social theory must recognize the existence of
biological constraints - principally the possession of symbolic and
internalizing faculties - but this should impinge no more on the nature of
the explanation sought than the recognition that social life is constrained
by the laws of gravity. Once the social theorist has recognized the facts that
human beings can use symbolic language, internalize normative culture
and do not fly around randomly in space, the theoretical enterprise can
proceed untroubled any further by the concerns of evolutionary biologists
and physicists.
52
But what precisely is the nature of the constraint which biology is thought
by social theorists to impose upon higher orders of explanation, and what
exactly can this constraint tell us about the specifics of any particular case?
The social theorist who has perhaps dealt most fully with this question is
Claude Levi-Strauss. Because Levi-Strauss' views on the matter are clearly
articulated, and because his view travels as far down the biological road as
the assumptions of conventional social theory will allow, it is worth
spending a little time on his argument, as it nicely illustrates the radical
distinction which social theory inevitably makes between nature and
culture.
Levi-Strauss begins his answer to this question with the familiar assertion
that what distinguishes humans from animals, and hence the study of
human societies from animal societies, is the human (ultimately
biological) capacity for symbolic communication. Following de Saussure's
fundamental distiction between the signifier and signified (1983), and his
assertion that the relationship between the two is ultimately arbitrary,
Levi-Strauss develops a theory of culture in which the elements are
formally equivalent to the elements of a language (Levi-Strauss 1966).
Thus, culture - defined by Levi-Strauss, as by others - as that which is
particular, and hence not part of universal biology, (Levi-Strauss 1969,
Ch.l), is conceived as a system of signification in which the signs bear an
entirely arbitrary relationship to that which they signify. Like language,
the elements of culture derive their meaning, for Levi-Strauss, not from
any necessary relationship with that which they represent, but from their
relationships with other signs as part of a total system of signification.
This is the synchronic aspect of culture. Levi-Strauss argues, then, that the
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actual signs which constitute cultural systems - such as totemism, kinship
systems and myths - could have been other than they actually are, in
exactly the same way as for a word; convention alone dictates that in a
particular context one is obliged to refer to a pink animal with four legs
and a twisted tail as a "pig", and not anything else.
In this respect, Levi-Strauss* argument does not differ essentially from the
general social scientific position that the contents of culture need to be
understood sui generis. Where he goes further than most, however, is in
the degree of attention he pays to the underlying biological capacities to
use and manipulate symbolic relationships. Whilst most social theorists
are prepared to accept these as a basic condition of their analysis, Levi-
Strauss makes it a fundamental purpose of his analysis to explore the
extent to which the characteristics of the biological human brain
determine the nature of culture. This very enterprise appears to be
founded on a paradox: we have seen that for Levi-Strauss the content of
cultural categories is, like de Saussure's conception of the linguistic
signifier, arbitrary. How then can culture be both arbitrary and determined
by the organic nature of the human brains which facilitate it?
The answer provided by Levi-Strauss is that since human brains
everywhere share basic symbolic faculties - that is, the capacity to make
and maintain connections between arbitrary signifiers (binary logic) - these
underlying principles should be present in all products of human mental
activity everywhere. Despite the variety in cultural contents, which are
arbitrary - and in Levi-Strauss' view rooted ultimately in the materialist
dialectic of the specific milieu - the underlying structural principles of any
54
particular cultural phenomenon must be the same. The important point
to notice is that, as a reading of some of Levi-Strauss' actual analyses
makes clear (eg Levi-Strauss 1966), the structural priciples in question are
fundamentally algebraic transformations of structure. In this way, cultural
contents remain arbitrary and essentially relative, whilst all cultures
everywhere are said to display a common set of structural transformative
principles.'
Whether or not Levi-Strauss is successful in demonstrating the common
structural properties of diverse cultures has been a much debated issue
(see Leach 1970), but the adequacy of his account in this respect is not at
issue here. What is of great importance to the argument I am developing
is that even an apparently extreme reductionist argument like that
advanced by Levi- Strauss, which explains the structure of human culture
in terms of the universal architecture of the human brain, retains the
fundamental assumption of the arbitrary, that is, sui generis, nature of the
contents of culture. In other words, the meaning of cultural symbols (that
is, the signifieds to which they are arbitrarily connected) has nothing
whatever to do with biology; they relate instead to an entirely different
(non-biological) order.
The Social Basis of Motivation
I wish now to broaden the foregoing discussion of the non-biological basis
of social scientific explanation, to consider the exact implications which
' Particularly clear secondary accounts of the details of Levi-Strauss' argument may be
found in, for example, Leach (1970), and Badcock (1975).
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this has for the motivation of action. It is important at this stage to
emphasise that by the "motivation of action" I mean the directed use of
physical or mental energy. My reasons for employing this definition will
become clear later in the chapter, but for the time being let me stress that
this does not confine motivated action to actions which are the outcome
of intention{although this will obviously be important). Rather, I mean to
emphasise merely that motivated action involves the expenditure of
energy in some specific ways as opposed to others. In this way, I
distinguish motivated actions only from the logical category of random
actions, which, by definition, involve the expenditure of energy in ways
which have no explanation.
In terms of this definition, it can be seen that conventional social theory
necessarily gives an account of motivation in terms of non-biological
orders. This is because the assumption of non-biological sui generis levels
of analysis inevitably invloves the assumption of causal connections
between these levels of analysis and the specific doings of individual
actors. Put more basically, if it is legitimate to analyse social behaviour as
forming part of a larger independent system (broadly conceived), which
has its own properties and processes, and is distinct from other such
systems, then because this system only exists by dint of specific actions
being performed by specific individuals, it is necessary to assume that such
actions are causally determined by that system. This recognition is made
explicit, again in the works of Talcott Parsons:
The prerequisite of adequate motivation gives
us one of the primary starting points for
building up the concepts of role and of
institutionalization. Fundamentally the
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problem is, will the personalities developed
within a social system, at whatever stage in the
life cycle, "spontaneously" act in such ways as to
fulfill the functional prerequisites of the social
systems of which they are parts, or is it necessary
to look for mechanisms, that is, modes of
organization of the motivational systems of
personalities, which can be understood in direct
relation to the socially structured level or role
behavior? The older "psychological" view that
societies are resultants of the independently
determined "traits" of individuals would take
the first alternative. The modern sociological
view tends to emphasize the second (Parsons,
1951 p.31).
Although perhaps less explicit, no less of an assumption of the non-
biological origins of motivation exists in the self-conscious disavowal of
the structural and systemic properties of social action found amongst
symbolic interactionists (see, for example, Blumer 1969). Here action is
thought less to be determined by the involvement of the actor in formal
concrete sui generis systems, but more by the self-reflective manipulation
and interpretation of meaningful symbols. But precisely because such
symbols are only meaningful because they belong to a non-biologically
constituted system of arbitrary signification, which therefore has an
existence of its own, motivation must once again be considered to
determined by non-biological demands.
In effect, the social scientific requirement of treating motivation as a
means by which the processes and dynamics of normative and symbolic
systems are played out, denudes the concept of motivation of any real
significance. One indication that this fact is beginning to be explicitly
realized by social theorists can be found in Anthony Giddens' discussion
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of motivation in his major theoretical work, The Constitution of Society
(1984). In this he writes:
I distinguish the reflexive monitoring and
rationalization of action from its motivation. If
reasons refer to the grounds of action, motives
refer to the wants which prompt it. However,
motivation is not as directly bound up with the
continuity of action as are its reflexive
monitoring or rationalization. Motivation
refers to potential for action rather than the
mode in which it is chronically carried on by the
agent. Motives tend to have a direct purchase
on action only in relatively unusual
circumstances, situations which in some way
break with the routine (p.6).
In this passage Giddens explicitly replaces a concern with the motivation
of action with its routinization. Effectively, in terms of my definition, he
is saying that actions are motivated principally by habit. It is true that he
he says that such habit is. an essential requirement of the (presumably
biologically based) personality, but crucially, this is qualified by the claim
that its specific content is integral to the institutions of society:
Routine is integral both to the continuity of the
personality of the agent, as he or she moves
along the paths of daily activities, and to the
institutions of society, which are such only
through their continued reproduction (1984
P-60).
In this way, all that can be said to be biologically motivated is the
formation of habits. To understand the content of such habits however,
we need to understand the exact constitution of the social institutions
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whose "reproduction" the habits in question serve. 2 Motivation,
therefore, insofar as it refers to the specific direction in which energy is
expended - that is, to the content of actions, and not merely to action itself
- is in Giddens' formulation a function of the specific institutional milieu
of the actor.
We may summarize the implications of sociological analysis for the
motivation of action as follows: biology supplies the general conditions
for motivated action, whilst the particular social milieu (however it is
conceived by the various formulations) supplies the specific contents of
any actual instance of motivated action.
Motivation and the "Cultural" Biologists
It should not be thought, however, that this fundamental separation of
the capacity for motivated action, and the nature of specific motivations is
restricted to conventional sociological analyses. On the contrary, similar
assumptions, albeit cloaked in deceptively Darwinian language, have been
made by a number of seemingly orthodox modern evolutionary biologists,
evidently dissatisfied with the empirical shortcomings of the
sociobiological analysis of culture (eg Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981,
Cloak 1975, Boyd & Richerson 1985, Dawkins 1989). For the purposes of
illustration, and before moving on to an analysis of this understanding of
2 This assumption of the basic need for habit formation, irrespective of the contents of such
habits, is nicely illustrated by Giddens' use of Bruno Bettelheim's account of life in a
prisoner of war camp in which the tendency of older prisoners to ape their captors is seen as
an evidence of such habit formation.(Giddens 1984,pp60-64).
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motivation, I wish to offer a brief discussion of one such model, namely
Richard Dawkins' concept of the "meme" (Dawkins 1989, Ch,ll).
Dawkins begins his introduction of the concept of the "meme" with the
»
standard social scientific claim that humans are different from animals
because they possess "culture". He then asserts that "cultural transmission
is analogous to genetic transmission in that, although basically
conservative, it can give rise to a form of evolution" (1989 p.189). What is
crucial about this is that cultural transmission is seen as "analogous" to
biological evolution. His principal justification for this assertion is that
units of culture share with genes the basic property which permits
evolution to occur, that is, they are replicators. These units of culture are
what he terms "memes", and like genes, although crucially,
independently from the influence of genes, they either spread or die out
depending on the degree of success they display in making replicas of
themselves. As an example, consider the following:
Consider the idea of God. We do not know how
it arose in the meme pool. Probably it originated
many times by independent 'mutation'. In any
case, it is very old indeed. How does it replicate
itself? By the spoken and written word, aided by
great music and great art. Why does it have
such high survival value? Remember that
'survival value' here does not mean value for a
gene in a gene pool, but value for a meme in a
meme pool. The survival value of . the god
meme in the meme pool results from its great
psychological appeal. (1989, p.193).
Dawkins, and this is perhaps where his analysis is most surprising, is quite
explicit that he does not mean to reduce "psychological appeal" to
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"biological advantage", hence ultimately explaining the presence of a
meme by its genetically adaptive significance (as was the case with
Lumsden & Wilson's "culturgen" examined in the last chapter). In fact
the very idea of an analogous process of mutation in the meme pool
precludes this possibility because, by definition, mutation is random and
so must have an equal probability of emerging in any human brain.
Equally, because the spread of mutant memes is held to be determined
only by the qualities of the meme itself (exactly as with genes) it would be
impossible to argue simultaneously that some human brains are more
likely than others to adopt a particular meme. The following example
illustrates graphically that the contents of Dawkins' memes are quite
independent of genetic influence:
A gene for celibacy is doomed to failure in the
gene pool, except under very special
circumstances such as we find in the social
insects. But still, a meme for celibacy can be
successful in the meme pool (1989, p.198).
By advancing this process of "meme selection" Dawkins is doing nothing
less than removing the content of human actions from the sphere of
biology, and thus, in terms of motivation, is advancing an argument
identical to that of conventional social theory. Of course his insistence
that memes follow patterns of development formally equivalent to
genetic natural selection, would probably be regarded as rather simplistic
and naive by most social theorists, as would his contention that unitary
"pieces" of culture can be isolated. Neverthelss, by arguing for a strictly
analogous relationship between the processes of genetic and cultural
evolution, Dawkins is quite explicitly endorsing the sui generis analysis of
human social behaviour, and its consequent isolation from biological
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motivation. Ironically, the most radical of gene-selctionists, turns out to
be a sociological determinist, par excellence.
Evolution and the Motivation of Action
In what remains of this chapter, I wish to subject to scrutiny, the
assumptions about the motivation of action which I have outlined so far.
To recapitulate, the essence of the conventional social scientific position as
I have represented it, is that whilst human beings of course possess
fundamental biological capacities which facilitate motivated action, these
capacities tell us nothing about the content of the actions which they are
motivated to perform. Insofar as motivated action may be considered as
the expenditure of energy in specific ways, we may say that, from this
point of view, motivation must be considered an exclusively social or
cultural phenomenon; that is, as determined by essentially non-biological
factors. Biology is to the motivation of action as the engine of the motor
car is to the journey: it is, to be sure, a necessary prerequisite, but a
knowledge of its nature, no matter how detailed and accurate, could never
tell us the car's destination.
A consideration, however, of the processes by which the facilitating
biological capacities came into being, suggests that this convenient
separation may not be as justified as its proponents would wish to believe.
Action, as even the most hard-line social theorists willingly accept,
depends upon physiology. In particular human action, as we are so
frequently told, depends upon the unique architecture of the human
brain, as it is this which permits the uniquely human activites of symbolic
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communication and thought, and the internalization of normative
culture. But what is the origin of this unique organ? It is unlikely that
even our sociological hard-liners would wish to dissent from the view
that it came about as the result of thousands of generations of natural
selection.3 To be precise, to the best of our knowledge, the human brain,
with all its unique "capacities" came about in accordance with the
evolutionary principles outlined in chapter one; namely, that the genes
which prescribed its development spread and dominated the gene pool
because they were relatively more successful than others in making copies
of themselves. In other words, genes for human brains ultimately
survived because they produced phenotypic effects in their bearers which
enhanced their inclusive fitness.
The question to which we are now finally forced, is, to what extent can the
attributes accorded to human brains by social scientists, be said to
constitute a sufficient selective advantage to explain their evolution? Put
more directly, and in the context of motivation, to what extent can the
capacity to to be motivated, that is, to expend energy in specific, but
biologically arbitrary ways, be said to constitute a sufficient selective
advantage for the evolution of the human brain? My own view of the
matter, and one which I believe follows inextricably from an
understanding of the process of natural selection, is that such an
assumption denies the very possibility of its evolution.
3Although, amusingly enough, Anthony Giddens appears to think that Darwinism has
had its day in the natural sciences, whilst still being of use to social scientists (Giddens
1984, p.231).
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To see why this is so, it is necessary to return briefly to the argument
outlined in chapter one. There I emphasised that the process of natural
selection must be considered in teleological (or teleonomic) terms; that is,
the effects which a gene has for its own reproduction, are causally related
to its own existence in the species' genome. For example, the genes
underwriting the human heart owe their existence to that fact that the
phenotype they produced (ie, actual functioning hearts), was relatively
advantageous (ultimately in terms of inclusive fitness) to those
individuals who possessed it. What is essential about this example,
however, is that it is the specific effects of the heart which are responsible
for its existence in the genome. If, on the other hand, the heart was an
organ merely with the capacity to perform in the way it does, but which
did not actually do this, there would obviously be no selective advantage
attached to it whatsoever, and so it could not evolve.
The point I am making here is that because evolution is an ultimately
teleological process, that is, is fuelled by effects, mere potentialities cannot
evolve. Returning to the case of human behaviour, it makes no sense to
say, therefore, that human capacities for internalization, symbolic
communication etc. evolved by natural selection. Rather it is necessary to
say that the capacities in question evolved because they produced specific
adaptively advantageous effects for the inclusive fitness of the individuals
who possessed them. The problem which is therefore posed by the
conventional social scientific conception of motivation is clear: if the
biological nature of human capacities can tell us nothing about the specific
contents of the actions which they facilitate - which are, biologically
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speaking arbitrary - it is impossible to assume that the capacities in
question came about by natural selection.
This is not to say that the directed (that is, motivated) expenditure of
energy needs to be determined entirely from within the organism,
however. One very obvious example where this is not the case, is
photosynthesis in plants. Here the capacity to photosynthesise is all that is
genetically determined; the action of performing photosynthesis, which
has a determinate effect on whether the plant in question reproduces, is
consequent upon the presence of an environmental factor, namely
sunlight. What is crucial about this situation, and that which separates it
from the case of human action, is that the environmental motivator (as it
were) - sunlight - pre-exists the genetically determined capacity to
photosynthesise. Thus, if there was no sunlight present when the first
plants with the genetic mutations underwriting the capacity to
photosynthesise emerged, then no photosynthesis would have taken
place, and so the capacity would not have evolved.
What all of this means for the case of human action, is that for culture
(broadly understood) to be the primary motivtor of action, as conventional
social theory claims, it would have needed to have existed prior to
emergence of the physiological apparatus which facilitates it. In other
words, if the contents of human actions are determined by variously
conceived sui generis social factors, then these factors would have had to
be already in existence when the first biological capacities to be motivated
by them emerged. Moreover, they would have needed to possess a
content which not merely motivated action, but which motivated actions
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whose contents had adaptively advantageous effects for the inclusive
fitness of the actors in question. The difficulty with this is obvious: as
these motivating factors cannot have an existence independently of
human agency, then they cannot have existed prior to the emergence of
the biological apparatus which facilitates human agency.
Even if this logical obstacle could be overcome - which it could not - there
remains the evolutionary problem of explaining the stability of a
motivationally neutral population. Essentially what this means is that
such theories implicitly assume the presence of genetic predispositions for
behavioural manipulation. As soon, however, as one mutant gene
emerged in the population which conferred even a slightly advantageous
motivational bias to its bearer, this gene would be the subject of enormous
positive selective pressures.
Of course these objections apply just as strongly to Dawkins' ( and the
other "cultural biologists'") attempt to understand culture, as they do to
conventional social theory. His suggestion that memes bear a strictly
analogous relationship with genes leads to exactly the same radical
separation of the capacity for motivation from the contents of motivated
actions. Indeed, Dawkins' formulation is, astonishingly, even more
explicit in this respect, in that he claims that "we do not even have to posit
a genetic advantage in imitation" (Dawkins 1989, p.200), which is held to
be the principal capacity involved in meme replication.
It is I think possible to see that in the light of our knowledge of the
evolutionary process, the conventional reliance on motivational plasticity
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simply will not do. To begin with the assumption that the actual content
of motivation can be understood as wholly independent of the capacity to
be motivated, is to implicitly deny the possibility of the involvement of
biological apparatus in human action, and hence to allow the explanation
of action to collapse into metaphysics. In reaching this conclusion, I must
emphasise that I am doing no more than following Sahlins' advice that
"cultural life must conform to natural laws" (1977, p.65; see p.44 above),
but have simply traced the implications of "natural laws" for "cultural
life" to their logical conclusion.
The Paradox
If the arguments I have advanced so far are accepted, it should now be
clear that a consideration of the principles of evolutionary biology
introduces a paradox into the explanation of human behaviour. Such
behaviour cannot be explained in terms of its adaptive significance as the
sociobiologists would wish, because, very simply, it is too diverse, prone to
variation and apt to be injurious to the inclusive fitness of the individuals
in whom it is displayed. At the same time, however, theories which, by
their logical separation of the biological ability to act, from the contents of
actions, manage to offer empirically compelling accounts of human
behavioural diversity, cannot be sustained when the implications of
evolutionary biology are fully considered.
The conclusion to which we are therefore drawn is that the only
satisfactory account of human behaviour is one which is able to account
for the contents of actions in evolutionary biological terms, whilst at the
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same time, taking full recognition of the fact that human action is diverse,
and perhaps more to the point, is often maladaptive. On the face of it, this
enterprise sounds quite evidently contradictory: if an action is motivated
in accordance with evolved mechanisms, such mechanisms could only
have evolved by motivating actions which are relatively advantageous to
the inclusive fitness of their bearers, and so cannot simultaneously be held
to motivate those which are not. Further consideration, however, reveals
that this situation is not as paradoxical as at first it appears. It is to the
solution of this paradox that I now wish to turn.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Evolution, Psychology and the Motivation of Action
To see that the paradox on which I concluded the last chapter is really
nothing of the kind, it is necessary to briefly return to an argument
outlined in chapter one. Here, it will be recalled, I emphasised that an
important reason why the charge of "Panglossian optimism" is not an
appropriate objection to evolutionary theory, is the phenomenon of "time
lags" (ppl6-17 above). Essentially, this refers to the fact that environments
can change at a quicker rate than organisms can evolve, and so it is quite
possible that an organism could display a genetically based trait which is
maladaptive in the environment in which it is observed, but which was
adaptive in the environment for which it evolved. In principle, this fact
means that even "fatal" genes - that is, those which prevent their own
reproduction - could be explained in terms of inclusive fitness theory if it
could be shown that they produced an adaptive phenotype in some
previous environment. Obviously such a situation would be
evolutionarily unstable, and could not be expected to obtain for long
without either the selection of appropriate mutations, or as would be
most likely in such a case, extinction. More frequently, however, time lags
can be expected to account for phenotypes which are not wholly "fatal",
but which display insufficient adaptive function to account for their
selection; the less diminution in adaptive function the changed
environment produces, the longer the adaptation in question is likely to
survive. What this fact compels us to remember, however, is that
evolution is most certainly not a spent force, whose completed work we
may now retrospectively examine. On the contrary, evolution continues
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even, perhaps especially, as environments change, and will continue long
after our current examinations of its consequences to date are complete.
Clearly, consideration of the effects of time lags in evolutionary
explanations is an enormously complicating factor. What it first of all
suggests is that it is inadequate to confine our examination of the
evolutionary significance of any observed trait to its currently observed
effects. Rather, we should be concerned with the consequences of this trait
in the environment for which it evolved. The difficulty with this is that,
depending upon the species and trait in question, data on this may be
sparse and inaccurate, and rarely will have been subjected to the rigorous
scrutiny which a complete analysis of evolutionary significance would
demand.
A second implication of this, and one which complicates matters
considerably, is that the environmental changes may affect the nature of
the trait itself. This is because to speak of a "genetically determined" trait
is in fact somewhat misleading, in that in reality genes and environments
interact to produce phenotypes. The word "environment" is of course
used here in a rather loose sense, to include both the external
environment, and the internal environment of the organism, but it is
clear that both are crucial to the ontogenetic development of a particular
trait. A basic example of this effect would be plants which grow in
inadequately lit places, and as a result grow long and spindly, and so have
abnormally weak stems. The weakness of the stem is a trait which must
be attributed to genetic determinants, which dictate how the plant will
interact with various environments, and to the absence of the
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environment which would produce an adaptive response. In other
words, an environmental change has occurred which changes the nature
of the phenotype, without affecting the genotype. Yet the explanation of
the effect, which is maladaptive, must still be given in genetic and
ultimately adaptive terms. This is because even though the response was
maladaptive, it still took place because the plant possessed genetic
determinants which caused a particular response to a particular
environment, and the possession and nature of these genetic
determinants are as they are because they were subject to the normal
evolutionary process. The proof of this lies in the fact that had the genetic
determinants been different, the environment in question would have
interacted differently with the genetic material of the plant to produce a
different response.
Sociobiology or Evolutionary Psychology?
Whilst all of this may be of limited significance for the case of plants,
when the same reasoning is applied to the case of human behaviour it is
clear that the implications are very great indeed. No-where do we find so
perfect an example of the operation of time lags than in the evolution of
human behaviour. Here is a situation in which the entirety of recorded
history constitutes a period of evolutionary time - perhaps five hundred
generations - in which none but the most superficial genetic evolutionary
changes could occur. Contrasted with this, are the two million years or so
of pre-historic human evolution, in which our primal ancestors lived a
predominantly hunter-gatherer existence.
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It follows from this and the foregoing argument, that it is therefore quite
wrong to assume that behaviour observed in modern human beings
should have currently adaptive consequences. What this means, then, is
that the paradox on which I ended the last chapter need not be such when
the crucial factor of the environment is brought into consideration. This
is because since genetic adaptations only manifest their effects in certain
environments - specifically those for which they evolved - the absence of
the environment in question is likely to have a detrimental effect upon
the manifestation of the adaptive phenotype. At the same time, however,
this recognition allows us, in principle, to pursue an analysis of the
maladaptive trait along adaptive genetic lines. What this means for
human action is that the motivation of maladaptive or novel actions
which, as we have seen, could not be explained by sociobiological
approaches, can still be accounted for in evolutionary terms, and without
recourse to the logically and empirically unacceptable assumptions of
conventional social theory.
To see precisely how this principle offers a solution to the paradox, it is
helpful to make a distiction between the approach of "sociobiology", as
already discussed, and "evolutionary psychology". Fundamental to this
distinction is the way in which each approach conceptualizes exactly what
it is that evolves. For the first it is behaviour; that is, the actual concrete
actions of the organism in question. For the second, the view which I am
advocating here, it is psychological mechanisms. At first sight this
distinction seems rather dubious; after all, have I not been insisting from
the beginning that evolution is fuelled by consequences, that is, the actual
behaviour of the organism in question? This is perfectly true, but further
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consideration reveals that to say that actual behaviour determines the
evolution of a trait is, in fact, quite different from saying that behaviour is
the trait which evolves. As the arguments advanced so far in this chapter
make clear, what evolves are genes which, under certain environmental
conditions, produce phenotypes which have beneficial effects for the
inclusive fitness of the bearers of these genes. In behavioural terms, what
evolves are genes which, under certain environmental conditions,
produce behaviour which is adaptive. The fundamental point therefore is
that there is nothing about the genes which guarantees that the adaptive
behaviour will develop, since the genes merely produce the physiological
apparatus which under the right conditions produce this behaviour.
It is important to emphasise that this formulation is fundamentally
different from the social scientific position outlined in the last chapter.
What I am definitely not saying is that the environment motivates action.
As I have already argued, were this the case then the apparatus in question
could not have evolved. What I am saying is that, in accordance with the
fundamental principles of natural selection, the motivation of action
cannot be treated as separate from the apparatus which permits it, and. so
the nature of both must have evolved in accordance these principles.
Since motivated action takes place in an environment, however, and
more exactly in response to environmental events, dramatic changes in
the nature of these events will undoubtedly have implications for the
actions which are thereby motivated. To be specific, such a formulation
assumes that there is a finite repertoire of possible responses to the
environment, which were adaptively appropriate in the environment of
evolutionary adaptedness, but which in the absence of the evolution of
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new responses, continue to be called forth by features of the new
environment.
Quite clearly, since the environmental features which elicit motivated
actions are different from those for which the motivations in question
evolved, the consequences will not necessarily be adaptive. But equally
important is the fact that motivational responses to novel environments
are not random. This is because to assume that a given action has an
equal chance of being motivated in response to any enviromnent, is to fall
into exactly the same trap as conventional social theory, namely, to
divorce the content of an action from the evolution of its facilitating
biological apparatus, and thus implicitly deny the possibility of the
evolution of that apparatus. On the contrary, motivated actions which
are elicited by novel evironments can only be assumed to be so elicited
because of some similarity between the novel environmental feature and
the evolutionary environmental feature in response to which the
motivation evolved.
It is the nature of this essential similarity between the current
environment and the environment of evolutionary adaptedness which, I
suggest, justifies analysis at the level of psychological mechanisms. To
appreciate why this is so, it is necessary to consider precisely what it means
to say that the two environments bear a similarity with each other. Again,
this may seem a rather dubious point, particularly since so far I have
argued that maladaptive behaviour need not present a problem for
evolutionary explanations when environmental differences are
considered. The point I am making, however, is not that the two
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environments are objectively similar, in the sense of eliciting motivations
which would prove adaptive in either case, but rather they are similar
from the point of view of the motivational system of the individual
concerned. In other words, the motivational system, or more simply, the
mind of the individual, responds to the novel environment as though it
was responding to the environment of evolutionary adaptedness. This is
for the very simple reason that it has not yet evolved responses to any
other environment and so has no option, as it were, but to treat features
of the modern environment as though they are the features of the
evolutionary environment which they most resemble.
The point I am attempting to make can be seen best by considering the
analogy of blindfolding a competent typist, arbitrarily altering the order of
the typewriter keys, and then asking the typist to type a well-known
passage. Obviously, the result will be the production of a random series of
letters. The motivation, however, that is, the expenditure of energy in
particular ways as opposed to others (pressing certain keys in a certain
order) remains the same, and although in the changed environment of
randomly altered keys, the observed outcome is random nonsense, the
motivated action (the keys which are actually pressed) is far from random,
and indeed quite explicable in terms of the original environment. To
pursue this analogy a little further, and in illustration of my point about
the similarity of environments, we may say that the new environment of
altered keys, is similar to the old environment of the standard keyboard,
in that whilst they are of course crucially different in terms of effects, the
closest thing to the new keyboard in the original environment of the typist
is the old, standard keyboard, and so the typist, lacking any "adaptations"
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for the new environment (i.e. knowledge that the order of the keys is
different), behaves as though they are in the old environment, and
presses the keys that would have led to the desired effect.
What this anaolgy illustrates is that the crucial determinant of the
similarity between the two environments is the nature of the
motivational system of the actor. In the most abstract sense,
environmental similarity is determined by the interpretative processes of
the actor; to return to our analogy, the typist interpreted two different
environments as the same, and on that basis performed the actions they
did. However, what must be remembered is that the interpretative
processes of the actor are part and parcel of the evolved mental apparatus,
and so must operate in an evolutionarily directed fashion. In other words,
the capacity for interpretation can only have evolved to be selective, and
so novel environments must elicit the responses they do because of
certain evolved (and thus, ultimately adaptive) innate rules or principles
of interpretation.
It may of course be objected that this application of the concept of
interpretation fails to recognize the uniqueness of this specifically human
activity. But to make this objection, is to once again fall into the trap of
failing to recognize that the biological apparatus which permits this
unique ability evolved by natural selection. Insofar as all behavioural
adaptations involve biased responses to particular environments - which
of course they must to be adaptations at all - it is permissable to say, in an
abstract sense, that all organisms interpret their environments. This is
certainly not to deny that different species evolve quite different means by
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which this is achieved, and that the human method is probably by far the
most complex. But insofar as evolutionary theory forces us to recognize
that all behaviour is evolutionarily biased behaviour, and that all
behaviour is environmentally specific, it is essential to realize that the
admittedly great differences in species-specific mechanisms, are
fundamentally quantitative rather than qualitative.
What all of this amounts to, is that human resposes to environments (like
those of all other species) must be considered meaningful, that is, carried
out because the environment has some significance for the actor. But
unlike the usual sociological formulation of this, both the content of the
meanings which actions have, and the processes by which certain
environments are given certain meanings are evolved biological givens,
and not arbitrarily imposed cultural imperatives. In other words, action
must be seen as the motivated signifier of a biological signified, rather
than the arbitrary signifier of a cultural signified. This suggests not
merely that the evolved human mind should become the centre of focus -
evolutionary psychology - but it suggests that the mind we are looking for,
and the world it creates, are of a very specific kind.
Evolutionary Psychology: Reductio ad Absurdum?
Before turning to a consideration of precisely what kind this is, I wish to
say something about the objections which are commonly raised against
the kind of reductive analysis which I am advocating, and in the process,
help to clarify further exactly why I propose to take this as my level of
analysis. It is often argued, as part of the sociological concern with sui
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generis analysis at the level of the social, that to reduce explanations to the
level of individual psychology is to do precisely the opposite of that which
I am advocating, and fail entirely to account for the meaningful nature of
human conduct. One version of this, and one which is essentially a
philosophical rendering of the central assumptions of conventional social
theory, is Marjorie Grene's critique of what she takes to be the
sociobiological conception of mind (Grene, 1978). Here Grene defines the
mind by means of a quotation from A.J.P.Kenny:
"To have a mind" Kenny writes, "is to have the
capacity to acquire the ability to operate with
symbols, in such a way that it is one's own
activity that makes them symbols and confers
meaning upon them" [Kenny and others, 1973,
p.47] (Grene 1978, p.214).
Grene then goes on to clarify the terms of this:
The word symbols here refers to artifactual
entities, assigned by convention to assume
certain roles in the social practices of their users;
and the word activity here means responsible
activity, characteristic of the kind of center of
action that can do right or wrong, be praised or
blamed (ibid, italics in original).
It is very clear from this, that the mind is understood in this analysis as
exactly the same in all crucial respects to that assumed by conventional
social theorists. That is, the mind is the "capacity to acquire the ability to
operate with symbols", whilst the symbols themselves are entirely
"artifactual" and "assigned by convention to assume certain roles". In
other words, the contents of the mind, understood as the fundamental
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meaning or significance of its products, are extrinsic to the biological
nature of its capacities, and are determined by arbitrary social convention.
It is this assumption which, Grene argues, demands the essentially non-
biological analysis of mind. She thus concludes her paper, following a
passage from Sahlins:
...it is, again, the capacity to acquire the ability to
enter into just such symbol-constituting and
symbol-constituted activities that is definitive of
mind and so renders mind, like culture,
irreducible to its biological and in particular to
its genetic conditions (Grene, 1978, p.224).
It is important at this point to consider precisely what it means to say that
mind cannot be reduced to "its biological and in particular to its genetic
conditions". Evidently, Grene is here failing to distinguish between
ultimate and proximate causation as they figure in evolutionary
explanations (see ch.l above ). To briefly repeat the distinction, ultimate
explanations refer to the adaptive significance of the trait in question, that
is, to the effects which led to the evolution of the trait; proximate
explanations on the other hand, refer to the immediate physiological
mechanisms by which the trait comes about. In the case of the present
example, it is clearly quite correct for Grene to argue that the activities of
the mind cannot be reduced to its proximate determinants. Comparing
modern sociobiology with Hobbes' attempt to "assimilate 'moral' into
'natural' philosophy", Grene writes:
It was a bold attempt and most unpopular, since
like sociobiology it aimed at the reduction of all
standards, purposes or duties - all to which we
owe allegiance - to the blind bombardment of
particles by one another (ibid, p.218).
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The difficulty, of course, is that "the blind bombardment of particles by one
another", even if an accurate picture of human brain activity (which it is
not), is a proximate and not an ultimate explanation of mental activity. As
such, it must itself be reducible to a further level of explanation, namely
that of ultimate causation. All that proximate causes tell us about a
phenomenon, is how it works, and not why it works in the way it does.
Thus, in the case of mental activity, the most neurophysiology (which is
what Grene is really talking about) could explain, for instance, about
uttering a particular sentence on a particular occasion, is the physiological
changes which have to occur in order for that utterance to be made. To
understand why the utterance was made, that is its motivation, it is
necessary to appeal to an ultimate explanation. That is to say, it is
necessary to pose the question, what was the adaptive significance of the
neurophysiological mechanism which was responsible for that utterance
being made on that occasion in the environment of evolutionary
adaptedness? Or, in the terms of the foregoing discussion, why did it pay
the genetic ancestors of the individual in question to interpret certain
features of their environment in such a way that this action was prompted
on its basis?
What this suggests is not that biological explanations of mind should be
abandoned, but, on the contrary, ultimate biological explanations are the
only admissable explanation of mind. Only by making the assumption,
made by Grene in common with conventional social theorists, that the
contents of the mind are ultimately arbitrary, is it possible to avoid this
conclusion, and, as I have repeatedly stressed, this assumption is
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impossible to sustain. Also neatly demonstrated by Grene's
misunderstanding, however, is the exact level to which we are justified in
requiring explanations to reduce. As I argued in chapter one, and
following unavoidably from modern evolutionary theory, ultimate
explanations can only ever be given in terms of relative success of the
genes which underwrite the trait in question. However, the unit whose
behaviour determines the success of any particular gene (because it is
determined by that gene) is, equally unavoidably, the individual
organism, or what Dawkins calls the gene's "vehicle" (Dawkins 1982,
1989). In this sense, then, ultimate explanations are inevitably and
exclusively concerned with the consequences of genetically determined
behaviour of whole individuals.
It would therefore be incorrect to seek ultimate explanation at the level of
neurophysiology, but would be equally fallacious to seek it at the level of
groups of individuals (as Grene's analysis seems to, and as sociological
analysis explicitly does). This is becuase, in the case of neurophysiology,
even if direct consequences of particular processes could be examined, the
genetic evolutionary consequences could not be known without reference
to the behaviour of the entire organism: genes for a perfectly functioning
heart will not spread, if the organism also possesses genes for self-
destruction at the point of reaching sexual maturity. Similarly, groups of
individuals constitute an environment in which specific actions of
individuals take place, and will to that extent exert an influence over the
evolutionary success of any individual action. But precisely because the
actions of other individuals are determined by their own genetic make-up,
and not that of the individual in question, the behaviour of these others
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cannot determine the spread of that individual's genes. Put another way,
other individuals do no more than to provide an environment in which
some individual actions will be more evolutionarily efficacious than
others. This, I should add, also includes the case of genetic relatives, for
even in this case, genes can only exert a direct influence over the
behaviour of the individual who bears them, whether this behaviour is
selected to be altruistic towards relatives or not.
From this reasoning it is clear that it is quite incorrect to seek ultimate
explanations of behaviour at any level other than the behaving organism,
whether this be at the neurophysiological or the sociocultural. Also
following from this, the argument that human action in modern
environments should be considered at a collective level because such
action produces remote consequences ("the unintended consequences of
action"), can be seen to be fallacious. This is because whilst the
consequences of actions are indeed often remote, and quite different from
what they would have been in the environment of evolutionary
adaptedness, this fact does not alter the motivation of the action, which as
we have seen, must be regarded as fundamentally biological. Thus, such
remote consequences must be treated as part of the logical category of the
environment, rather than as forming part of the action's motivation,
which is always individual, and hence amenable to ultimate evolutionary
explanation. In this way, remote consequences of actions will certainly
affect the outcome of the actions of others; but, what is essential to realize
in this connection, is that they do so indirectly, by affecting the
environment in which motivated individuals act, and so cannot be
treated as determinants of action in a motivational sense.
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Evolution, the Nature of Mind and the Meaning of Action
If, as the foregoing arguments suggest, we are correct in requiring
explanations of human behaviour to reduce to the biologically motivated
individual, the question which must now be addressed is, what precisely is
the nature of the mind which is thereby suggested? First of all, we can say
with certainty that we are not dealing with the sort of entity implicitly
assumed by most social theorists, or that stated explicitly, for example,by
Levi-Strauss, or by Marjorie Grene. Here, as we have seen, mind is
understood as a principally facilitating agency, which is crucially devoid of
all content. The content of the actions which it facilitates are arbitrary, and
hence only explicable with reference to exterior factors. Similarly, we can
be equally certain that we are not dealing with the entity proposed by the
sociobiological theorists discussed in chapter two. Here, by contrast, mind
does possess a biologically determined content, but is equated with
behaviour, and thus is assumed to operate in an environmental vacuum,
with the effect that behaviour which is not adaptive cannot be regarded as
behaviour and so can have no mental origin.
Suggested by the arguments presented here, however, is a model of mind
which, in contrast to the sociobiological model, actively interprets its
environment, but unlike the sociological model, interprets this
environment on the basis of a biologically determined set of meanings
which motivate specific actions. We know that the meanings which are
attributed to the environment must have had some adaptive significance
in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, as must the actions
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which are motivated on that basis. Thus, although the consequences of
actions performed in modern environments may be maladaptive, they
must possess a deep significance for the actor which would have
motivated adaptive actions in the original environment.
The mind, therefore, which these observations imply, must not only
contain a common biologically determined set of "deep" meanings, which
are attributed to features of the environment according to certain innate
adaptive principles, but must possess mechanisms linking these meanings
with the performance of specific actions. The implications of this is that
actions observed in a modern environment, which are clearly novel or
maladaptive, must be analysed in terms of their deep meaning or deep
content, and the mechanisms by which this is related to its manifest or
surface content. Only by analysing the link between the two levels, will it
be possible to give an adequate evolutionary account of the motivation of
action, whilst at the same time recognizing that actions do not neatly
reflect the predictions of crude and rigid biological determinism. Since,
however, such meanings and motivational mechanisms only exist in the
biological human mind, it is here that the analysis of the significance of
action must occur, if it is to avoid the various fallacious reductions which
I have discussed.
In the chapters which follow, therefore, I shall offer a detailed account of
the model of mind which I believe best meets these demands, and show
how its adoption provides the tool necessary for the adequate
evolutionary explanation of apparently inexplicable human actions. The
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model I have in mind is that advanced by classical psychoanalytic theory,
and it is to that I now wish to turn.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Biological Foundations of Psychoanalysis
Since Freud first advanced the fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis,
there has been no shortage of self-styled "Freudians", ready to adopt
and adapt these concepts, and to defend against vociferous critics such
unpopular concepts as the Oedipus complex, repression, penis-envy
and the unconscious. Similarly, there has been no shortage of critics,
who, with similar enthusiasm, have attempted to demolish
psychoanalysis from every angle, apparently stopping at nothing to
expose Freud and his followers as ludicrous charlatans and confidence
tricksters (see for example, Masson 1984; Eysenck, 1986). Yet there
seems to be one aspect of Freud's work, on which supporters and critics
have been firmly united: that is, that his speculations on the
evolutionary history of the human species range from the dubious to
the patently absurd. Writers as diverse as Hans Eysenck (1986) - who,
amongst his other questionable beliefs, thinks that Pavlov made a
greater contribution to understanding human psychology than Freud -
and Ernest Jones (1957), Freud's biographer and principal English
follower, are essentially at one in their rejection of Freud's
evolutionary claims. So strong has been the rejection of this particular
strand of Freud's work, that some analysts have gone so far as to
attempt to explain Freud's interest in evolutionary explanation in
psychoanalytic terms; E.R.Wallace (1983), for example, tries to account
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for the central argument of Totem and Taboo, in terms of Freud's own
father-conflict.1
It is perhaps not altogether surprising that the vast majority of Freud's
followers and (re) interpreters have chosen to draw a tactful veil over
his phylogenetic and anthropological speculations in general, and in
particular what Serge Moscovici (1985) calls "the black books of Dr
Freud".2 After all, Freud's biological thinking was based upon two
central premises, Haeckel's biogenetic law, and Lamarck's belief in the
inheritance of acquired characteristics (see Ch 1 above), which even in
his own life-time were generally known to be incorrect. Ernest Jones
reports having "begged" Freud to omit references to Lamarckian
inheritance in Moses and Monotheism because "no responsible
biologist regarded it as tenable any longer" (Jones, 1957, Vol. 3, p.313).
What is perhaps more surprising, however, is the absence - until very
recently - of any serious attempt to align psychoanalysis with a correct
understanding of evolutionary biology.
In part this omission must be related to Freud's own apparently
environmentalist bias. Freud was fond of emphasising the separation
of psychology from biology in his clinical writings, but usually it seems
for fear of the kind of neurophysiological reductionism discussed in
the previous chapter. He writes for example:
' Interestingly, Eysenck (1986) appears to agree with him, and thus performs the not
uncommon intellectual trick of using psychoanalytic theory to discredit psychoanalytic
theory.
2The "black books" are Totem and Taboo. The Future of an Illusion. Civilization and its
Discontents. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, and Moses and Monotheism.
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We have found it necessary to hold aloof
from biological considerations during our
psycho-analytic work and to refrain from
using them for heuristic purposes, so that we
may not be misled in our impartial
judgement of the psycho-analytic facts before
us (Freud, 1913b, S.E. 13, pp. 181 - 82).3
This is amplified, when he writes in his Introductory Lectures on
Psycho-analysis:
...psycho-analysis must keep itself free from
any hypothesis that is alien from it, whether
of an anatomical, chemical or physiological
kind, and must operate entirely with purely
psychological auxiliary ideas (Freud, 1916-17,
S.E.15, p.21).
It is true also that it was, in large measure, the biologism of such
notorious figures as Alfred Adler, G.Stanley Hall, and C.G.Jung which
led to their departure from the orthodox psychoanalytic movement. It
is important, however, to place these observations in perspective. The
importance of phylogenetic considerations in Freud's work cannot be
doubted, and indeed, as I shall go on to argue, are fundamental to a
coherent understanding of his theory; he insisted, however, that
consideration of such factors should not be achieved at the expense of
giving adequate weight to ontogenetic factors. For Freud, phylogeny
and ontogeny were simply two sides of the same problem:
I fully agree with Jung in recognizing the
existence of this phylogenetic heritage; but I
3 This arid all susequent references to the work of Sigmund Freud are taken from The
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. (S.E.), giving
volume and page number. The year refers to the date of original publication.
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regard it as a methodological error to seize on
a phylogenetic explanation before the
ontogenetic possibilities have been
exhausted. I cannot see any reason for
obstinately disputing the importance of
infantile prehistory while at the same time
freely acknowledging the importance of
ancestral prehistory. Nor can I overlook the
fact that phylogenetic motives and
productions themselves stand in need of
elucidation, and that in quite a number of
instances this is afforded by factors in the
childhood of the individual. And finally, I
cannot feel surprised that what was
originally produced by certain circumstances
in prehistoric times and was then
transmitted in the shape of a predisposition
to re-acquirement should, since
circumstances persist, re-emerge in the
experience of the individual (Freud, 1918,
S.E. 17, p.97).
It is clear therefore, that Freud's emphasis on ontogeny, which in part
resulted in his split with Jung, reflected not the kind of
environmentalist preoccupation of many of his successors, but a
particular understanding of the relationship between phylogeny and
ontogeny. As Frank Sulloway has put it:
As a committed psychobiologist in his
overall approach to the human mind, Freud
knew that proximate (that is, psychological
and physiological) as well as ultimate
(evolutionary) explanations were necessary
for a complete theoretical understanding of
the subject (1980, p.391).
It is precisely the nature of this understanding between proximate and
ultimate causation, which I propose to elaborate in this chapter, which
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secures the contribution of classical psychoanalytic theory to the
problems posed by modern evolutionary theory.
The general failure of psychoanalytic theorists to take seriously Freud's
attempts at ultimate-causal analysis, may also be related to the
therapeutic and generally ameliorative aims which psychoanalysis has
adopted. In part this is because evolutionary speculations seem
academic and remote from the perspective of the consulting room. But
perhaps more significant than this - and relevant to the not
inconsiderable use which social theorists have attempted to make of
psychoanalysis - are the apparent limits to optimism set by
phylogenetic factors. After all, pathological defences brought about by
harsh familial experiences, or by oppressive political regimes, could, by
therapeutic proceedures - individual or collective - in principle be
relieved. Concentration, however, upon the evolutionary history of
these defences, implies a constitutional factor, not so readily amenable
to environmental interference, and perhaps the acceptance of the
limits of human happiness. Freud was well aware of this fact, as is
show by a remark to a student in the 1930s:
My discoveries are not primarily a heal-
all...[They] are the basis for a very grave
philosophy. There are very few who
understand this, there are very few who are
capable of understanding this (Quoted in
Sulloway, 1980, p.439).
So dominant has this environmental emphasis been in the history of
psychoanalysis (although, as I shall show later, the last decade has
perhaps seen the beginning of a a reversal of this tendency) that it is
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tempting to regard that history as the final vindication of Freud's
contention that he had dealt the final blow to human narcissism: a
blow, it should be added, which was ducked by even his closest
followers. When the details of Freud's understanding of the
relationship between phylogeny and ontogeny are closely examined,
however, it becomes clear that such environmentalist developments
do not merely obscure the relevance of Freud's thought to modern
evolutionary biology, but allow psychoanalysis to fall into exactly the
same theoretical traps as the dominant traditions of twentieth century
social theory.
In this chapter, therefore, I wish to consider a number of key
developments within psychoanalytic theory, and in the light of these
emphasise how Freud's own formulation, informed as it was with a
flawed theory of evolutionary biology, nevertheless proposes a model
of the human mind fundamentally compatible with the theoretical
and empirical demands of modern evolutionary theory. In particular,
I wish to consider the implications of the environmental assumptions
underlying the formulations of the various neo-Freudian schools of
ego-psychology, British object-relations theory, and critical
psychoanalysis.
Ego-Psychology , Adaptation and the Source of Motivation
One of the most significant post-Freudian attempts to develop
psychoanalytic theory - especially from the point of view of theoretical
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sociology4 - was the emergence in the United States of "ego-
psychology". The principal figure in the development of this approach
was Heinz Hartmann, although Hartmann's approach is perhaps best
known through the work of Erik Erikson (e.g. Erikson, 1950). To the
reader familiar with the work of Hartmann (e.g. 1939, 1964) it may
appear somewhat surprising that I have chosen to begin my critique of
the environmental bias in psychoanalysis here. After all, in many
ways, Hartmann's work appears to be the most explicitly "Darwinian"
of all psychoanalysts', concerned as it is with the central problem of
"adaptation"(Hartmann 1939), whilst apparently retaining the essence
of Freud's formulation. As we shall see, however, despite this
emphasis, Hartmann's theory in fact makes assumptions
fundamentally incompatible with adaptation properly understood, and
in crucial respects, offers an account of motivation which is the exact
opposite of that which such a concern suggests.
Hartmann's avowed intention is to expand what he regards as Freud's
principal interest in the pathological, and continue his early concern,
elaborated in his Project for a Scientific Psychology, (1895, S.E.I) to
produce a "general psychology" (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1985, p.238).
He is thus concerned to introduce into psychoanalytic theory an
account of normality, and in particular, to emphasise the role of reality
in normal - as opposed to pathological - states. It is important for our
purposes to explain exactly how this is achieved, since although
4 It is perhaps significant that Heinz Hartmann had undergone "intensive study" with Max
Weber (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p237).
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Hartmann regards his analysis as essentially a development of Freud's
view, it does, in fact represent a fundamental divergence.
Hartmann - as the label "ego-psychology" suggests - offers a
modification of the classical view principally in terms of the nature of
the ego. In Freud's metapsychology, the ego is conceived as an agency
motivated by the instinctual demands of the id, but which takes into
account the restrictions imposed by reality (and its internalized
infantile representative, the super-ego). The importance of this single
source of motivation, and the mediating role of the ego, is illustrated
in the following account by Freud:
If the id's instinctual demands meet with no
satisfaction, intolerable conditions arise.
Experience soon shows that these situations
of satisfaction can only be established with
the help of the external world. At that point
the portion of the id which is directed to the
external world - the ego - begins to function.
If all the driving force that sets the vehicle in
motion is derived from the id, the ego, as it
were, undertakes the steering , without
which no goal can be reached. The instincts
in the id press for immediate satisfaction at
all costs, and in that way they achieve
nothing or even bring about appreciable
damage. It is the task of the ego to guard
against such mishaps, to mediate between
the claims of the id and the objections of .the
external world...In so far as it tames the id's
impulses in this way, it replaces the pleasure
principle, which was formerly alone decisive,
by what is known as the 'relaity principle',
which, though it pursues the same ultimate
aims, takes into account the conditions
imposed by the real external world (1926, S.E.
20, p. ).
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Hartmann, however, offers a conceptualization of the ego, which
rather than being monistically motivated by the id, is dualistically
motivated by both the id and the demands of reality. This modification
is made possible in Hartmann's scheme by his employment of the
concept of adaptation, and his conception of the ego as a fundamentally
adaptive agency (Hartmann 1939). It is important, however, to be clear
about the exact sense in which this term is used. For Hartmann, the ego
is considered "adaptive" in the sense that it facilitates the individual's
physical survival. This is achieved by allowing the individual to "fit
in" with environments of an "average expectable" range (1939, p.24),
and:
..the crucial adaptation a man has to make is
to the social structure, and his collaboration
in building it (1939, p.31).
Because Hartmann regards fitting in with the social structure as a
primary adaptive requirement of the individual, he is able to
conceptualize the ego in the way he does. By allowing the
environment to directly motivate the activities of the ego, Hartmann
considers that the environment - essentially the social environment -
produces a "partial domestication of the pleasure principle" (1964,
p248). In this way, Hatmann's scheme essentially allows the demands
of reality to define the individual's objects of pleasure, and thus
effectively closes the gap between the two classical concepts of reality
and pleasure principles:
...pleasure premia are in store for the child
who conforms to the demands of reality and
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of socialization; but they are equally available
if this conforming means the acceptance by
the child of of erroneous and biased views
which the parents hold of reality (1964,
p.258).
Whilst Hartmann does not himself lay particular emphasis upon the
extent to which this formulation differs from Freud's, it is important
for the present discussion that the differences are emphasised. By
allowing a direct motivational route from the demands of external
reality to the individual, it is possible for Hartmann to regard the ego as
possessing spheres which are entirely conflict free. Indeed, it is this
potential for the absence of intra-psychic conflict which allows ego-
analysts - most notably Erikson (1950) - to equate mental health with a
successful adaptation (in Hartmann's sense) to reality. For Freud, on
the other hand, conflict is inherent in the very nature of the ego,
which, in fact, owes its existence to the fundamental gulf which exists
between the pleasure and reality principles. Moreover, Freud's ego is
only motivated to act as the result of the frustration of the pleasure
principle by the reality principle. Thus, in Freud's formulation, the
reality principle is never motivating in any direct sense, but exerts its
influence by means of forcing the ego into a compromise.
It is therefore in direct contradiction of Freud's whole model of psychic
economy to suggest that the reality principle can absorb the psychical
functions of the pleasure principle by redefining the content of
pleasure. In Freud's words:
Actually the substitution of the reality
principle for the pleasure principle implies
no deposing of the pleasure principle, but
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only a safeguarding of it. A momentary
pleasure, uncertain in its results, is given up,
but only in order to gain along a new path an
assured pleasure at a later time (1911, S.E.12,
p. 223).
It is possible to see from this quotation, not merely the crucial respect
in which Hartmann's formulation differs from Freud's on the matter
of motivation, but also that Freud's own formulation is in fact much
closer to the modern evolutionary conception of motivation which I
advanced in the previous chapter. To see why this is so we need to
notice the divergence between Hartmann's notion of adaptation and
that of modern evolutionary theory. Whilst from the point of view of
the latter, adaptation is, as we have seen, a matter of ultimate
reproductive success, for the former it is essentially reduced to the need
for individual physical survival. Whilst physical survival is, up to a
point, an obvious prerequisite of reproductive success, it is far from
sufficient. It is, for example, quite possible to imagine an individual
quite adept at maintaining his own physical survival, but hopelessly
unsuccessful at reproduction. The more basic problem with
Hartmann's view however, is that adaptation is equated with an
external source of motivation. Thus, for Hartmann, the most "well-
adapted" individual is one who has subordinated his own internal
biologically based motivation to the demands of external reality and
actually absorbed these demands as his own source of pleasure. When .•
it is realized that, in evolutionary terms, external reality is essentially
the inclusive fitness interests of other individuals, it is possible to see
that Hartmann offers a model of motivation identical, from an
evolutionary point of view, to that of conventional social theory.
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Freud's conception, by contrast, is founded upon a basic and
irreconcilable tension between the deep biologically rooted source of
motivation (the pleasure principle), and the conflicting frustrating
demands of the reality principle. The crucial point about Freud's
formulation, then, is that the motivation of all action is ultimately and
exclusively derived from within the biologically evolved constitution
of the individual, and that whilst this exists in a perpetual state of
tension with the demands imposed by others, it is never subordinated
to these. In this way it can be seen that Freud's theory of mind
possesses the first and most basic prerequisiste of an evolutionarily
adequate model: a biologically determined, culturally independent
source of motivation.
Object-Relations, Pleasure and the Source of Phantasy
Another significant development in psychoanalytic theory, both from
a clinical point of view and from the point of view of social theory, was
the emergence of the British object-relations school, and in particular,
the work of such men as W.R.D.Fairbairn (e.g. 1952), Harry Guntrip
(e.g.1973), and D.W.Winnicott (e.g.1958). For present purposes I shall
concentrate mainly on the modifications to the classical position
proposed by Fairbairn, since these illustrate the essential divergence
between the two approaches.
Not unlike the ego-psychology of Hartmann, the starting point of the
object-relational approach is the premise that Freud's orignial
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formulation suffers from its reliance upon endo-psychic pleasure-
seeking drives as the sole motivating factor in mental life. Unlike
Hartmann's reformulation of the source of pleasure, however,
Fairbairn attempts to "rescue" psychoanalysis from this failing, by
proposing an alternative to Freud's model which does away with the
notion of pleasure altogether. Thus, Fairbairn proposes a modification
in Freud's economic view which regards the libido as "not primarily
pleasure-seeking, but object-seeking" (1952, p.155).
This alteration of Freud's notion of pleasure has a number of
important implications which are recognized explicitly by Fairbairn.
The first is the necessary reformulation of the relationship which
Freud conceived between structure and drive. Throughout his
metapsychological writings, Freud maintained a theoretical distinction
between three fundamental dimensions of psychoanalytic enquiry: the
dynamic, the topographical and the economic points of view. The first
refers to the constant exertion of contradictory intra-psychic forces; the
second to the presence of distinct functional sub-systems, and the third
to the existence of a psychical energy, capable of "increase, decrease and
equivalence" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p.127), which "powers" all
mental activity.
Whilst this distinction makes little practical difference in the case of
the id, in the case of the ego, it produces an important distinction
between the processes of which the structure is capable, and the energy
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which motivates the carrying out of these processes. 5 Thus in Freud's
model, the libido is conceived as initially directionless energy, which,
as the result of specific processes, secondarily becomes attached to
objects through the activity of the ego. This, as I shall emphasise
shortly, does not deny the importance of specific object-characteristics
in the satisfaction of libido, but merely stresses the facilitating nature of
objects in achieving pleasure, which remains the aim of the libido.6
Fairbairn, by contrast, regards the ego as inherently energized. Thus,
rather than responding to the energy supplied from the id by cathecting
it to objects which are acceptable to all conflicting psychical parties, the
ego possesses the energy, and so is primarily motivated to form object
relationships from the outset. The metapsychological consequences,
therefore, of introducing a primarily motivated ego, is the explicit
abandonment of the separation of topography and economy, and thus,
the necessary implicit abandonment of an inherently dynamic
conception of mental life. As Guntrip has put it:
The only escape from a dualism of radically
opposed structures is to banish the term "id",
and reserve "ego" to denote the whole
basically unitary psyche with its innate
potential for developing into a true self, a
whole person (1973, p.41).
A further consequence of the reversal of Freud's object/pleasure
relationship is Fairbairn's modification of the classical theory of
6This distinction is, of course, strictly analytical: the structure could not be observed
without the enrgy, nor vice versa, and this is why there is always a dynamic point of view.
6See the discussion of the relationship between source, aim, object and pressure in "Instincts
and their Vicissitudes" (Freud, 1915, S.E.14).
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psycho-sexual development. Coherent with his view of the ego as
primarily motivated to form object relationships, Fairbairn replaces
Freud's theory of psycho-sexual stages with a sequence of object-
relational stages. Thus Freud's scheme of oral-anal-phallic-gential, is
replaced with immature dependence - transitional - mature
dependence, the first referring to a state of totally undifferentiated
identification with the mother, and the last to the ability to experience
oneself as entirely separate from others. Whilst in modern
circumstances, Fairbairn believes that the transitional phase was
usually problematic, it is, in principle, he argued, possible to pass
through the stages harmoniously:
In a state of nature the infant would never
normally experience that separation from his
mother which appears to be imposed upon
him increasingly by the conditions of
civilization (Fairbairn, 1952, p.109).
It is this peculiarly modern separation between mother and infant,
which leads, in Fairbairn's view, to psychopathology.
The cause of psychopathology, and the subject matter of psychoanalysis,
is, for Fairbairn, the presence of "internal objects", which result from
the interruption of the natural development from immature to
mature dependence. Because under modern circumstances, the infant
experiences the mother as both gratifying and frustrating, it
internalizes this object in an attempt to control it more effectively.
This results in a "splitting" of the ego, and the ultimate basis for all
psychopathology: a conflict between the natural urge towards
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development, and the unwillingness to surrender the original
enticing, yet frustrating object.
What is crucial here, however, and central to all object-relational
approaches, is that the source of "internal objects" - and hence all
psychopathology - lies in the failure of the external world. This point
can be seen most clearly in Fairbairn's version of the Oedipus complex,
and infantile sexuality. For Fairbairn, infantile sexuality in general,
and the Oedipus complex in particular, arise as secondary defences
against a failure to achieve a satisfactory object-relationship, and
usually occur as the result of adult seductiveness. The (male) child's
antagonistic relationship with the father is likewise a reslut of a
relational failure, where the father - like the mother before him - is
experienced as both enticing and frustrating. The primary causal
significance which Freud accorded to the Oedipus complex, is thus
reversed in this scheme, in which it is regarded as secondary and
environmentally contingent. In Fairbairn's words:
...the role of the ultimate cause [sic.] which
Freud alloted to the Oedipus situation,
should propertly be allotted to the
phenomenon of infantile dependence (1952,
p.120).
This quotation reveals more than the technical primacy given by
Fairbairn to object-dependence, it also reveals the fundamentally anti-
evolutionary nature of his - and subsequent object-relations theorists' -
conception of psychoanalysis. The clue to this is in the claim that for
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Freud, the ultimate cause of psychopathology - and indeed all mental
activity - lies in the Oedipus complex.
Fundamental to the centrality of the Oedipus complex in the classical
view of both normal and pathological development is the assumption
that it is a universal human characteristic, and fundamental to this, is
the notion - since Freud's early abandonment of the seduction theory -
of phantasy. What is so crucial about Freud's understanding of
phantasy, however, is that it is considered to possess a typical content,
irrespective of experience, which is a product of phylogenetic
inheritance, in short, of biological evolution. To express the
significance of this, Freud introduced the term "primal phantasy" in
1915, (1915a, S.E. 14, p.269), although it must be emphasised that the
idea which the term indicates had already been central to
psychoanalytic theory for some twenty years.
Time and time again in Freud's work do we find references to this
fundamental idea. In discussing the "sexual theories of children", for
example, he writes:
...it is not owing to any arbitrary mental act or
to chance that those notions arise, but to the
necessities of the child's psycho-sexual
constitution; and this is why we can speak of
the sexual theories of children as being
typical and why we find the same mistaken
beliefs in every child whose sexual life is
accessible to us (1908, S.E.9, p.215).
And again, in the "Wolf Man" analysis:
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Wherever experiences fail to fit in with the
hereditary schema, they become remodelled
in the imagination^..] It is precisely such
cases that are calculated to convince us of the
independent existence of the schema. We
are often able to see the schema triumphing
over the experience of the individual; as
when in our present case the boy's father
became the castrator and the menace of his
infantile sexuality in spite of what was in
other respects an inverted Oedipus complex.
(1918, S.E. 17, pp.119-20).
Indeed, it should not go unremarked that it is precisely to the
explanation of the origins of the specific content of primal phantasies
that Freud's much maligned, and admittedly Lamarckian, Totem and
Taboo (1913, S.E.13) is devoted.
The relationship between the classical model and Fairbairn's, on the
matter of object relations is, therefore, essentially one of basic
opposition. Whilst Fairbairn sees the processes, and more
importantly, the content of mental development as profoundly
dependent upon actual experiential relationships with the external
object world, Freud sees them as basically dependent upon an innate
phylogenetic "schema", which actually defines the subjective
experience of the object world. Yet it is important to emphasise that in
the classical model experience does not give way completely to
phantasy. Indeed, on the contrary, the relationship between phantasy
and its objects is explicitly theorized by Freud, and can again be seen in
contrast to the object-relational view.
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As I pointed out above, Fairbairn's abolition of the drive/structure
distinction involves a reformulation of the ego as inherently energized
and primarily object-seeking, which contrasts with the classical view of
the ego as secondarily attaching directionless energy to objects, in the
primary service of the pleasure principle. It is tempting to draw a
purely descriptive parallel here between the object-relational approach
and the sociobiological view outlined in chapter three. In both cases
the failure to distinguish analytically between motivation and the
object of motivation leads to a wholly static conception of the
environment, in which motivated variations are implicitly ruled out.
The classical view by contrast, in making a fundamental distinction
between motivation (that is pleasure) and the object of motivation, is
able to account for variation without collapsing into biological
arbitrariness.
To see how this is so, we need to consider Freud's formulation of the
relationship between objects and instincts:
The object of an instinct is the thing in regard
to which or through which the instinct is
able to achieve its aim. It is what is most
variable about an instinct and is not
originally connected with it, but becomes
assigned to it only in consequence of being
peculiarly fitted to make satisfaction possible
(1915c, S.E.14, p.122).
The importance of this quotation is in the fact that it demonstrates that
in the classical view, the objects of motivation are neither strictly
determined by biology, but at the same time are not completely
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arbitrary. Instead, objects are chosen because they are "peculiarly fitted"
and so must possess some intrinsic quality which suits them for the
task, but not to the total exclusion of all others. In terms of the
foregoing argument, therefore, we may say that in the classical view,
external objects are first chosen because they best resonate with the
contents of primal phantasies.
We are now in a position to see how precisely the classical
metapsychology - as opposed to the object-relational - meshes with the
evolutionary conception of object relations as it has been expressed so
far. We have seen that from the classical point of view, objects are
chosen because of an intrinsic suitability, rather than some unique
quality. In other words, there are, in principle, a variety of objects
capable of satisfying the instinct. The importance of this observation,
however, is that in the environment of human evolutionary
adaptedness, there must have been fewer possible objects capable of
exhibiting this "peculiar fit", and satisfying the instinct, than there are
in modern environments. Put differently, the level of discrimination
between suitable and unsuitable objects which we evolved, was
adequate for a primal hunter-gatherer environment, and the objects
which were chosen on its basis must in general have produced
adaptive consequences. Under modern circumstances, however, it is
entirely plausible that there are many novel objects which are capable
of instinctual satisfaction, but, because we have not yet evolved the
means to discriminate against them, produce maladaptive
consequences.
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It seems, therefore, that the metapsychological conception of the
relationship between biology and the external world which is
contained in the classical theory of object relations is entirely in
accordance with the demands of evolutionary explanations, as outlined
earlier. In particular, the notion of primal phantasy, and the separation
of object and instinct, characteristically dropped by object-relational
reformulations, provide the link between the biologically rooted source
of motivation discussed in relation to ego-psychology above, and the
basic problem of the motivation of behavioural variation. This link is
strngthened, however, when the picture is broadened to include the
classical formulation of psycho-dynamic processes, and in particular
the basis of repression.
Critical Psychoanalysis and the Basis of Repression.
A third group of psychoanalytic revisionists, who have been
particularly influential in the adoption of psychoanalytic ideas by social
theorists, are the "critical" psychoanalysts exemplified by such men as
Wilhelm Reich, Erich Fromm and especially, Herbert Marcuse.
Although these writers have all contributed complex and differing
Freudian-Marxist syntheses, I am concerned here only with the
particular relationship conceived bewteen the individual's biological
constitution and society, and the way in which this formulation differs
from Freud's own. I shall therefore concentrate upon Marcuse's
formulation (1955), as his conceptual revision makes the divergence
most clear.
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Unlike ego-psychology and object-relations theory, both of which
Marcuse is especially critical, he begins his analysis with the literal
acceptance of Freud's late instinct theory. Marcuse is particularly
unusual in this respect, because not only does he adopt the concept of
libido ("Eros"), but also the highly unpopular and speculative notion of
the death instinct ("Thanatos"). Marcuse's analysis differs too from his
fellow Marxist-Freudian Wilhelm Reich, in that whilst Reich's ideal
conception of society is one in which the repression of instincts is
entirely absent (an idea which Reich followed to the point of insanity
and imprisonment), Marcuse accepts that a "basic" level of instinctual
repression is both desirable and necessary (Marcuse 1955, p.38). Where
Marcuse differs radically from Freud, however, is in his additional
notion of "surplus repression".
This concept is introduced to rectify what Marcuse sees as Freud's
failure to adopt an adequately historical perspective, and refers to "the
additional controls arising from the specific institutions of
domination" (1955, p.46). Thus instinctual repression, beyond the
theoretical minima of basic repression, is correlated with the
fundamentally economic requirements of domination which obtain in
the society in question:
Within the total structure of the repressed
personality, surplus-repression is that
portion which is the result of specific societal
conditions sustained in the specific interests
of domination. The extent of this surplus-
repression provides the standard of
measurement: the smaller it is, the less
repressive is the stage of civilization. The
distinction is equivalent to that between the
107
biological and the historical sources of
human suffering (1955, pp.87-88).
The notion of surplus-repression as an historically relative
phenomenon is developed in Marcuse's other major conceptual
modification of Freud, his reformulation of the nature of the reality
principle. Marcuse reads Freud's conception of the reality principle as
referring in general to the requirements of civilized existence. Because
of his insistence, however, that surplus-repression is historically
specific, Marcuse replaces Freud's single abstract conception of reality
with the notion of a multiplicity of possible reality principles, the
contents of which are determined by the economic infrastructure of the
society. Under capitalism, the specific form of the reality priciple is
termed by Marcuse, the "performance principle", under the rule of
which "society is stratified according to the competitive economic
performances of its members" (1955. p.60).
The (surplus) repressions of instinct which are brought about under
the performance principle, in Marcuse's view, leads to the sublimation
of potentially pleasurable libido into activities which are beneficial to
the maintenance of the economic status quo. Even the sphere of sexual
activity itself, under the performance principle, is subjugated to the
economic demands of the capitalist system; sexual energy which is not
diverted into work, is distorted and unnaturally focused into restrictive
genitality, rather than into its natural pre-genital polymorphous forms.
Marcuse's vision is the abolition of all such restrictions of libido so
that:
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The free development of transformed libido
within transformed institutions...would
minimise the manifestations of mere
sexuality by integrating them into a larger
order, including the order of work (1955,
p.202).
The performance principle, therefore, is responsible for the specific
forms of instinctual repression under capitalism, and since its content
is directly determined by the demands of the economic infrastructure
of capitalism, Marcuse's theory involves an effective equation of intra¬
psychic repression with economic repression. Thus, the abolition of
capitalism will bring with it the 'withering away' of the performance
principle, and hence the abolition of surplus repression and an
accompanying resurgence in the primacy of the instincts.
Leaving aside the various empirical difficulties with Marcuse's case,
not to mention the difficulties raised by his retention of the death
instinct, it is, for our purposes, important to notice the respects in
which Marcuse's approach to repression and reality differs from
Freud's. Whilst Marcuse sees the origin of surplus-repression (which
for him is ultimately the only significant from of repression) in the
economic infrastructure, Freud unequivocally traces the origin of
repression - and most importantly the contents of what is repressed - to
a biological evolutionary root. This is a fact which is frequently
overlooked, even by otherwise accurate accounts (e.g.Bocock 1976), but
which is in fact essential to the coherence of Freud's theory of
repression.
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To see how important this is to Freud's formulation, it is essential to
grasp the distinction which he makes in his metapsychological account
t
between "primal repression" and "repression proper":
We have reason to assume that there is a
primal repression, a first phase of repression,
which consists in the psychical (ideational)
representative of the instinct being denied
entrance into the conscious. With this a
fixation is established; the representative in
question persists unaltered from then
onwards and the instinct remains attached to
it...
The second stage of repression, repression
proper, affects mental derivatives of the
repressed representative, or such trains of
thought as, originating elsewhere, have
come into associative connection with it, On
account of this association, these ideas
experience the same fate as what was
primally repressed. Repression proper,
therefore, is actually an after-pressure.
Moreover, it is a mistake to emphasize only
the repulsion which operates from the
direction of the conscious upon what is to be
repressed; quite as important is the attraction
exercised by what was primally repressed
upon everything with which it can establish
a connection. Probably the trend towards
repression would fail in its purpose if these
two forces did not co-operate, if there were
not something previously repressed ready to
receive what is repelled by the conscious
(1915b, S.E. 14, p. 148, italics in original).
It is possible to see from this quotation that, for Freud, everything
which the adult mind subsequently represses, only meets this fate
because of an "associative connection" with the content of the primally
repressed. To fully comprehend this relationship, however, it is
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necessary to consider the role of the super-ego in repression, and its
relationship with phylogenesis.
The most important point to note here is that repression proper
presupposes the existence of the super-ego:
Since we have come to assume a special
agency in the ego, the super-ego, which
represents demands of a restrictive and
rejecting character, we may say that
repression is the work of this super-ego and
that it is carried out either by itself or by the
ego in obedience to its orders (1933, S.E.22, p.
67).
The ontogenetic emergence of the super-ego as the internalization of
certain parental prohibitions, however, presupposes the existence of
primal repression, because, as we have seen, it is the content of primal
repressions which determine the content of subsequent repressions
through their "associative connection". What this means then, is that
the content of the super-ego is itself explicable as a primal repression,
and so ultimately explicable with reference to phylogenesis. Thus,
Freud's Lamarckian interpretation:
The super-ego, according to our hypothesis,
actually originated from the experiences that
led to totemism...The experiences of the ego
seem at first to be lost for inheritance; but,
when they have been repeated often enough
and with sufficient strength in many
individuals in successive generations, they
transform themselves, so to say, into
experiences of the id, the impressions of
which are preserved by heredity. Thus the
id, which is capable of being inherited, are
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harboured countless egos; and, when the ego
forms its super-ego out of the id, it may
perhaps only be reviving shapes of former
egos and be bringing them to resurrection
(1923, S.E.19, p.38).
Once allowance has been made for Freud's Lamarckian biology, it can
be seen that he is making the crucial point that the super-ego, the
agency whose contents are responsible for repression proper, does in
fact have an evolutionary history, and so its contents - and hence the
contents of what is repressed - is not environmentally contingent, but
ultimately biologically determined. As Sulloway has put it:
Freud's notion of the superego constitutes an
important conceptual watershed between his
two formal categories of primal and secondary
repression [repression proper]. The superego
arises as the last of the great primal
repressions and, like them, is reducible to an
organic process founded in the ancestral
experience of the race (1980, p.375).
What is crucial from our point of view, and what distinguishes Freud's
conception of repression from that advanced by Marcuse, is that for
Freud, the content of what is repressed has an evolved biological basis,
whilst, for Marcuse, it is contingent upon the particular mode of
«
production which happens to be in operation at the time. Thus, exactly
as with the case of primal phantasy, which, as we have seen, provides
the basic "schema" for the content of the developing child's phantasy
life, so primal repression provides the basic schema for the content of
what is repressed, and internalized as the super-ego.
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Besides the obvious logical superiority of Freud's version - accounting
as it does for the initial act of repression, which is presupposed by
subsequent repressions - it is important to notice, once again, how his
assumption of a basic evolved content, presents a view which is
coherent with the demands of evolutionary explanation. This is
because, for repression to have an evolutionary basis - which if it exists
as a process it must - it is necessary to assume that the effects of
repression (in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness) were
adaptive. If it were assumed, however, that the content of what is
repressed is completely arbitrary it would be impossible to make this
assumption for the simple reason that repression is, by definition, a
selective process, and so it must be more adapative to repress some
things than others. In Marcuse's theory, however, there is no
biological basis to the content of repression, and so there is no a priori
reason why any material should be in any way more likely to be
repressed than any other; it depends entirely upon the mode of
production of the moment, and not on the inclusive fitness interests of
the individual. In Freud's formulation the fact that the content of
what is repressed, as well as the capacity for repression, has a biological
basis, it is possible to conceptualize it as the product of evolution. In
Marcuse's case, however, repression must ultimately meet the same
fate as culture did for the conventional social theorists in chapter three.
In this chapter, I have argued that the unpopular, but crucial,
evolutionary biological assumptions which underlie classical
psychoanalytic theory, whilst substantively incorrect, in fact mean that
the model of mind which is thereby articulated is essentially in
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accordance with that suggested by modern evolutionary theory. So far I
have concentrated upon the fact that in the classical model, the mind
and its processes possess a biologically determined content which
distinguishes it from the purely facilitating model assumed by both
conventional social theorists, and a number of key psychoanalytic
revisionists. In the next chapter, I wish to turn my attention to the
analysis of this content, and consider its adequacy in the light of
modern evolutionary theory, and in particular consider the
evolutionary significance of the classical formulation of the content of
repression and the dynamic unconscious which it assumes.
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CHAPTER SIX
Evolution, Deception and the Dynamic Unconscious
As the arguments I have advanced in earlier chapters make clear, the
recognition that human beings possess unique characteristics such as
symbolic language, the capacity for self-reflection, and most of all
consciousness, does not separate them from the evolved biological world.
On the contrary, as I have repeatedly suggested, the only ultimate
explanation for the possession of these characteristics is an evolutionary
one, and therefore one which specifies the adaptive significance of the
effects of the trait in question in the environment in which it evolved.
It is perhaps surprising that evolutionary biologists have been, in general,
rather negligent of the whole area of human consciousness. It is, after all,
as the social theorists frequently point out, what distinguishes human
behaviour from that of all other species, and what apparently gives
human motivation such a unique character. It is, in particular, what
permits human beings to act teleologically, to assess goals and means, and
to formulate motives. The question which must be faced, therefore, is
what was the adaptive significance of this capacity, and in particular, what
can evolutionary considerations tell us about its nature?
Inclusive Fitness and Self-Consciousness
Perhaps the most important point to consider, is that human beings are
not merely conscious of their environment, but, crucially, are conscious of
themselves. This realization formed the cornerstone of the philosophy of
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George Herbert Mead (amongst others) and has, naturally enough, become
a central theme in modern social theory. At first sight, the emergence of
self-consciousness does not seem difficult to understand in evolutionary
terms. This can best be seen by considering the evolutionary implications
of Mead's classic statement of the nature of the self (1962). For Mead, the
human self is distinguished as unique because it is capable of being both
subject and object (1962, pp. 136-7). It is also a fundamentally social self,
because its capacity for reflexivity is derived from social experience, that is,
through "taking the role of the other". Through this process of role-
taking, Mead argues that human action proceeds by the monitoring of
one's own conduct from the point of view of another:
The immediate effect of such role-taking lies
in the control which the individual is able to
exercise over his own response (1962, p.245).
To see how such a tendency could evolve, but also to see its limitations, it
is necessary to consider the role which "the other" plays in interactions
from the point of view of evolutionary theory. Clearly, from this point of
view, 'the other' is not a unitary concept, for the simple reason that some
'others' share more of 'self's' genes than others. Yet, leaving this aside,
the point of view of the other will clearly be an important consideration in
the success or failure of a given proposed action, since there will always be
a significant degree to which the genetic interests of the other will diverge
from those of self (even in the case of quite close genetic relatedness).
Thus, since an action which is completely in the interests of self, will
almost certainly not also be in the interests of other, some internal
representation of the interests of other will plainly be advantageous. This
is because, a failure to consider the point of view of the other at all, when
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pursuing one's genetic self-interest, would inevitably lead to conflict, the
negative consequences of which could threaten to outweigh the benefit of
the action.
Yet there is one important respect in which Mead's formulation can be
seen to constitute a distinct adaptive liability. This relates to the
motivational totality of role-taking, which is a central feature of Mead's
idea. For Mead, lacking the perspective of modern evolutionary theory,
role-taking is regarded as a process by which individual orientation to the
demands of the other (usually the collective), is achieved by the absorption
of these demands as part of the self, with the consequence that they
effectively become motivationally undifferentiated. Mead is at times quite
explicit about this:
And thus it is that social control, as operating
in terms of self-criticism, exerts itself so
intimately and extensively over individual
behavior or conduct, serving to integrate the
individual and his actions with reference to
the organized social process of experience
and behavior in which he is implicated. The
physiological mechanism of the human
individual's central nervous system makes it
possible for him to take the attitudes of other
individuals, and the attitudes of the
organized social group of which he and they
are members, toward himself, in terms of his
integrated social relations to them and to the
group as a whole; so that the general social
process of experience and behavior which the
group is carrying on is directly presented to
him in his own experience, and so that he is
thereby able to govern and direct his conduct
consciously and critically, with reference to
his relations both to the group as a whole
and to its other individual members in terms
of this social process. Thus he becomes not
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only self-conscious but also self-critical; and
thus, through self-criticism, social control
over individual behavior or conduct
operates by virtue of the social origin and
basis of such criticism. That is to say, self-
criticism is essentially social criticism, and
behavior controlled by self-criticism is
essentially behavior controlled socially (1962,
P.255).
Self-consciousness is thus explicitly equated by Mead with social control,
and hence social motivation. In other words, rather than allowing the
point of view of others to be taken into account when anticipating a
particular course of action in the pursuit of genetic self-interest - as the
account given above suggests - Mead is in fact allowing the interests of
others to directly motivate, rather than to frustrate action, and thus denies
the possibility of genetically self-interested actions. As Mead put it:
Hence social control, so far from tending to
crush out the human individual or to
obliterate his self-conscious individuality, is,
on the contrary, actually constitutive of and
inextricably associated with that
individuality; for the individual is what he
is, as a conscious and individual personality,
just in so far as he is a member of society,
involved in the social process of experience
and activity, and thereby socially controlled
in his conduct (1962, p.255).
It would seem then, that self-consciousness of the sort proposed by Mead
could not be expected to evolve, since it would have the effect of directly
prioritizing the inclusive fitness demands of the other. But what precisely
is the form of self-consciousness predicted by inclusive-fitness theory? To
answer this question it is necessary to consider certain basic predictions of
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inclusive-fitness theory about the nature of interaction, and in particular,
the precise circumstances in which the genetic self-interest of others could
be expected to be promoted by an individual; in other words, the
circumstances for the evolution of altruism.
The Evolution of Self-Decepetion and the Nature of Repression
I have no wish to become involved here in semantic arguments about
whether what I am going to discuss can legitimately be called altruism.
Obviously, as was demonstrated by the theory outlined in chapter one, to
speak of the evolution of altruism is contradictory in that altruism,
defined as an act which benefits the inclusive fitness of the recipient at the
expense of that of the altruist, cannot evolve. What I mean to delineate,
therefore, are the circumstances under which apparently altruistic actions
could evolve, because in reality they enhance the inclusive fitness of the
actor.
Apart from the possibility that altruistic acts may be induced (Trivers 1985,
p.49; Badcock 1986, Ch.3), it is generally accepted by biologists that,
following Hamilton's fundamental theorem, there are two essential ways
in which apparent altruism can evolve: kin altruism and reciprocal
altruism. The first I have already discussed in chapter one, and refers to
the fact that because relatives share genes with calculable frequencies,
actions could be selected which enhance the reproductive success of
relatives providing that the cost of doing so does not exceed that predicted
by the coefficient of relatedness between the two individuals. The second,
however, refers to the possibilities of apparent altruism towards unrelated
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individuals, and it is principally to Robert Trivers that we owe its
theoretical elaboration (Trivers, 1971, 1981,1985).
Trivers reasons that, theoretically, acts of apparent altruism could be
selected between unrelated individuals if, at some future time, they
produced a reciprocation of equal value. Indeed, he marshalls
considerable evidence in support of the view that just such a situation has
evolved in many species (e.g.1985, Ch.15). However, he also points out
that since the individual who initiates the reciprocal relationship must, by
definition, perform the first act before the reciprocation is forthcoming,
such relationships are highly prone to exploitation. For this reason,
certain characteristics make the evolution of reciprocity more likely:
During the pleistocene, and probably before, a
hominid species would have met the
preconditions for the evolution of reciprocal
altruism: long lifespan; low dispersal rate;
life in small, mutually dependant stable
social groups ...; and a long period of parental
care (Trivers 1981, pp.10-11).
Yet even under these propitious circumstances, such relationships are
capable of being exploited, and since selection will obviously favour those
who are most adept at exploiting such situations, can be expected to
evolve. At the same time, however, selection will also favour those who
successfully resist attempts at exploitation. In this connection Trivers
distinguishes between gross and subtle cheating, where the former refers
to the total failure to reciprocate, and the latter to the failure to reciprocate
as much as has been received. Whilst it is likely that selection will quickly
favour the detection of gross cheats, making total failure to reciprocate an
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ultimately unsuccessful strategy, Trivers suggests that the co-evolution of
cheating and its detection will produce ever more subtle means of
cheating, and ever more subtle means of detection, with the effect that:
It is the subtlety of the discrimination
necessary to detect this form of cheating and
the awkward situation that ensues that
permit some subtle cheating to be adaptive
(Trivers 1981, p. 13).
It is important to point out that the phenomenon of cheating should not
be expected to be confined to reciprocal relationships. Given that even in
the case of kin relationships there are strictly quantifiable limits upon the
degree of apparent altruism which it is adaptive to render, it will clearly
also be adaptive to successfully exploit these relationships in exactly the
same way as those based upon reciprocity. The significance of this will be
discussed more fully later, but for the present it is important to consider
the implications of the evolution of subtle cheating and detection, for the
nature of self-consciousness.
It would seem inevitable that the co-evolution of subtle cheating and
detection must bring with it the evolution of indicators of reliability in
reciprocal interactions, and means for accurately detecting those indicators.
Clearly, an individual who is predisposed to engage in reciprocal
relationships with others who reciprocate will be at a selective advantage
over those who engage in such relationships at random. As soon,
therefore, as both reciprocators develop some peculiar characteristic, and
others develop the predisposition to react favourably to this characteristic
in reciprocal exchanges, the co-evolutionary process is set in motion. This
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first stage will be followed by the emergence of apparent reciprocators who
do not in fact reciprocate (or increasingly, reciprocate less than required),
who at first will possess a selective advantage, but only until some means
to distinguish between genuine and pseudo-reciprocators emerges. From
here, more subtle forms of pseudo-reciprocator will emerge amongst the
genuine reciprocators, followed by more subtle means of distinguishing
them, and so on.
It has been suggested by a number of authors (eg Trivers 1981, 1985;
Alexander 1979; Badcock 1986), that this situation must have had a specific
effect upon the evolution of self-consciousness; that is, rather than the
continual extension of self-consciousness, its limitation, and facilitation of
self-deception. This argument follows from the recognition that for self-
consciousness to evolve, there must have been some selective advantage
to its nature, and that a full awareness of the nature of one's motivations
would be not merely unnecessary, but in fact a liability. For example,
Alexander writes:
I suggest that the separateness of our
individual self-interesets, and the conflicts
among us that derive from this separateness,
have created a social milieu in which,
paradoxically, the only way we can actually
maximise our own self-interest and deceive
successfully is by continually denying - at
least in some social arenas - that we are in
fact doing such things. By conveying the
impression that we do not intend to deceive,
and that we are in fact altruistic and have the
interests of others at heart, we actually
advance our own (evolutionary) self-interest.
I believe as a consequence that our general
cleverness at creating deceptions and
detecting them has made it next to
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impossible for individuals to benefit from
deliberate deception in ordinary social
situations, because of the likelihood of
detection and exposure, and, possibly, severe
punishment. The result, I believe, is that in
our social scenario-building we have
evolved to deceive even ourselves about our
true motives (Alexander 1979, p. 134).
What this argument suggests is that consciousness appears to have
evolved as a sort of self-management system, capable of presenting a set of
motivations to others, which are both acceptable and plausible. At the
same time, however, it also suggests that consciousness (and self-
consciousness) does not play a particularly important role in our actual
motivation, of which it will be in our interests to be unaware. As Trivers
has put it:
As mechanisms for spotting deception
become more subtle, organisms may be
selected to render some facts and motives
unconscious, the better to conceal deception.
In the broadest sense, the organism is
selected to become unconscious of some of its
deception, in order not to betray, by signs of
self-knowledge, the deceptions being
practised. (Trivers, 1981, p.35).
Following this analysis, Christopher Badcock has made the important
point that the unconscious which is here described by Trivers is, in
important respects, the same as that advanced by Freud, in that it is
dynamic, and thus capable of receiving material unacceptable to
consciousness by means of repression:
The essentially dynamic nature of Trivers'
unconscious is fully apparent...where...he
describes the unconscious not merely as
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something apart from consciousness, but as a
phenomenon positively engendered by the
need to hide certain realities from
consciousness - in a word as a consequence of
repression (Badcock, 1986, p.43, italics in
original).
What is perhaps the most important implication of this is that the
unconscious predicted by Trivers does not do away with the unacceptable
motivation altogether; on the contrary, the motivation remains intact,
that is, exerting its influence, but without the awareness of the actor.
Indeed, it implies that actions which are in fact deceptively self-serving,
will be capable of reformulation by the actor, as in fact correctly reciprocal.
I shall develop this point in later chapters, in the context of the example of
sexual commitment, but for the present it is important to note how this
relates to the Freudian notion of repression and motivation.
Freud's conception of repression, like that implied by Trivers, involves
not the abandonment of the unacceptable idea altogether, but rather its
denial of access to consciousness. However, it is important to stress that
for Freud the repression of a wish also means that the wish in question
will not be enacted in that form. This point is not explicitly made by
Trivers, who, as the quotation above implies, seems to only apply his
argument to the repression of the knowledge that an act is self-serving.
Clearly, however, this restriction would be adaptively unrealistic, since it
would allow individuals to perform patently self-serving actions, whilst
simultaneously denying the obvious fact that this is what they are doing.
In Freud's formulation, however, a self-serving motivation needs to pass
the censor of the ego and super-ego before it can be enacted, and the actor
can become aware of what he is doing. What this means then is that
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before an action is performed, its motivation must be capable of being
consciously formulated by the actor, and crucially, formulated in a way
which is acceptable to the demands of the ego and super-ego. To
appreciate the significance of this, we need momentarily to remind
ourselves of the nature of the ego and super-ego.
We saw in the last chapter that, for Freud, the super-ego is an agency
whose origin and content is ultimately explicable phylogenetically, but
which develops ontogenetically through the internalization of certain
parental demands which are interpreted through the lens of an innate
schema. The ego is the agency responsible for the mediation between the
conflicting demands of the super-ego, the id (and the dynamically
repressed) and external reality. Before an action can be self-consciously
performed, therefore, it must be acceptable to the generalized quasi-
parental demands of the super-ego, and to the specific demands of reality,
whilst still being sufficiently close to the original repressed wish to be
motivated at all.
It is possible to see, therefore, that according to the classical psychoanalytic
view, but also in accordance with evolutionary expectations, actions are
only performed if their motivation can be self-consciously formulated by
the actor in such a way as to be acceptable to these various demands. But
because we must also assume that only inclusive-fitness enhancing
actions can be motivated, the ability to formulate motives in a publicly
acceptable way will never be a sufficient condition for an action to be
performed. This is because, as Trivers has pointed out, pure reciprocity is
not a stable state of affairs, and so those who always act only upon the basis
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of publicly approved motivations - that is, for whom all motivation is self¬
consciously accessible - will systematically lose out to those who are
motivated by inclusive fitness demands, not acceptable to other similarly
motivated individuals.
This argument suggests, therefore, that repression is not merely a means
by which unacceptable motives are kept from consciousness, but also
facilitates the performance of actions which are both self-serving, but for
which publicly acceptable motives can be formulated. Indeed the focus
here falls not upon the act of formulating one's own motives in an
acceptable way - which may, of course, be necessary on occasions - but on
the fact that they can be so formulated, and thus that they may be so
formulated by others.
It should be noted that according to the evolutionary view, actions which
are performed on the basis of ego and super-ego censorship should still
have beneficial effects in terms of inclusive fitness, even though they
have been modified by the effects of repression. Whether or not this is
actually the case is obviously an empirical question, and one which I
propose to address through the examples to be elaborated in subsequent
chapters. At present however, it is sufficient to note that the
transformations which repressed wishes undergo, before they reach a state
which can gain conscious expression, are regarded by Freud to be of a quite
specific nature. This means that there are definite paths of connection
between the the repressed and its conscious derivitives, and that the two
do not become connected by mere accident. Indeed, it is fair to say that the
"substitutive-formations" (eg 1926, S.E.20, p.145) which represent the
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repressed wish in the conscious, are formed precisely because of an
inherent subjective (although unconscious) affinity with the repressed. In
this way, it is possible to see that, according to Freud's theory, there is a
fundamentally symbolic relationship between the content of actions
actually performed and the unconscious and repressed wishes which
motivate them. This symbolic relationship, however, is of a very distinct
kind, and quite different from the relationship conceived by conventional
social theorists between action and sui generis social forces. Whilst for the
latter, as we have seen, action is arbitrarily symbolic of wider social forces,
from the psychoanalytic point of view, action is symbolic of unconscious
wishes in a motivated and essentially functional sense. In other words,
whilst for conventional social theorists, actions are performed ultimately
because convention (however theorized) dictates, for psychoanalysis,
actions are performed because, by their intrinsic nature, they are able to
elicit motivation from specific, biologically rooted, repressed wishes.
As I suggested in the last two chapters, the presence of a novel
environment could have the effect of producing actions which are not, in
fact, adaptive, but when the theory of repression outlined here is
considered, the likelihood of this possibility is greatly increased. This is
because repression, as I have expressed it, has the effect of forcing the
formation of publicy acceptable substitutes of fitness-enhancing wishes, in
the interests of acting in a deceptively reciprocal way. The effect of this,
therefore, is that the repressed wish must be capable of undergoing
various transformations in order to reach a form in which it can be self¬
consciously formulated in an acceptable way, and still satisfy the original
fitness-maximizing impulse. This suggests a degree of fundamental
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lability in the derivitives of the repressed wish, without which the most
acceptable "compromise" (e.g.1896, S.E.3, p.170) could not be reached.
Freud expressed this in terms of the pivotal distinction made between
objects and instincts, discussed earlier in relation to object-relations theory,
by which he was able to explain the satisfaction of instincts through objects
far removed from those originally cathected. In terms of the foregoing
argument, however, it is possible to see that the separation in question,
which, as I have argued, is central to the coherence of classical
metapsychology, is explicable in terms of the need to produce substitute
satisfactions for repressed wishes. In a novel environment, however, the
possibilities for substitute formation will obviously be different from those
in our original environment, and so it is possible that subjectively
acceptable substitutes will be chosen, which lack the essential functional
attributes of the repressed wish which they represent. In essence, this is
the same as the argument I advanced in the last chapter in connection
with objects, but is here widened to include all possible transformations of
motivation, of which, as I shall later exemplify, changing the object is but
one.
Self-Deception, Insight and the Possibility of Analysis
The argument that self-consciousness has evolved to facilitate the
performance of self-serving actions, for which publicly acceptable motives
can be formulated, raises a number of questions about the possibility of
self-insight, which must be addressed before we can proceed. The first of
these, and perhaps the most obvious, is the fact that it is a matter of
common experience that patently self-serving motives can be formulated
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by actors, and indeed, very often are. At first sight this seems to invalidate
the conclusions I have drawn about the nature of repression, and in
particular the role of repression in permitting only those actions for
which publicly acceptable motives can be formulated. Yet, it should be
noted in this connection that the motives which I have suggested should
be repressed, are only those motives whose detection by others will confer
an adaptive disadvantage to the actor. It might be imagined that all self-
serving motives are likely to fall into this category, but in fact this is not
the case. The first thing to notice here is that self-serving motivations per¬
se, are not equivalent to motives to cheat. This means that merely
pursuing one's own genetic self-interest, in reciprocal or kin relations,
should not necessarily be subject to repression, because such actions are
publicly acceptable in the sense that they do not involve deception. Thus,
to say that one wishes to receive a fair price for an item one is trading,
although in some respects self-serving, does not depart from the
reciprocally acceptable (indeed, the absence of such a concern might be
expected to elicit suspicion on the part of the partner to the exchange).
The second thing to notice, however, is that the the co-evolution of
cheating and detection proposed by Trivers suggests that once this system
has reached an advanced stage, as presumably it has in the human case,
some degree of cheating, or at least a propensity to cheat, should be
regarded as normal by participants in reciprocal interactions. Once
cheating becomes established as a strategy, we can expect, as I have already
pointed out, the detection of cheating to also become established. The
next stage is the evolution of a more subtle form of cheating, and, the
counter-evolution of a more subtle means of discrimination between
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cheats and reciprocators. Yet at each stage, to be a subtle cheat will always
be more beneficial than to be a genuine reciprocator, and so it is reasonable
to hypothesise that the assumption that any individual is in fact a genuine
reciprocator, will become increasingly less reliable. In other words,
individuals who do not overtly display some tendencies towards non-
reciprocation, could reliably be predicted to be subtle cheats, and hence
more dangerous than the more obvious cheats around them. Thus, to
treat apparent full-reciprocators as full-reciprocators becomes an
increasingly unsuccesful strategy, whilst engaging in interactions with the
more benign, less-subtle cheats becomes increasingly successful, because at
least their mode of cheating is easily detectable, and hence controlled.
The most adaptive strategy from this point on, however, is clearly to
retain a facade of a tendency towards rather obvious cheating, whilst at the
same time developing a strategy for more subtle cheating alongside this.
In this way, it is possible to see how the ability to formuate deceptive
motives for one's actions is not ruled out by the analysis of repression I
have advanced here. Indeed, if this reasoning is accepted, some degree of
critical self-awareness would seem to be a pre-requisite of successful self-
deception through repression. This argument suggests, therefore, that the
general principle that repression allows only those actions for which
publicly acceptable motives can be formulated stands, but that what is
considered to be "publicly acceptable" should be broadened to include a
measure of selfish conduct. Still, however, this does not imply that those
selfish motives which are formulated are necessarily to be equated with
genuine motives. On the contrary, it is quite feasible that a publicly
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acceptable selfish motive (as it were), which is formulated for a given
action, in fact disguises its repressed, unacceptable motivation.
This last point brings us to a second, and perhaps less obvious, problem
raised by this analysis of self-consciousness, which relates to its
implications for the possibility of that analysis itself. If, as I am arguing,
the content of all consciousness and self-consciousness is ultimately
explicable only in terms of inclusive fitness considerations, then this
would seem to preclude the possibility of any account legitimately
claiming independent validity. If the only motivation of which I can
become self-conscious, is that of which to become self-conscious is
evolutionarily adaptive, then the formulation of motivation which I am
offering here, cannot be in any way different in quality from that which I
am imputing to actors in general. It would seem then, that for the theorist
to claim independent validity for his formulation is, in this case, to deny
the very premises of that formulation.
The first poi;nt to make in reply to this, is that similar criticisms can be
made of any attempt to explain human action in terms other than 'pure
reason'. This is not to say that action should be explained in these terms;
on the contrary, such an explanation could not operate independently of
the terms of the actor, and would thus not constitute an explanation at all.
The point which I am making is the familiar one that since social theorists
are also social actors, any attempt to theorize social action must also
encompass the act of theorizing itself. And, since the act of theorizing
implicitly denies the theorized an independent validity - that is, a fully
self-evident nature - it can be argued that the act of theorizing therefore
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implicitly denies its own independent validity, and the self-evident
nature which it assumes.
The requirement, therefore, is for the theorist to be able to decouple the act
of theorizing from the theorized, and this can generally only be done if it
can be shown, minimally, that the conditions responsible for the theorized
do not apply to the theorizing, and that those which are responsible for the
theorizing are somehow authoritative. In the context of the present
argument, therefore, the claim that it is correct to say that the motivation
and meaning of an action may in fact be different from that self¬
consciously attributed to it by the actor could itself be accused of possessing
a motivation and meaning different from that which I am attributing to it,
namely that it is true. This can be avoided, however, if I am able to show
that the conditions which apply to action in general (namely, that its
meaning is self-deceptively formulated), do not apply to the act of
theorizing about action, and that such theorizing can be formulated in
such a way as to secure its independent validity.
But what grounds are there for supposing that such a separation of
theorizing from self-deception is possible or legitimate? On the face of it,
this seems a most unpromising proposal, since the theory apparently
stands or falls on the fact that one's true motivation is obscured from
consciousness, and yet, at the same time, it articulates what it claims to be
the true basis of motivation. To see how such a separation may
nevertheless be possible, it is important to remember that it is only one's
own motives of which it will be adaptive to be unconscious, and therefore
that it is only one's own actions whose meanings are likely to be self-
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deceptively formulated. The act of formulating the motives of others,
however, can easily be seen to be of a quite different kind, when it is
remembered that far from being unconscious of the true deceptive nature
of other individuals' actions, it will clearly be in our interests to have as
profound an insight into their true nature as possible.
What this means then, is that whilst our motives for formulating the
motives of others might be self-deceptively formulated - for instance as
scientifically rather than personally relevant - the content of the motives
we ascribe to others need not necessarily be inaccurate. On the contrary,
the more closely our interpretation of the actions of others corresponds to
their own unconscious motives, the better placed we are to prevent our
own exploitation. Of course this does not in itself explain Freud or
Darwin, or why psychoanalysis and evolution were not discovered twelve
thousand years ago, but it does suggest that we have not evolved powerful
barriers against the understanding of motivation in the abstract, as we
have against understanding it in ourselves, and thus that it is possible to
be correct in our abstract formulations about human motivation, even if
this is not guaranteed.
This last observation does, however, raise two further issues which need
explicitly to be mentioned. First there is the question of the therapeutic
aim of psychoanalysis, which is to do precisely that which I am suggesting
is impossible, and enable individuals to subjectively accept the true basis
of their repressed unconscious motivations. The second is the
demonstrable fact that individuals on occasion deceive themselves not
merely about their own motivation, but also that of others. This point,
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which will prove to be of considerable importance, will be examined in
the next chapter, but for the time being, let us consider the first.
The first point which needs to be made about psychoanalytic therapy, is
that it is characterized by the operation of resistances, the removal of
which is seen as the chief task of analysis, but one which is notoriously
difficult to achieve. Yet even given the assumption of such resistances,
there does not seem to be any compelling reason why self-insight should
ever be achieved. To see how something resembling self-insight might
come about, it is necessary to consider whether there are any
circumstances under which it would be adaptive to attain anything
approaching a full awareness of one's own motives. Since, according to
the view I am advancing, the chief reason for self-deception is the
performance of self-serving actions for which publicly acceptable motives
can be formulated, it would seem that the only circumstances under
which such self-deceptions can become redundant are when the publicly
acceptable motive which is formulated fails in its purpose. That is, when
those who one is attempting to deceive, become aware that such a
deception is being practised. However, it must be emphasised that this is
very unlikely to be straightforward, since whilst there is a possibility that
the deception may be restored, an awareness of the true nature of the
motive would be disadvantageous. At the same time, a total denial of the
basis of the accuser's insight, whilst possibly adaptive for a while, could
not be expected to be plausible in the light of overwhelming evidence to
the contrary.
134
What all of this suggests, therefore, is that providing the motive of which
one is accused is more publicly acceptable than the true motive, even if
closer to this than that which is consciously formulated, it may be adaptive
to accept the motive of which one is accused. This is because, although
not ideal from a deceptive point of view, it is at least believed, and because
of the distance which still exists between it and the true motive, a degree
of deception - and self-deception - may still be successfully practised. The
implications of this for psychotherapy are therefore rather ironic, in that it
follows from this that interpretations of one's actions which are in fact
farthest from the truth, and so most publicly acceptable, are those which
are most likely to be accepted. Those which, by contrast, are closest to the
repressed reality, can be expected to be the most difficult to subjectively
formulate, despite the intervention of the therapist.
If we consider this point in terms of the functions of repression I have
been advancing, it is possible to see that in the case of one's actions being
interpreted as revealing a deeper motive which is still publicly acceptable,
the action implied by this motive, providing it is still acceptably close to
the repressed, could be substituted for that which has been analysed. The
adaptive significance of this is obvious. If a piece of deception fails, the
most adaptive strategy will be to reformulate the deception, not as the
truth, but as another, but more credible, deception. In terms of self-
deception, therefore, once it is no longer adaptive to maintain one self-
deception - because it has been correctly revealed as just that - it will be
adaptive to replace it with another self-deception which has been ratified
as both publicly acceptable and credible. However, in the event of the true
motivation of an action being formulated by another individual, to self-
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consciously formulate it as one's true motivation would negate the very
purpose of the self-conscious formulation of one's motives. In other
words, true insight into one's own motivation would seem to be ruled out
by the very evolution of self-consciousness.
Does this therefore mean that all psychoanalytic interpretations which are
accepted by the analysand are necessarily greater or lesser distortions of the
truth? If this is the conclusion which must be reached, then not merely is
doubt cast on the viability of psychoanalysis as a therapeutic method, but
also on the adequacy of those theoretical assumptions derived from
clinical experience. This conclusion clearly hinges upon the relationship
which is assumed between becoming self-conscious of a wish to perform a
certain action, and the performance of that action. If, however, we accept
the argument that self-consciousness evolved not merely to facilitate the
formulation of self-deceptive motives for its own sake, but instead so that
only those actions for which publicly acceptable motives can be formulated
are peformed, it is possible to see that the relationship between self-
consciousness and action is not necessarily as straightforward as it appears.
This is because whilst the performance of an action implies that its
motives can be deceptively formulated, the formulation of motives does
not necessarily imply that the action will be performed. Indeed, if
consciousness represents the likely response of others to an action, the
very fact that a wish is consciously formulated by the actor as unacceptable,
suggests that it will not be enacted in that form. It would only be those
actions, therefore, which are formulated as desirable, which are likely to be
performed, and it is precisely the formulation of true motives by the
actor, but without their subsequent enactment, which is the aim of
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psychoanalysis, at least the mature method of classical analysis employed
by Freud after 1920 (see Badcock 1988, ch.6).
This does not mean, of course, that when a repressed wish is self¬
consciously formulated it should cease to produce transformed
representatives. Insofar as this assumption is made by psychoanalysis, it
seems to be without biological foundation, and a product of a therapeutic
bias - not an accusation easily made of Freud himself - which unjustifiably
equates the return of repressed derivatives with mental abnormality.
In terms of the view offered here, then, we can now see that the
assumption of the adaptive functions of repression I have outlined means
that it is theoretically possible to gain true insight into one's motives, but
only at the expense of their enactment in that form. Indeed, it suggests
that in the event of another individual correctly intuiting the basis of
one's true motivation, if the deceit cannot plausibly be maintained (the
processes of which are discussed in subsequent chapters), it may be
adaptive to self-consciously formulate one's true motivation as
undesirable, so as to best advertise a commitment to its prevention.
I have tried in this chapter to outline a view of self-deception and its role
in motivation which is compatible with both the insights of classical
psychoanalytic theory, and modern evolutionary biology. In the next
chapter, I wish to broaden this discussion to consider the possibility of
collective motivation and self-deception, in relation both to the
arguments advanced in this chapter, and those elaborated previously.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Inclusive Fitness and the Nature of the Group
The central argument of the last chapter was that the evolution of human
consciousness can only be understood in terms of its deceptive functions;
that is, in terms of the role of repression in facilitating the performance of
actions which are both deceptive, but for which publicly acceptable
motives can be formulated. As I pointed out, this argument suggests that
whilst an accurate insight into one's own motives is unlikely to evolve,
the ability to correctly intuit the deceptive motives of others could,
correspondingly, be expected to evolve as a counter-measure. I also
pointed out however, that this argument is complicated by the fact that
self-deception appears not to be in reality as individualistic as this. Indeed,
it is perfectly self-evident that actors do not merely attribute publicly
acceptable motives to their own actions, but also to those of others. At
first sight this realization appears to cast considerable doubt on the validity
of my analysis: if individuals are as likely to attribute publicly acceptable
motives to others as they are to themselves, then surely it cannot be
argued that such self-deceptive formulations of motive have an adaptive
value. In fact, following my argument, this realization would seem to
have the effect of forcing exactly the opposite conclusion, since to deceive
oneself about the motives of others must carry with it an adaptive penalty.
To see why this is not the conclusion which must necessarily be drawn,
and to see how this problem relates to the arguments advanced in
previous chapters, it is necessary to begin with a more detailed analysis of
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the source of the contents of self-deception, or in psychoanalytic terms, the
basis on which material is repressed and admitted to consciousness.
The Ontogenesis of Self-Deception
Throughout my discussions of psychoanalysis, and the relevance of
psychoanalytic ideas to the problems posed by evolutionary biology, I
have stressed the emphasis placed by Freud on phylogenetic
considerations. At the same time, however, I have attempted to show
how Freud's formulation avoids the trap of rigid biological determinism,
and instead recognizes a complex interplay between phylogenesis and
ontogenesis. My purpose here, before moving on to directly address the
question of collective self-deception, is to elaborate somewhat on this
relationship, and in particular to consider the evolutionary logic of the
relationship on the matter of self-deception.
The thrust of my argument so far has been that since one's own genetic
interests inevitably diverge from those of others, it will be adaptive to take
the interests of others into account when acting, since a failure to do so
could be expected to lead to costly conflicts, which could outweigh the
advantages of genetically self-interested motivations. In order to explore
exactly what it means to take the interests of others into account, however,
I wish now to consider a number of possible alternatives, and stress the
relative roles of ontogeny and phylogeny in each.
The first possibility is that we are simply selected not to wish to act in ways
which are likely to enhance our own fitness at the expense of others.
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Although such a position might appear to contravene the impossibility of
the evolution of altruism, it is in fact theoretically possible since the cost of
cheating could come to outweigh its advantages, if its detection and
punishment was strongly enough selected. Yet, for the reasons given in
the last chapter, although possible, such a situation seems highly unlikely
to become an evolutionarily stable strategy (Maynard Smith 1974), since
cheating in a more subtle way would always carry with it a much greater
selective advantage, with the same immediate effect of avoiding the
maladaptive consequences of detection (Trivers 1981, 1985).
The second possibility is that self-interested motives exist, but that the
content of those which are denied conscious expression and enactment is a
biological given. In other words, those impulses which undergo
repression do so because biologically compelled. Although this
formulation has the merit of allowing an independent source of self-
interested motivation, it suffers from a degree of inflexibility, and for
practical purposes has similar drawbacks to the first possibility. This is
because were the content of that which is denied to consciousness
determined entirely by biology, there would exist the possibilities either
that fitness sacrifices are made when not necessary, or alternatively that
inadequate sacrifices are made when greater sacrifices are adaptively
useful. That is, such a state of affairs would not be able to take into
account, and hence maximize the fitness gain from, any fluctuations in
the degree of tolerance or awareness of other actors.
A third possibility, therefore, is that the content of the motives which are
excluded from consciousness is determined entirely by the exigencies of
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the immediate social environment. This would have the advantage of
permitting a high degree of sensitivity to such fluctuations, but would also
carry with it significant penalties. In particular, and this is the essence of
the criticisms made of Marcuse's theory in chapter five, it would involve
an equation of self-restraint with the unbridled genetic interests of others,
which is tantamount to a genetic predisposition towards allowing oneself
to be the victim of deception. In other words, it is equivalent to a genetic
predisposition towards altruism.
The final possibility, however, is that whilst the content of that which is
denied conscious expression is sensitive to fluctuations in what is publicly
acceptable, that which is capable of being accepted as falling within the
sphere of "public acceptability" has a biologically defined limit. In other
words, restrictions placed upon the actor which go beyond those which it
is to his genetic advantage to observe - that is, those which benefit other
individuals at his expense - ought not to be accepted as the basis for
repression. At the same time, if self- interested actions can be performed
without incurring sanctions from those whose interests they work against,
then it would clearly be in any actor's interests to take advantage of this.
What this therefore suggests is the evolution of a degree of ontogenetic
flexibility in the content of those self-serving motivations which are
denied access to consciousness (and hence direct enactment), but an
essential underlying biological blueprint, working to prevent self-
deception from serving conflicting genetic interests.
It is in the light of this observation of the logic of self-deception, that the
relationship which Freud posited between phylogeny and ontogeny in the
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emergence of the ego and super-ego needs to be understood. I pointed out
in chapter five that Freud's view of the super-ego was most certainly not
entirely environmentally contingent; on the contrary, it is understood
fundamentally as a phylogenetic acquisition dependent upon the
operation of primal repression. At the same time, the ontogenetic
emergence of particular super-egos is the consequence of the
internalization of certain parental restrictions in early childhood:
The installation of the super-ego can be
described as a successful instance of
identification with the parental agency (1939,
S.E. 23, pp.63-64).
This dual origin - phylogenetic blueprint and ontogenetic detail -
correspond, therefore, at least in outline, to the dual need for sensitivity to
variations in public acceptability and the prevention of unbridled
deception.
It is particularly significant for the present argument that Freud regarded
the source of super-ego ontogenesis as identification with parental
agencies. This is because, if indeed it is correct to regard the agency of the
super-ego as performing the adaptive functions I am suggesting, the
parental view of that which is publicly acceptable can be expected to be the
most reliable available. This is in spite of the fact that, as Trivers has
shown (1974, 1985), parent-offspring conflict can be expected to be a
ubiquitous feature of parent-infant relations. The reason for this is that
although, as Trivers demonstrates, the genetic interests of parents and
their offspring are not identical, parental interests do nevertheless remain
the closest to those of the infant that can be expected under normal
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circumstances. Furthermore, if the strictly Freudian view of the matter I
have so far advocated is the one which is accepted, the difference in
interest which does exist between parents and their offspring is
accommodated by the fundamentally conflictual model which is thereby
assumed. This point is indeed recognized explicitly by Trivers:
Since the personality and conscience of a child is
expected to affect the child's altruism and
selfishness, these characteristics may be a matter
of disagreement between parent and
offspring...So far as we know, personality and
conscience are formed early in socialization,
probably during the first five years of a child's
life. We expect the child to develop during this
time internal representations of its parents'
viewpoints as well as its own. These may be in
conflict, requiring mediation by some third
entity. This suggests a similarity to Freud's
system of the id, the super-ego, and the ego. The
id represents internal, innate, egoistic impulses
in the Freudian system. We might say it
represents the offspring's own self- interest. The
super-ego represents the internalized demands
of the parents and is developed in interactions
with them. The ego, in turn, acts as a referee,
reconciling the demands of the id and super-ego
(Trivers 1985, p.163, italics in original).
To identify with unrelated individuals on the other hand, and thus
9
effectively adopt their standard of the publicly acceptable would, by virtue
of the absence of any genetic similarity, again open the possibility of
exploitation. Given the phylogenetic blueprint for the content of the
super-ego, such a possibility would clearly not be without limit, but could
nevertheless be expected to be real, and evolutionarily significant.
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What this argument therefore suggests, is that the type of compromises
which individuals actually make between fundamental fitness
maximizing wishes, and the demands of public acceptability as mediated
through parental authority are, to a degree, variable. But, where the
expectations of evolutionary theory are borne out by classical
psychoanalysis is in the assumption of a phylogenetic limit to this
variability; in short, only that which it is adaptive to vary is in fact varied.
This means then that the degree of self-deception which an individual
actually practises - and hence according to the argument being developed
here, the actions which are actually performed by way of a compromise -
will exhibit some variation according to limits which are ontogenetically
set to public acceptability in childhood.
Ontogenesis and Culture as Collective Self-Deception
As I remarked at the beginning of this chapter, a tendency to deceive
oneself about the motives of others seems to be most unlikely to evolve,
and yet it is quite clear that such a tendency does exist. Indeed, when the
relationship I am suggesting between behaviour and self-deception is
considered, this tendency would seem to come very close to being the rule
rather than the exception. To see why such a realization is so problematic
for the theory I am advancing, we need briefly to consider the
evolutionary logic of the consequences of behavioural similarity.
My argument so far has been that behaviour is the product of compromise
between an unconscious fitness maximizing wish which, if enacted,
would benefit the actor at the expense of others (with ultimately
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maladaptive consequences), and the internalized representative of certain
parental prohibitions. The effect of this is that actions which are
performed can be expected to be deceptions, for which publicly acceptable
motives can be formulated, since it is only in this way that action can be
both motivated according to the basic principles of evolutionary biology
and yet still be successfully carried out in an environment of competing
genetic interests. If, however, actions are indeed deceptive - that is, tend to
benefit the actor at the cost of others - then it is difficult to see how not
merely has there evolved no antipathy towards behaviourally similar
others, but moreover why it is that human societies seem, on the contrary,
to be based primarily upon sympathy towards behavioural similarity.
The reason for this difficulty is that if one's own actions are deceptive,
then to welcome the very same deception in others - indeed to use the
exhibition of such a deception as the basis for altruism - is equivalent to a
motivated self-sacrifice. To illustrate this we could take the hypothetical
example of a possible transformation of an unconscious desire to engage
in gross cheating. Let us suppose that this unconscious desire meets with
an internalized prohibition of such wishes (from the super-ego), and that
the well known Freudian defence of projection is employed to deal with
this wish as it seeks to return from the repressed.' Briefly, projection is
the defence in which an unconscious wish is prevented from gaining
conscious expression by consciously and compulsively attributing it to
another individual. Thus, for example, the actor in question may
habitually make accusations of non-reciprocation of other individuals,
' The mechanism of projection is discussed in detail, in connection with sexual object choice,
in chapter nine.
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and remain quite unconscious of the fact that the basis of this is his own
desire to do the same. The adaptive significance of such a strategy is not
difficult to see: by making accusations of this type, the actor affirms to any
individual with whom he is prepared to engage in reciprocal interactions
that this individual is trusted to reciprocate. At the same time, the
awareness that the actor in question is acutely sensitive to attempts at
cheating, could be expected to reduce the confidence of the actor with
whom he is interacting in the possible success of any attempt at non-
reciprocation. The effect of this, therefore, will be that the original actor
actually gains from the interaction, by effectively reducing the chances of
non-reciprocation (see Nesse & Lloyd 1990). In this way the strategy of
projecting such a fitness enhancing desire, whilst apparently equivalent to
its abandonment, may in fact result in the achievement of a more secure
benefit by means of a more round-about route.
If we now apply this example to my argument, we can see that an
individual who behaves in the way described could be expected to be
selected to avoid interactions with others who behave in a similar way.
This is because such behaviour confers a fitness advantage to its bearer at
the expense of those with whom he interacts, and so to interact with an
individual who behaves in the same way ought to result at best in perfect
reciprocation, and at worst in a relative fitness loss. Yet even if perfect
reciprocation were the likely outcome, interactions involving full-
reciprocation ought to be systematically rejected in favour of those which
confer an adaptive advantage, that is, those in which cheating prospers. In
reality however, rather than exhibiting the sort of mild negative attraction
which this argument predicts, it is obvious that similarly disposed
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individuals attract. A particularly striking example of this, and pertinent
to the example given here, is the sympathy which develops amongst
individuals who share common negative evaluations of some other
individual or group, and in particular, one might consider the formation
of groups based upon racial hatred. If the irrational accusations and
attribution of negative characteristics which is typical of such groups is
indeed based upon a projection of the unconscious wishes of the accusers,
then, on this argument, such accusers ought to be selected to avoid
interactions with each other. What typically happens instead, however, is
that individuals who adopt similar compromises (defences in
psychoanalytic terms), form into groups which collectively pursue the
actions which constitute the compromise. In other words, individuals
who practise similar self-deceptions, seem to deceive themselves about the
motives of each other, and therefore, on this basis, effectively render each
other altruism. As I have remarked, this could be interpreted as a pattern
of pure reciprocity, but it should be remembered that it is also effectively a
self-imposed restriction on deception, and so is relatively
disadvantageous; certainly it must confer sufficient a disadvantage to
confound the explanation of its evident strength.
The problem can however be solved if we briefly return to the central
insight of Hamilton's model (1964a,b) which was discussed in chapter
one. The essence of this insight, it will be recalled, is that since selection
can only be considered to operate at the level of the individual gene,
calculations of genetic self-interest must also take into account kinship;
that is, fitness becomes inclusive fitness. In this way, as I mentioned in
the last chapter, it is argued that one of the fundamental forms of apparent
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altruism is kin altruism; that is, apparent acts of altruism are explained by
the probability that an identical copy of a gene will appear in the recipient
by common descent. But the question remains, how could this
phenomenon explain the case of apparent altruism which I am currently
discussing? After all, what we are dealing with in this case is not genetic
similarity at all, but behavioural similarity which, I have strenuously
argued, is not rigidly biologically determined as are purely physical
characteristics.
To answer this question we need to consider the relationship which I have
so far implicitly posited between behavioural and genetic similarity, which
at first sight may appear unrelated, but which in fact, as further
consideration reveals, are nothing of the kind. I ponted out earlier in this
chapter that a crucial point at which evolutionary expectations are borne
out by psychoanalytic theory is in the ontogenetic emergence of the specific
contents of the individual super-ego (within a basic phylogenetic
blueprint), which facilitates sensitivity to fluctuations in standards of
public acceptability. Given in addition, however, the convergence of
evolutionary and psychoanalytic theory on the matter of the parental
source of super-ego ontogenesis, and the relationship which exists
between this and actual behaviour enacted by way of compromises, it
follows that similar behaviour is the product of similar internalized
prohibitions and therefore a reliable indicator of relatedness. In other
words, since similar behaviour results from similar parental prohibitions,
it is reasonable to surmise that under the circumstances of our
environment of evolutionary adaptedness - primal hunter-gatherer
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societies - similar behaviour, more often than not, would indicate similar
parenthood.
Considered from this point of view, the apparent altruism which would
be involved in collective self-deceptions based upon behvioural similarity-
could be explained as an example of kin-altruism. Because the genetic
interests of kin overlap, so do benefits derived from self-deception, even
though this involves technically becoming the victim of a relative's
deception. This is because one's victimization confers a fitness benefit to
another who possesses a proportion of one's own genes, and so those
genes enjoy a net benefit through the advantage conferred on the relative.
It is a striking fact that Freud advanced a model of the processes involved
in group formation which adumbrates, in the closest detail, the modern
evolutionary calculations which underlie this reasoning. This point has
been developed by Christopher Badcock, who, in particular, has pointed
out the similarity between the psychoanalytic concept of identification and
the evolutionary expectation of a psychological mechanism mediating
kin-altruism (see also Rancour-Laferriere 1981):
Freud's declaration that 'Identification is known
to psychoanalysis as the earliest expression of an
emotional tie with another person' [1921, S.E.18,
p.105] points towards the considerable
psychological evidence underpinning the
contention that identification is basic to kin
altruism in human beings. The element of
altruism comes about, evidently, by making
individuals identify with others to the extent of
doing for them what they might otherwise only
do for themselves. Yet one of Freud's most
important insights was that this ability to
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overcome one's sense of difference from - and
indifference to - the other is a consequence, not
of an innate tendency to form indiscriminate
identifications with other people, but of the
dynamic structure of the process of
identification itself (Badcock 1986, ppl01-102).
It is precisely the dynamic structure of the process of identification, as
conceived by Freud, which gives the concept of identification such
pertinence to the present discussion. It is in his major work on collective
psychology, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921, S.E 18),
that Freud gives his most thorough discussion of the phenomenon of
identification. Here he stresses that identification in adulthood is based
upon the infantile prototypes (that is, with the parents) which formed the
basis of super-ego ontogenesis. Identifications, however, and this is where
Freud's analysis is crucial for the present argument, do not come about
directly between individuals but rather occur indirectly as a result of the
perception of a common relationship with an ideal. Specifically, Freud
argued:
A primary group of this kind is a number of
individuals who have put one and the same
object in place of their ego ideal [super-ego] and
have consequently identified with one another
in their ego (1921, S.E. 18, p.116, italics in
original).
Exactly as predicted by the argument above, Freud's model of
identification is based upon the surest possible predictor of relatedness: a
common parent, as indicated by a common ego-ideal. Where the
convergence of psychoanalytic and evolutionary theory is perhaps most
important, however, is in their recognition of an individual, instinctual
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basis to apparently arbitrary collective phenomena. For, not only does the
concept of identification provide an explanation for the apparent altruism
involved in group phenomena, but also suggests that the content of group
behaviour - in a word, culture - can be explained in exactly the same way
as individual behaviour. In short, just as individual behaviour is the
result of a compromise between a fitness maximizing wish and the
demands of public acceptability, so it is for culture, with the difference that
here a number of individuals have internalized similar standards of
public acceptability, and hence are practising similar self-deceptions and
resulting behavioural compromises.
This argument suggests moreover, that the penalties associated with
rendering altruism to unrelated individuals should exert a selective
pressure on both the emphasis of group identity, and the detection of
difference. Thus, individuals sharing behavioural compromises similar
enough to indicate relatedness, could be expected to be selected to
emphasise their similarity against their differences, and at the same time
to be able to discriminate against those not similar enough to indicate
relatedness. This suggests first of all that "cultural" groups of all kinds
should be defined by a common behavioural pattern which has strictly
defined limits. But because of the origin of the behavioural similarity
involved, genuine relatedness would only be indicated by a motivated
commitment to the behavioural pattern in question; in other words, a
genuine compromise. For this reason, anyone traversing the limits of the
group's behavioural pattern could be reliably predicted to have formed a
behavioural compromise based upon a different internalized standard of
acceptability; that is, they would not be related. At the same time, this
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suggests that because altruism, either direct, or in the form of the sharing
of self-deceptions, is a consequence of behavioural similarity, an obvious
form of cheating would be mimicry, that is, exaggerating one's
commitment to the compromises of the group whilst in fact maintaining
commitment to alternative compromises. Like all forms of cheating,
however, we can expect this to have its counterpart in the evolution of the
means for its detection. For instance, in the case of racial hatred
mentioned earlier, we could consider the likely fate of an individual who
professed a genuine disregard for the particular despised group but who
was found secretly displaying considerable friendship towards one of its
members. A better example still would be a professed member of a
religious organization which strictly prohibits extra-marital relationships
being caught in flagrante; what is at issue in this case is not the desire to
engage in such behaviour - we can assume that this is the latent meaning
behind the abstemious behaviour of all members - but the fact that the
individual in question adopted a different compromise, and therefore
displayed a different standard of public acceptability. In this case, the
action performed indicates a weaker standard of public acceptability, and so
not merely is the individual in question displaying a different source of
internalized restraint - and thus is not related - but is actually enjoying a
fitness gain from the action, logically at the expense of those in whom
such behaviour is prohibited. It thus follows that such group members
should be selected to become fully aware of the selfish nature of this
conduct, and so cease any identification with this individual. In this way,
the suggestion that "cultural" groups of all kinds are formed on the basis
of collective self-deceptions based on kinship as indicated by a common
source of internalized prohibition, may throw considerable light upon the
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general question of normative commitment, and indeed on the
consequences of normative deviation.
It has been often enough remarked too that not merely do the
behaviourally similar attract, but that they do so in opposition to the
dissimilar. Freud, for example, notes that:
Of two neighbouring towns each is the other's
most jealous rival; every little canton looks
down upon the others with contempt. Closely
related races keep one another at arm's length;
the South German cannot endure the North
German, the Englishman casts every type of
aspersion upon the Scot, the Spaniard despises
the Portuguese. We are no longer astonished
that greater differences should lead to an almost
insuperable repugnance, such as the Gallic
people feel for the German, the Aryan for the
Semite, and the white races for the coloured
(1921, S.E. 18. p. 101).
Similarly, Serge Moscovici observes:
The active and passionate fellow-feeling
experienced for one's compatriots or clansmen
or for those sharing the same idea had as its
counterpart a no less active and passionate
antipathy for the nationals of other countries,
the inhabitants of a neighbouring town, those
with a different religion or for foreigners, blacks,
Jews and the rest.
The combination of fellow-feeling for 'us' and
antipathy for 'them' had the corollary of a
feeling that 'we' were superior. Men are
frequently prepared to recognise as fully human
only those individuals belonging to their own
ethnic, linguistic or national group and to treat
outsiders as less than human. The names of
many Amerindian tribes simply mean 'men',
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'flesh' or 'people' (the Navajos, Apaches and
Utes, for example) and the Greeks were kind
enough to call all foreigners barbarians
(Moscovici, 1985, p.247).
If similarity does indeed have the significance I am claiming, then
observations such as these are readily explicable as the counterpart to kin-
altruism: an absence of altruism in dealings with unrelated individuals,
and a correspondingly acute awareness of any possible deceptions which
such individuals may be practising. Of course this analysis of collective
self-deception as based upon kinship is a striking example of the effect of
evolutionary time lags which was outlined in earlier chapters. Quite
clearly, the altruism which is rendered in such situations is, under
modern circumstances, maladaptive in the sense that it is not, in general,
directed towards kin at all, but unrelated individuals. Nevertheless, this
merely points to the fact that under the conditions of our evolutionary
adaptation, such behavioural similarity would have been a reliable
indicator of relatedness.
Considered with the criticisms I have already made of conventional social
theory in mind, the approach outlined here suggests that not only can
apparently maladaptive aspects of individual behaviour be explained from
an evolutionary point of view, but so also can its collective and apparently
normative aspects. Unlike conventional sociological perspectives which
regard the norm as essentially arbitrary and uni-directionally imposed
upon individual voluntarism to meet the demands of the social system,
the economic infrasturucture, or whatever other abstract sui generis
entity, this approach sees the norm as a collective behavioural
compromise between a biologically determined fitness maximising wish
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and the exigencies of public acceptability. The collective nature of
apparent normative conformity, which has traditionally been interpreted
as socialization or enculturation, is here understood as a manifestation
kin-altruism brought about by collective self-deception. In this way, the
theoretically unacceptable assumptions which underlie conventional
approaches to normative culture are avoided. Collective modes of
behaviour are not seen as possessing an arbitrarily imposed content, and
hence as externally motivated; rather, they possess a content which is
determined by biologically motivated transformations of fitness
maximising wishes. Similarly, variation in these collective modes of
behaviour, which as we have seen, seem to pose such a problem for
conventional sociobiological explanations, is entirely expectable from this
perspective, since they reflect varying sources of internal prohibition and
resulting compromises.
It is clear that the analysis offered here lends considerable support also to
Freud's contention that there are parallels between individual
psychopathology and culture, and indeed that the latter is little more than
a collective expression of the former.2 For example, in a paper dealing
with the parallels between religious practices and obsessional neurosis he
writes:
It is easy to see where the resemblances lie
between neurotic ceremonials and the sacred
acts of religious ritual: in the qualms of
2 For an attempt to develop the parallels between the two amongst Australian Aborigines,
see for example, Roheim (1934); for an account of the parallels in the case of the history of
religion, see Badcock (1980).
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conscience brought on by their neglect, in their
complete isolation from all other actions
(shown in the prohibition against interruption)
and in the conscientiousness with which they
are carried out in every detail (1907, S.E. 9, p.119).
A further parallel is indicated in the unconscious content and motivation
of neurosis and religious practices:
It is one of the conditions of the illness that the
person who is obeying a compulsion carries it
out without understanding its meaning - or at
any rate its chief meaning. It is only thanks to
the efforts of psychoanalytic treatment that he
becomes conscious of the meaning of his
obsessive action and, with it, of the motives that
are impelling him to it. We express this
important fact by saying that the obsessive action
serves to express unconscious motives and
ideas. In this we seem to find a further
departure from religious practices; but we must
remember that as a rule the ordinary pious
individual, too, performs a ceremonial without
concerning himself with its significance,
although priests and scientific investigators may
be familiar with the - mostly symbolic - meaning
of the ritual. In all believers, however, the
motives which impel them to religious practices
are unknown to them are or represented in
consciousness by others which are advanced in
their place (ibid., pp. 122-123 ).
•
In other words, collective cultural phenomena - such as religion - are the
product of self-deceptive compromises between internalized prohibitions
and unconscious repressed wishes, in exactly the same way as individual
behaviour, and as with individuial behaviour, their motivation can only
be understood in terms of biologically determined latent meaning. It is
precisely by the reduction of the motivation of all behaviour - individual
or collective, normal or pathological - to such latent meanings that
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psychoanalysis is able to break the hopeless circularity of conventional
social scientific explanation, and provide an evolutionarily satisfactory
model of the motivation of even such behaviour as appears to defy
evolutionary explanation absolutely.
I have in this chapter tried to show how the apparent paradox of collective
self-deception can be resolved when the biology of kinship is considered.
In so doing, however, I have suggested that, as psychoanalytic theory
would claim, the manifest meaning and content of collectively
undertaken self-deceptions is determined in exactly the same way as those
undertaken individually; that is they are motivated transformations of
fitness maximising wishes, frustrated by the necessities of the genetic self-
interest of others, as internalized in childhood on the basis of certain
phylogenetically determined limits and patterns. In the chapters which
follow, I wish to concentrate upon the exemplification of the mechanisms
by which such fitness maximising wishes are transformed, and how such
an approach is both empirically and theoretically more compelling than
either the sociobiological or the sociological alternatives. I have chosen to
illustrate these points with the example of sexual behaviour, since whilst
this is a sphere of behaviour which, in view of the evolutionary
arguments I have advanced, ought to be most heavily determined by
biology, in fact displays considerable variation and evidence of




Sexual Variation 1: Evolution, Commitment and Deception.
The Problem of Sexual Variation
There are a number of reasons why sexual behaviour is an appropriate
example to illustrate the problems posed by the evolutionary analysis of
human behaviour. By far the most obvious of these is the fact that of all
possible facets of behaviour it is the one which should, it seems, in view of
the arguments so far presented, be most clearly and unambiguously under
the control of biological mechanisms. Not only is sexual object choice
crucial for the evolutionary success of all other genetic adaptations, but so
also is sexual behaviour towards the chosen object. Simple evolutionary
theory suggests, therefore, that this should strongly favour the selection of
the optimization of both object choice and sexual behaviour, with a
common optimal pattern quickly developing. Gross non-reproductive
deviations from this pattern, by contrast, should be eliminated as soon as
they emerge, with weaker deviations gradually eliminated by increasingly
successful patterns. The reality of the situation is, however, not so
straightforward, since not merely do we find a startling array of objects of
human sexual desire, but also of behaviours adopted towards these objects.
Leaving aside for a moment the issue of "minority" sexual object choices -
such as those which cross sexual, species and even animate/inanimate
boundaries - there seem to be huge "cultural" variations in criteria of
sexual desirability even amongst objects which meet the basic gross
reproductive criteria which evolutionary theory predicts: Ford & Beach,
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for example, in their classic review of some 190 tribal societies conclude
that there are "few if any universal standards of sexual
attractiveness"(Ford & Beach 1951, p.86).
It has, however, been suggested by those sympathetic to evolutionary
biology that despite an admittedly high degree of variation in definitions
of sexual attractiveness, there are certain abstract universals which
underlie this variation. In particular, Ian Vine has suggested , following
Donald Symons (1979), that it is possible to isolate two substantive
universals of female beauty: indicators of general health and of
youthfulness, both of which are of obvious relevance to reproductive
success (Vine 1989). Moreover, even the evidence of Ford & Beach (1951)
suggests that there are universal features in the female assessment of male
attractiveness which differ from those in the case of male assessment of
females:
One very interesting generalization is that in
most societies the physical beauty of the female
receives more explicit attention than does the
handsomeness of the man. The attractiveness
of the man usually depends predominantly
upon his skills and prowess rather than upon
his physical appearance (Ford & Beach 1951,
p.86).
Again, it could plausibly be argued that "skills and prowess" are of obvious
relevance to the male's ultimate reproductive success, particularly in a
species where co-operative hunting by males evidently played such a
crucial role in its evolution (Hill 1982). The problem which such an
argument faces, however, is the familiar one that generalizations of this
sort are quite impotent when faced with empirically significant variation
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(see chapter 2 above). Moreover, in this particular case, exceptions to the
generalization which is alleged to obtain can be found with such ease and
frequency that it can hardly be considered meaningful at all.
This is not of course to deny that one should expect standards of
attractiveness to be relatively abstract. On the contrary, as Ian Vine has
emphasised, any biologically determined standard by which the
desirability of objects is assessed needs to be relative to the potential mates
likely to be available to any actor (Vine 1989, p.13). It is quite clear that an
actor biologically predisposed to become sexually aroused only by such
objects as in whom highly precise conditions are met, would be at a
distinct selective disadvantage over even a rather indiscriminate actor in
the not unlikely circumstances that someone meeting these criteria was
either unavailable or, if available, unwilling. Whilst this does indeed
suggest that excessive discrimination ought, in principle, to be selected
against, what it does not explain is the considerable variation which exists
in sexual ideals, indeed the existence of sexual ideals at all. This is because
if standards of attractiveness need merely to be abstract enough to allow
for limitations in the available objects, there does not, at aleast at first
sight, seem to be any reason why apparently detailed preferences do
develop.
Perhaps this can seen be most clearly by considering not only rather
elusive cross-cultural variations, but the altogether more obvious and
pronounced variations which occur intra-culturally. For example, we
could take fetishism, which has been defined as:
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...a form of behaviour wherein sexual activity or
sexual fantasy focuses to an unusual extent
upon a body part or an inanimate object rather
than on a person as a whole (Gosselin &
Wilson, 1984, p.90).
Evolutionary biologists have, of course, recognized the difficulty which
such instances pose, and have attempted to explain them in terms of
evolutionary theory. In particular, it has been suggested by some (e.g Daly
& Wilson 1983; Symons 1979) that since sexual "deviations" (with the
possible, although perhaps partial exception of homosexuality) are almost
entirely male preserves, they are explicable with reference to the sex-
specificity of human reproductive costs. Essentially this view holds that
because the cost of the sexual act - in terms of subsequent investment - is
far greater for the female than for the male, the female would be expected
to evolve highly discriminating strategies for sexual object choice, whilst
the male could be expected to be relatively indiscriminate. Thus, the
phenomenon in question might be explicable simply as the consequence
of an evolved lack of discrimination on the part of the male, reflecting the
relative "inexpensiveness" of his participation.
Whilst, as I shall later show, this line of reasoning has some relevance, it
is unacceptable as an explanation of sexual variation. First of all, the sex-
specificity of sexual variation is by no means an conclusive as supporters
of this theory assume, and despite a general lack of reported cases (e.g.
North 1970), examples of female variations do exist (see Caprio 1957, pp.
156-157, for case-histories of lesbianism associated with other practices).
Secondly, and this is the chief objection, an explanation of sexual variation
relying on an evolved tendency towards sexual indiscrimination,
completely fails to take account of the compulsive and frequently
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exclusive character of much of this behaviour. Moreover, not only is
behaviour such as fetishism compulsive and exclusive, it seems by its very
nature to be precisely the opposite of indiscriminate: North's account of
rubber-fetishism illustrates the highly detailed requirements of such
fetishists:
Features for which the fetishist demand is
considerable are: high and tight collars, back-
fastenings, straps, buckles and laces; very tight
fittings in general, rubber linings to leather and
P.V.C clothes, complete head and face coverings,
corsets and waist "cinchers" (North 1970, pp.69-
70).
Similarly a sado-masochistic and fetishistic informant of North's, Mr
F.H.J., details his requirements for the ideal instrument of punishment:
"I have very positive ideas on the type of cane to
be used. The purpose of the exercise is not really
to punish but to stimulate. Therefore the
schoolmaster's twelve of the best accross a
trousered or knickered bottom with a medium
weight three-quarter foot cane leaving black or
blue stripes is not the answer. The cane must be
long, thin and very swishy and used very hard
and always accross a bare bottom. It will then
sting terribly while making only a thin, faint red
stripe accross the bottom. A large number of
strokes can then be given without being really
brutal" (North 1970, p.186-7).
Not only are the requirements of fetishists extremely detailed, but,
according to North (1970) willing participants are often extraordinarily
difficult to find, with the effect that such individuals find sexual
satisfaction abnormally difficult to obtain. This hardly supports the
conclusion that the sexually deviant are indiscriminate, and when the
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risks of arrest and social ostracism associated with many forms of sexual
deviance are considered - for instance, exhibitionism, voyeurism, sado¬
masochism and frottage - it is suggested that they are driven by anything
but indifference; rather, an irresistable compulsion to engage in the
specific activity in question in favour of all others.
It is, however, worth pointing out that it is not merely evolutionary
biology which faces difficulties in explaianing such behaviour, but so also
do "cultural" theories. Leaving aside the biological objections to
conventional social scientific explanations discussed in detail in chapter
three, it is quite evident that for a theory which relies for its force upon the
assumption of arbitrary, externally constituted systems of signification
with the power to motivate action in accordance with these, the presence
of action in which this culturally constituted significance is ignored is
clearly difficult to explain. This point may be illustrated if we take again
the example of fetishism. In fact reliable data on the range of fetish objects
is difficult to obtain, probably because fetishists are generally secretive
about their deviation, and rarely feel the need or desire to seek treatment.
But the fact that such fetishes which have been documented include so
wide a range of objects as safety-pins (Mitchell, Falconer & Hill, 1954), wet
canvas shoes (Epstein 1975), and P.V.C. and rubber clothing (North 1970),
to list but a few, suggests that, if anything, they are chosen in spite of any
culturally determined significance.
In fact, the only sociological tradition to seriously attempt an explanation
of human sexual deviation - symbolic interactionism - explicitly denies
the sort of determinism typical of structural sociology; at the same time,
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however, the notion of an external motivating culture is as dominant as
ever. The Iowa interactionist, Kuhn writes:
Sex acts, sexual objects, sexual partners (human
or otherwise) like all other objects towards
which human beings behave are social objects;
that is they have meanings because meanings
are assigned to them by groups of which human
beings are members for there is nothing in the
physiology of man which gives a dependable
clue as to what pattern of activity will be
followed toward them. The meanings of these
social objects are mediated to the individual by
means of language just as in the case of all other
social objects. That the communicators which
involve these definitions are frequently - at least
in our society - surreptitious and characterized
by a huge degree of innuendo does not in any
wise diminish the truth of this assertion. In
short the sexual motives which human beings
have are derived from the social roles they play;
like all other motives these would not have
been possible were not the actions
physiologically possible, but the physiology does
not supply the motives, designate the partners,
invest the objects with performed passion, nor
even dictate the objectives to be achieved (Kuhn
1954, quoted in Plummer 1982, p.225).
I have no wish to repeat here my arguments against such a conception of
motivation, which are expressed in chapter 3 above; instead I mean to
emphasise the inadequacy of this formulation in coming to terms with the
empirical reality of sexual behaviour. According to the symbolic
interactionist point of view, and well illustrated by this quotation from
Kuhn, sexual objects become sexual objects exclusively as a result of the
imposition of sexual meaning by the social group. As Ken Plummer has
expressed it: "sexuality is in a broad sense assembled from the cultural
categories currently available" (Plummer 1982, p.235). In this way, it is
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suggested that all that is of sociological interest are the categories through
which individual sexualities are constructed, since without them there
would be no sexuality of any sort; normality (as expected by biological
theory) is no less a cultural construct than deviance. The implication of
this, therefore, is that if actors did not grasp the relevant cultural categories
defining sexualities and their consequent objects and activities of arousal,
there would be no sexual activity. Similarly, were there an array of sexual
categories entirely different from those which humanity has to date
known, sexual activity would have been manifested quite differently, its
only biological constraint being the "physiologically possible": a loose
constraint indeed!
Leaving aside, as I have said, the blatant biological ignorance of such a
view, the largest empirical challenge which this position faces is the
possibility of the emergence of a sexual practice or orientation not
corresponding to a prevailing cultural category: in other words, the
invention of perversion. Although it may be argued that the existence of
pre-categorical sexual activity, as it were, is evidence of the innate fluidity
of sexuality, and its openness to cultural construction, such a position
would be hopelessly inconsistent, since it would involve the arbitrary
attribution of biological determination to certain categories of behaviour
and not others. In other words, it would involve a straight reversal of the
crude biological distinction between normal and abnormal sexuality, with
private and novel deviations being regarded as natural, whilst common
publicly acknowledged activities such as heterosexual monogamy would
be dismissed as an arbitrary social construction. The difficulty of course
would be that this formulation would have no more grounds for making
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the distinction than the one it seeks to criticize; in many ways, of course, it
would have considerably less.
Although it is of course true that details of some sexual variations are
publicly available - through medical and psychological text-books,
pornographic literature etc. - many, in detail anyway, are not, either
because they are novel inventions of the actor, or because they develop
prior to any conceptual grasp of their nature or deviance. There is in fact
ample evidence that the sort of pre-categorical sexual activity to which I
am referring does indeed occur, which, in my view, removes any
empirical credibility the interactionist view may have claimed. Taking
again the example of fetishism, the following is an extract from another of
North's informants who describes his childhood "invention" of an
elaborate fetishistic and sado-masochistc perversion:
"This was the time of direction of labour and
Mother was forced to go out and take some job
in a clothing warehouse office (typical
democracy we live in). Anyway the house was
empty when I used to return from school in the
afternoon, and I used to go upstairs, lay the mac
on the bed, strip naked, bind my legs and arms
together, and fall face down onto the mac, this
resulted in ejaculation generally without
masturbation. This was superseded by wearing
the mac, strapping my ankles, knees thighs
together and passing a rope through a hook in
the pantry ceiling, tying it to my ankles and
heaving on the rope till I was hanging head
down from the ceiling. I fastened the rope to a
hook and used to put the mac hood on, fasten a
tight collar round my neck, strap my hands
together and then just 'think' and slightly
'strain'. This used to result in extreme erection
and forced ejaculation against the mac's inside"
(North 1970, pp.165-66).
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It could hardly be said that the sexual significance of these practices derives
from any pre-existing cultural categories.
A further objection which this line of argument suggests is that the
approach in question cannot explain why a particular sexual variation
should be constructed, indeed why any variation should be constructed at
all. If, as this view holds, the compulsion to engage in a deviant sexual
practice is consequent upon a process by which the actor defines himself as
such a deviant, the question of the source of this definition is raised. If
the definition must be actively applied by other actors, then cases where
the deviant practice is engaged in- or acted out in fantasy - entirely without
the knowledge of others (perhaps the majority) cannot be explained. If,
however, it is argued that the definition is applied by the actor himself, on
the basis of prevailing cultural categories, then the question of why they
are applied in some cases and not others is left open. This is because the
theory, in this form, assumes no pre-cultural variation in sexual object
choice, and hence any actor with a grasp of these prevailing cultural
categories would be theoretically as likely as any other to become a
compulsive pervert. In other words, what once again becomes of central
interest, this time for purely empirical reasons, is the source of the original
motivation to perform the actions in question.
The Evolution of Sexual Commitment
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It should be clear from the foregoing that the problem with which we are
faced is essentially one of explaining the origin of variation in subjectively
experienced sexual desire. In particular, the problem for evolutionary
biology is the existence of subjective, and often compulsive, preferences
for the maladaptive. In order to examine whether the method of analysis
I have so far proposed can shed light on this particular problem, I propose
to begin by considering the general issue of the evolutionary logic of
subjective preference, or, sexual commitment. From there it will be
possible to see whether the adaptive psychological mechanisms which are
thereby suggested can, with a consideration of the effects of evolutionary
time-lags, explain apparently inexplicable patterns of sexual commitment
to adaptively less than optimum objects, in terms of evolutionary theory.
Perhaps the most obvious point to be made about commitment to a sexual
object is that it will always be less than fully adaptive for the commitment
to be total. The simplest reason for this is that such a situation would
place the actor at a severe disadvantage in the event of that object's
prolonged absence or death. Similarly, such total commitment would be
maladaptive in the event of the possibility of an actor's inclusive fitness
being enhanced by the availability of an adaptively superior object. For
instance, a male who maintained total sexual commitment to a non-
reproductive female would certainly be at a selective disadvantage over
one who abandoned such a female in favour of another who was capable
of reproducing. 1 To fully appreciate the consequences of sexual
iThis example is rather contentious, since there is a debate as to whether the human
female's menopause is in fact an adaptation or an artifact. Dawkins (1989) claims that it is
an adaptation which has the effect of diverting the effort of the mature female into the
assistance of her existing offspring; Symons (1979) claims that it is an artifact produced by
modern circumstances, which allow females to live to an age which they would not have
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commitment, however, it is necessary to consider the relative costs and
benefits of male and female reproductive investment.
From a purely physiological point of view, as has already been mentioned,
by virtue of internal gestation, the reproductive investment of the
mammalian female is many times greater than that of the male. The
logical consequence of this, therefore, is that males could potentially
increase their reproductive success by many times by not restricting
themselves to a single female, and indeed, this is born out by studies of the
vast majority of mammalian species (see, for example, Eisenberg 1966; Le
Boeuf, 1974, illustrates this with the rather extreme case of the elephant
seal in which males produce up to twenty times as many offspring as
females; see also Symons 1979, Ch,l). At first sight this argument appears
to suggest the existence of strong pressures towards the selection of far
higher levels of sexual commitment in the female than in the male. This
is however misleading, principally because it fails to take account of
consequences, other than impregnation, which copulation may have for
females. In particular, it ignores the impact of male provisioning.
Considerable evidence exists to support the view that a crucial factor in the
evolution of the specifically human mind was male cooperative hunting,
and the consequent male provisioning of females and their offspring with
meat (Symons 1979, Hill 1981, Badcock 1990; see also, Eisenberg 1966).
Badcock (1990), following calculations by Hill (1981), suggests that because
the nutritional value of meat, expressed in relation to the time necessary
reached in the primal environment. In fact, there is no reason why the two positions should
be incompatible.
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to obtain and process it, is approximately ten times that of vegetation
(p.148), strong selective pressures would have existed for (polygynously
mated) females to prefer to copulate with successful male hunters, in
return for donations of meat. As I shall later suggest, this observation has
extremely important consequences for the evolution of sexual
commitment, but for the present it is sufficient to note that once females
have more to gain from copulations than insemination - i.e. donations of
meat which can be used to provision any of their offspring - a strategy of
total commitment can be seen to be theoretically maladaptive for the
female as well as the male.
But if it is clear that total sexual commitment should be in principle a
significantly less than optimum strategy for both males and females, it is
equally clear that the same applies to its opposite: total indiscrimination,
or sexual promiscuity. That this should be the case for the female is
obvious, the reasons for which have already been discussed. In the case of
the male, however, the situation is rather more complex, and has to do
with the concealement of ovulation in the human female. Unlike female
primates such as chimpanzees and gelada baboons who advertise their
periods of fertility by means of elaborate physical and behavioural changes,
which males of the species respond to with enormous sexual excitement,
the human female's fertile period is virtually impossible to
detect(Alexander & Noonan 1979; Burley 1979; Benshoof & Thornhill
1979; Symons 1979; Turke 1989; Badcock 1990). It has been hypothesised by
a number of authors that the characteristically human loss of advertised
ovulation is explicable as a strategy by which females secure extended
periods of investment from males (Alexander & Noonan 1979; Hill 1981;
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Badcock 1990). Relating this phenomenon to the role of male hunting and
meat provisioning in hominid evolution, Badcock writes:
If only fertilization is at stake, both male and
female have an interest in making sure that
copulations occur predominantly during estrus.
But if provisioning females with highly
nutritious food is at issue the interests of the
sexes differ dramatically.
From the point of view of a female, advertising
estrus becomes a losing tactic if meat can only be
had in exchange for copulations. This is
because...males who will give her meat when
she is not likely to conceive will find
themselves at a reproductive disadvantage
compared to those who reserve their gifts for
her fertile period (Badcock 1990, p.157).
In this way, the gradual development of increasingly concealed ovulation,
probably through increasing, rather than decreasing the period of the
advertisement of ovulation (Turke 1989), would effectively force males
into a situation in which to secure the fertilization of a particular female, a
longer period of sustained copulation with that female - and hence, we
must assume meat donation - becomes necessary.
There does, however, appear to be a possible weakness in this analysis. It
could be argued that an alternative male strategy, which in net terms
would produce identical results, could just as easily be envisaged. This is
that precisely because the concealement of ovulation leads to a much
reduced probability that any one copulation will lead to fertilisation, males
would be selected who invested less in each female, whilst
correspondingly increasing the number of females with whom they
interact sexually. Certainly from the female point of view this state of
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affairs would appear to make little difference: providing that each female
is the recipient of many meat donations, their source - as long as from
competent hunters, as would obviously be usual - is unimportant. Yet
considered from the male point of view, this scenario has a major
drawback. This is that the situations described would only produce equal
results for any given male if it could be assumed that each copulation was
potentially as valuable as any other in terms of inclusive fitness. Since,
however, we can assume the existence of genetic variation in any
population, it is quite clear that the offspring of some females will be fitter
than others. The consequence of this, therefore, is that there will exist
pressures for the selection of males who prefer to copulate with females
who will best enhance their inclusive fitness. In consequence of concealed
ovulation then, males will be selected to copulate for longer, in exchange
for larger donations of meat, with the most adaptively viable females.
Even if we accept, however, that the fact of the concealement of ovulation
would have necessitated longer periods of sexual commitment to
individual females, the period of commitment in question remains very
small. Moreover, the "commitment" required need by no means be
exclusive, since as long as his meat resources could stand it, the male
would be able to maintain sustained copluations with more than one
female during the same period. It should be noted, however, that this
argument assumes that the exchange of meat for copulations is taken
literally; that is, a single piece of meat is exchanged for a single copulation.
In reality such a situation is very unlikely to evolve. This is because
differential parental investment would place the female at a major
disadvantage in this exchange: a single donation of meat at the moment of
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conception - even a number of such donations during perhaps one or two
of the female's cycles - would make a hardly discernable difference to the
gestating mother, and practically none at all to the subsequent offspring. In
this way, sustained provisioning of meat to particular females will in fact
be selected in males by the pressure of female choice. Whilst it could be
replied, as I suggested earlier, that the source of the donations of meat is
unimportant from the female's point of view, such an argument ignores
the likely consequences of pregnancy and incumberance with young
offspring for female attractiveness to successful hunters.
The reason why we should expect such factors to diminish female
attractiveness is not difficult to see, once the adaptive benefit to the male
of exchanging meat for copulations is fully considered. Fertilization alone,
which I have so far implied is the chief male gain from the exchange, is in
fact totally irrelevant to the male's inclusive fitness without the crucial
additional factors of successful gestation, birth, maturation to adulthood
and subsequent successful reproduction.2 Thus, since meat has an
adaptively enhancing effect for females, via the provisioning of their
offspring, then so must it also for males, via exactly the same route. 3 The
effect of this therefore, is that whilst it is clearly in the evolutionary
interests of males to make continued meat donations to the mothers of
their offspring, the costs associated with such a strategy make confidence of
paternity a factor of crucial importance (Alexander & Noonan 1979; Turke
2I ignore, of course, for the purposes of the present argument, the possibility of offspring
contributing to parental inclusive fitness by supporting siblings.
3This also suggests that male attempts to circumvent female choice altogether by securing
forced matings ought to be selected against, at least as a dominant strategy. It does not,
however, seem to preclude the possibility that such a strategy could evolve as a
"subordinate" strategy, when, for instance, the regular route for the male is closed.
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1989). In other words, whilst a male can significantly enhance his
inclusive fitness by provisioning his own offspring, provisioning those of
other males - albeit inadvertently - carries with it fitness penalties of equal
proportions. It therefore seems highly likely that selection should favour
males who regard females with either born, or perhaps especially unborn
offspring of other males, as significantly less attractive than others without
such offspring. In this way, it seems likely that males will be selected to
provision such females with decreasing frequency, the more unmistakable
their lack of paternity becomes. It therefore follows that since males will
be selected to avoid provisioning unrelated offspring, rather than attempt
to elicit donations of meat from any male, irrespective of paternity,
females will be selected to concentrate on eliciting donations of meat from
males whose confidence of paternity is high.
The foregoing considerations suggest a very important conclusion
concerning the likelihood of the evolution of monogamy as a dominant
strategy, and the psychological mechanisms regulating sexual
commitment which are discussed in the next chapter. The key point is
that since males will be selected to demand confidence of paternity as a
pre-requisite of sustained commitment, females should be selected to
enhance any given male's confidence of paternity, even where, in reality,
this has a less than advertised basis. From the point of view of any
particular female, it would plainly be more advantageous to receive meat
donations from more than one source, but only if the confidence of
paternity of each donor could be guaranteed. Thus, a basic cleavage is
suggested between the relative interests of males and females over the
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matter of female sexual behaviour, in which male choice will constrain
females to deceptively advertise commitment to any particular male.
From the point of view of the male, we have already seen that his
commitment will be selected by both female choice and by direct benefits
to his inclusive fitness conferred by making continued donations of meat
to his offspring. It would therefore seem to follow that providing the
male can display a convincingly acceptable degree of commitment to the
female he is provisioning, and adequately provision his own offspring
(relative to others in the population), his fitness would be best served by
attempting to obtain additional matings. There is of course no necessary
reason why we should expect males to be constrained by female choice to
be monogamous; all female choice can be selected to demand (apart from
successful insemination) is commitment to resource provisioning, and
thus, provided the male's resources are adequate to support the offspring
of more than one female with equal effectiveness, females could be
selected to accept polygyny (the so-called polygyny threshold). Indeed it
has been suggested that polygynous behaviour in males actually confers a
selective advantage on females with whom they mate (Badcock 1990; Fox
1988). This is because males who possess genetic material underwriting the
capacity for successful polygyny, will tend to transmit this tendency to
their sons and thus the inclusive fitness of the female will be enhanced
through the polygyny of their male offspring.
Certainly there is impressive evidence that the primal human mating
system was polygyny. Badcock (1990), for example, summarizes important
physiological adaptations - marked sexual dimorphism, sexual
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bimaturism, differential life-expectancy and female menstrual synchrony -
which strongly support a polygynous model. Nevertheless, there are a
number of additional points which need to be discussed in order to clarify
the exact nature of the sort of psychological mechanisms which this
situation could have selected. First of all, although, as I have said, the
principle interest of the female will be in the male's commitment to
provisioning, it should not be forgotten that females will not be selected to
stop at a single offspring. At the same time, since a female who has
responsibility for the offspring of another male ought to be less attractive
than one without such a responsibility, her best strategy will clearly be for
her subsequent offspring to have the same father as the first. It therefore
follows that females are likely to be selected to prefer males - polygynous
or not - who will maintain a sustained commitment to them, rather than
to any particular offspring they may produce. Of course, at first sight this
does not seem to preclude the possibility of females tolerating
philandering behaviour in males. This is because males who enhance
their fitness exclusively through additional mating, rather than parental
effort (that is, who merely inseminate additional females without
provisioning them), do not detract from the availability of resources to the
regular mate(s), or seem to pose any particular threat to the probability of
subsequent fully provisioned pregnancy. Yet further reflection suggests
that there may be a greater risks to regular mates than at first are suggested.
The main risk associated with the toleration of male philandering from
the female point of view is that of the possibility of a subsequent transfer
of commitment, that is parental and mating effort, to another female.
Such a strategy would be selected in males if the offspring of the new
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female were likely to be adaptively superior to any further offspring which
might be produced by the original female. Since age is so crucial a factor in
determining the reproductive success of any particular female, such a
situation is entirely predictable, in fact largely inevitable. The point,
therefore, is that a male who philanders with pregnancy as a consequence
will be subject to selection pressures to provision this female in favour of
his original mate (assuming of course that his resources are not infinite).
Since there will be such strong selective pressures acting on males to
maximize their fitness at the expense of their original mates by acting in
this way, it is reasonable to conclude that equally strong pressures will
exist for females to resist male philandering.
A further reason why philandering on the part of males might be expected
to lead to the formation of new mating and parental commitments is the
choice exercised by his female targets. Although it is possible to imagine
situations in which it might pay a female to obtain copulations from
males without subsequent provisioning - essentially when an existing
male can be relied upon to provision any offspring this female may
produce - such a scenario could not be expected to obtain in the majority of
cases. This is because, first of all, since the male's target could be as yet
unattached to a provisioning male, in the event of the female target
offering greater reproductive potential than his existing mate, a transfer of
commitment would be in his evolutionary interests. Secondly, however,
we have already seen that female choice will be selected so that females
prefer males displaying commitment, and so, just as with any other case, a
philandering male would have to display commitment as a basic pre¬
requisite of a successful conquest. From the point of view of his original
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mate, therefore, a male's philandering could be taken as a reliable
indicator that he has at least displayed commitment to another female,
and so that his commitment to her is in possible jeopardy.
Looked at from the perspective of his original mate, then, a male's sexual
interest in other females must pose a threat in terms of continued
provisioning and subsequent provisioned pregnancies. Whilst, as I have
said, this scenario does not rule out polygyny as an adaptive mating
strategy for the female, it does suggest that females should be selected to
regard evidence of their mate's sexual preference for any other female or
females with suspicion. It further suggests that since females stand to lose
from this situation, they will be selected to respond appropriately: that is,
by reducing their commitment to their partner accordingly. Likewise,
since the adaptiveness of male provisioning is so crucially dependent
upon confidence of paternity, males should be selected to regard any
apparent sexual preference for other males in their mates with equal
suspicion, and ultimately also reduce their commitment to their partner.
It thus follows that since both males and females stand to lose the
commitment of their partner in the event of their sexual preferences for
another individuals becoming apparent, selection will strongly favour
mechanisms in both males and females which serve to successfully
advertise commitment, and disguise the formation of new sexual
interests.
Of course it may be objected that this line of reasoning fails to take account
of the fact that an individual choosing to remove all commitment to
another in favour of an adaptively superior object, should not be selected
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to take any interest at all in the sustained commitment of the original
object, and therefore, that there should be no selection to deceptively
advertise commitment to an object when none exists. This is an excellent
point, and no doubt perfectly correct in instances where commitment has
indeed been firmly re-established elsewhere. Nevertheless it has to be
remembered that before such a situation can be reached, the actor in
question has to establish that the potential object of commitment is indeed
preferable to the existing object(s) in each and every respect. In other
words, not merely do their superior parental characteristics need to be
demonstrated - in terms of heritable adaptations and parental care - but
also the likelihood of their maintaining sustained commitment. Thus, a
female contemplating a new mate would have to be satisfied with his
superior hunting prowess (as both a heritable characteristic and as a factor
in his provisioning potential) and his likely degree of future commitment
to her. A male, on the other hand, would need to establish the female's
maternal potential - both physiologically and behaviourally - and, again,
her likely degree of future commitment to him, as representative of his
expected confidence of paternity. The effect of this situation, therefore, is
that since these factors can only be established through relatively lengthy
research, there will certainly be occasions - perhaps the majority - when a
potential new object of commitment, chosen initially perhaps on the basis
of some overt physical superiority, on the basis of subsequent
investigation turns out to less appropriate than originally seemed to be the
case. Consequently, the period of investigation between the initial arousal
of interest, and the point at which the object is finally deemed to be
superior in each of these respects, will be one in which it will be necessary
to obscure all of this from the notice of the original mate. Thus, there will
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always be a period where a deceptive display of commitment will be
necessary so as to avoid, as it were, "burning one's boats" prematurely.
What this argument establishes, therefore, is that there will be selective
pressures acting upon both males and females to appear more committed
to their sexual partners than is in fact the case. But since all successful
deception, by definition, benefits the deceiver at the expense of the
deceived, there will also be selective pressures acting upon both males and
females to resist the deceptions being practised on them by their sexual
partners. This, as fully recognized by Trivers (see chapter 7 above), can
only lead to the evolution of deceptive and counter-deceptive
psychological mechanisms of increasing subtlety. It is to these
mechanisms that I turn in the following chapter, and to the elucidation of
what must so far appear to be the quite random connection between sexual
variation and the evolutionary logic of sexual commitment.
180
CHAPTER NINE
Sexual Variation 2: The Evolutionary Psychology of Sexual Commitment
Before I move on to discuss the precise mechanisms involved in the
advertisement of sexual commitment, and how these can shed light on
apparently inexplicable variation in sexual behaviour, I wish to begin by
considering certain general features of these mechanisms which are
strongly suggested by the selective pressures outlined in the previous
chapter. The first point which needs to be made in this connection, and
one which is equally applicable to the evolution of all forms of deception,
is that the rapid selection for increasing subtlety (Trivers 1981, 1985) is
effectively equivalent to selection for increasing plausibility. To see why
this is so, we need only notice that the most reliable indicator that another
individual is cheating would be their displaying levels of altruism beyond
that which could evolve. In other words, since it is a fact of nature that
altruism (beyond the special cases of kinship and reciprocity already
discussed) cannot evolve, it could be reliably predicted that displays of
apparent altruism, not falling into these categories, could not be the
product of evolution, and therefore, for the displays in question to have
evolved, they must have conferred some benefit on their bearers; they
must, in other words, be deceptive. It seems reasonable to surmise,
therefore, that since (random mutations apart) apparently altruistic
behaviour must in reality confer a benefit on the actor, individuals will be
selected to treat such behaviour in others with suspicion. Consequently
such overt displays of implausible "sham" altruism ought to be selected
against as deceptive strategies, in favour of behaviour which appears to
181
confer a benefit on the actor, albeit in reality a greater benefit than is
apparent.
This means, therefore, that in situations where the future conduct of
others is crucial for the success of a planned course of action, it will always
be in the evolutionary interests of any actor to believe the self-interested
motives of others, whilst remaining sceptical about their claims to
altruistic motivation. It follows, therefore, that those deceptive strategies
which are likely to be selected in favour of displays of implausible
altruism, will be those in which the actor stands to gain some obvious
benefit, whilst ultimately gaining more than this: in other words, it will
pay an actor, not to appear more altruistic than he actually is, but instead
to appear less selfish .
If this reasoning is applied to the example of sexual commitment, it can be
seen that given the fact that it will often pay to display greater
commitment than in fact one has, such displays ought, in theory, to be
selected to be based upon the apparent self-interest of the actor concerned.
The difficulty with such an analysis is that, at first sight anyway, there does
not appear to be any way in which individuals could be selected to regard
displays of apparent commitment as plausible. This is because, as I have
pointed out at length in the previous chapter, since it will always be in
one's interests to appear to be more committed than in fact one is, any
display of commitment should reliably indicate deception, and so selection
should favour individuals who do not accept claims of commitment in
others. Although this is a strong objection, it fails to consider two crucial
points. First, both males and females stand to gain from practising a degree
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of genuine commitment: females because as the possibility of successfully
persuading other males of their confidence of paternity diminishes, so the
risks associated with infidelity in terms of the loss of commitment from
the original mate increases; males because their commitment benefits
their own offspring through resource provisioning. The second point is
that the degree of commitment it will in any particular instance be
adaptive to render will vary with the characteristics of the partner. Thus,
males will be selected to show a greater degree of genuine commitment
towards females who possess valuable adaptive characteristics, and with
whom their confidence of paternity is high, than females who lack such
characteristics, or with whom their confidence of paternity is low.
Correspondingly, females will be selected to show greater genuine
commitment to males who are both in possession of adaptive
characteristics, and whose own commitment to protracted provisioning is
high. The significance of these points, therefore, that commitment can be
both genuine and variable, is that it is after all possible for displays of
commitment to be based upon self-interest, and hence for deceptive
displays of commitment to successfully evolve.
Ambivalence and Sexual Object Choice
Although as I have just emphasised, selection would have favoured the
evolution of genuine commitment in both males and females, the fact
remains that it will always be adaptive to exaggerate the extent of this, so
as to elicit greater levels of commitment from one's partner, than one's
own commitment warrants. It is with this in mind that I now wish to
consider one curious, but nevertheless central, theme in the classical
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psychoanalytic theory of object-relations: ambivalence. According to
psychoanalytic theory, a fundamental ambivalence of attitude is typical of
close emotional relationships:
The evidence of psychoanalysis shows that
almost every intimate emotional relation
between two people which lasts for some time -
marriage, friendship, the relations between
parents and children - contains a sediment of
feelings of hostility, which only escapes
perception as a result of repression (Freud, 1921,
S.E.18, p. 101).
Crucial though this idea is, not merely to the psychoanalytic conception of
"normal" relations, but also to the whole theory of psychopathology, it
does appear, on the face of it, to be somewhat far-fetched and unnecessarily
elaborate. If normal affectionate ties are only brought about by the
repression of hostile wishes, which inevitably co-exist alongside them, the
question is raised as to why it is necessary to postulate the existence of the
hostile element at all, when exactly the same effect could be achieved by
the assumption of the affectionate element alone.
Freud's own justification for this assumption was clinical, based upon the
free associations of his patients, and the evident value of the concept in
providing a satisfying metapsychological account of such
psychopathological states as obsessional neurosis, paranoia and
melancholia (or what we should today call depression). Considered in the
light of earlier discussions, however, it is possible to see that a compelling
evolutionary justification for the assumption of this phenomenon,
emerges from the considerations detailed in the previous chapter. The
essence of my argument about the evolution of commitment has been
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that whilst it will be adaptive to advertise a greater level of commitment
than in fact exists, selection should favour genuine commitment, as well
as the ability to break this under circumstances where it will be more
adaptive to do so. The notion of ambivalence, therefore - the co-existence
of positive and negative feelings towards an object - would seem to
correspond to this expectation: positive feelings reflect the genuine
commitment to the object, whilst the negative feelings, the need to break
the commitment. But exactly as evolutionary theory predicts, the two
sides of the ambivalence are fundamentally contradictory; that is, because
the effectiveness of the positive feelings in eliciting commitment from the
object would be compromised by the simultaneous advertisement of their
provisional nature, it will, according to my earlier discussion of self-
deception, be maladaptive for both sides of the ambivalence to be
simultaneously admissable to consciousness.
The clue to this can be found in Freud's mention of repression in the
quotation given above. It will be recalled that acccording to the view of
deception and self-deception I advanced in earlier chapters, repression is
seen as a means by which self-serving wishes for which publicly acceptable
motives cannot be formulated are kept from consciousness, and hence not
enacted in that form. In the context of ambivalence, therefore, this
understanding of repression seems well justified: the negative hostile
wishes which co-exist alongside the positive ones serve the actor at the
expense of the object, and so need, for their effectiveness, to be obscured
from the object's awareness. The fundamentally genuine - albeit
exaggerated - nature of the positive feelings, means that according to the
considerations set out at the beginning of this chapter, they ought to be
185
effective in their deceptive deployment by virtue of their plausibility. In
other words, the positive feelings should be believed by the object because
they could be in the genuinely selfish interests of the actor. The fact,
however, that the negative hostile feelings (that is, those antithetical to
commitment) are repressed, means that they are, according to the
psychoanalytic model discussed in earlier chapters, constantly seeking
conscious representation, and indeed may break through into
consciousness if sufficiently distorted to be acceptable to the demands of
the super-ego, and yet still close enough to their original repressed root to
be motivated.
Although the notion of ambivalence does indeed seem to be supported by
the expectations of evolutionary theory, to see precisely how close the
classical psychoanalytic model of object relations actually is to the
evolutionary model outlined in the previous chapter, we need to consider
the role played by the mechanisms of defence in maintaining the
repression of the negative side of the ambivalent attitude towards the
object.
Reaction-Formation, Projection and the Return of the Repressed
It is a central tenet of psychoanaytic theory that under circumstances
where a straightforward repression does not suffice to keep an undesirable
idea from consciousness, the ego may invoke additional defensive
measures to ensure that the task of repression is successful1. One such
^The role played by the defences in the evolution of self-deception in reciprocal
relationships is discussed.by Alan Lloyd and Randolph Nesse (forthcoming, 1990).
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mechanism, thought by Freud to be the principal mechanism responsible
for the formation of obsessional neuroses, is reaction-formation. This
defence seeks to avoid the conscious emergence of the unacceptable
impulse by means of consciously and compulsively enacting its opposite
(e.g S.E.20. p.102). In the present context, therefore, the repressed part of
the ambivalent attitude towards the object - the negative hostile wishes
representing a lack of commitment - would be kept from consciousness by
means of compulsively exaggerating its opposite, that is, the positive,
commitment- advertising attitude towards the object.
If we consider for a moment the circumstances likely to produce the
deployment of defences, the assumption of the existence of this
mechanism seems to be particularly well justified. According to
psychoanaytic theory, repressed material is most likely to return in the
presence of some event or circumstance in the real world which calls it
forth. For example, following the above analysis of the repression of the
negative side of an ambivalent attitude, it seems likely that this material
will be called forth by the presence of a new object who has the potential to
be adaptively superior to the current object. Of course, it will be completely
in the interests of the actor for such feelings to exist, since, as we have
seen, it may well ultimately prove adaptive to break his existing
commitment in favour of its establishment elsewhere. However, until
the viability of this is established, it is most important that such feelings
are obscured from his current object. The problem therefore is that the
actor in question must take an interest in the new object, whilst
continuing to display his commitment to his present object. Since his
interest will inevitably be in danger of being betrayed by subtle indicators -
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the detection of which we can expect evolution to strongly favour - we can
expect evolution to also favour means by which these indicators can be
countered; that is, exaggerated displays of commitment at precisely the
time when its bogus nature is most likely to be revealed. Seen in this light
then, the emergence of a reaction formation against repressed hostile
wishes which threaten to break through into consciousness is easily
explicable as a compensation for the weakening of one's genuine
commitment at a time when it would be adaptively harmful for this to be
advertised.
Of course, this example also clearly illustrates the points made earlier
about the role of consciousness in deceptive behaviour. It will be recalled
that in my discussion of consciousness, repression and self-deception
(chapter 6 above) I suggested that motives capable of conscious expression
were likely to be those which meet the standards of public acceptability,
understood as that which it will be in one's adaptive interests for others to
be aware. In the case in question, this is clearly so. According to
psychoanalytic theory, the subjective experience of an actor practising a
reaction-formation against negative hostile feelings towards an object will
be one of extreme tenderness and devotion, whilst the very thought of
anything even loosely connected with the repressed wish will fill them
with horror and disgust. In other words, the content of consciousness
clearly corresponds to the interests of the object and whilst, as we have
seen, the display must be plausible, it cannot be taken as representing the
genetic interests of the actor in any obvious or straightforward way.
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Another of the mechanisms of defence posited by psychoanalytic theory,
which makes particular sense in the context of object-relations, is the
mechanism of projection, and in particular its role in the dynamics of
jealousy. Freud regarded projection - understood as the imputation of a
repressed wish to an object - to be the primary defence mechanism
operative in paranoia, including its manifestation in the form of
pathological sexual jealousy (1922, S.E.18)2. Jealousy, according to this
view, is the result of the imputation of one's own desire for infidelity to
one's sexual partner. For Freud, this was explicable, as with all
mechanisms of defence, as a means of alleviating intra-psychic conflict,
which in proximate terms is no doubt correct. When considered in the
light of evolutionary theory, however, it is clear that the mechanism in
question is easily explicable as another subtle strategy for the deceptive
advertisement of commitment.
To see why we should expect projected jealousy to be so successful a
deceptive strategy, it is necessary to recall the important point made at the
beginning of this chapter: deceptive strategies will increasingly be selected
by their essential plausibility. Seen in this context, it is not difficult to see
why jealousy should be plausible: displeasure at the infidelity of a partner
to whom one has displayed sexual commitment is, as we have seen,
entirely to be expected in a species such as ours in which male parental
investment evidently played so important a part in its evolution. At first
sight, however, it is not immediately clear why such easily explicable
2 In this paper,"Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality",
Freud distinguishes between two forms of pathological jealousy: projected and delusional,
but since both rely on projection as the underlying mechanism, I shall ignore the distinction
here.
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feelings should be regarded as deceptive. After all, as I have just
emphasised, jealousy seems to be a perfectly explicable reaction to
discovering the fact that one has become the victim of deception, hardly a
position from which one has anything to gain by acting deceptively. All of
this is quite true, but in fact far from questioning the deceptive value of
jealousy, explains why we should expect it to be so successful in facilitating
deception.
To see how this is so, we need only remember what is in fact advertised by
jealousy: disappointment that the object of one's commitment has not
themself exhibited commitment. Yet the very fact that this object's
commitment is deemed to be worth having, suggests that the jealous
individual values their adaptive characteristics relatively highly; if they
did not, then we should expect total indifference. As we have already
seen, an indication that another individual regards one as worth investing
in, is likely to suggest that their commitment can be counted on; and if
their commitment can be counted on, other (adaptive) factors being equal,
it will be advantageous to exhibit commitment to them, as opposed to
someone whose commitment is in doubt. In this way, by appearing to be
concerned about the commitment of one's partner, one is in fact
advertising one's own commitment to them, and thereby increasing the
chances of ultimately eliciting their commitment.
As with the case of reaction-formation, the mechanism of projection
would be most likely to be invoked when the repressed desire is most in
danger of breaking through into consciousness, that is, when the actor's
lack of commitment is most likely to be revealed. But with far greater
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subtlety than reaction-formation, projected jealousy appears to be so
obviously selfish, that its deceptive nature could hardly be reliably
predicted. Of course, if jealousy was only ever a product of projection we
should be entirely justified in expecting selection to favour individuals
who rejected such displays as deceptive. We have seen, however, that
jealousy should be quite legitimately motivated in instances where the
commitment of the partner is valued, and selection should therefore
favour the interpretation of jealousy as an indicator of the jealous
individual's commitment. In this way, projected jealousy ought to
appear identical to "normal" jealousy, and so the ability to discriminate
between the two will be correspondingly unlikely to evolve.
Guilt, Masochism and Deception
A difficult, but nonetheless important problem for psychoanalytic theory,
has always been the general issue of self-injury, as manifested in such
phenomena as guilt, depression and masochism. The theoretical difficulty
which this phenomenon posed was that if, as Freud's theory claimed,
human beings are motivated by the pleasure principle, whose aim is the
satisfaction of biologically determined drives, motivated self-injury, of an
often compulsive kind, could not be explained. In the context of modern
evolutionary theory the difficulty is all the more pronounced: there does
not seem to be any obvious explanation of how such behaviour could
possibly improve an individual's inclusive fitness; indeed at first sight it
looks as though it would have exactly the opposite effect. It is well known
that this general problem led Freud to posit the existence of a "death
instinct" (eg, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" 1920, S.E.18, pp.1 - 64), which
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although taken seriously by a number of post-Freudian writers (most
notably Herbert Marcuse), has, as Badcock has correctly pointed out, no
place in modern evolutionary biology (Badcock 1986, 1988). In view of the
argument I have expressed so far, however, the problem posed both for
psychoanalytic and evolutionary theory may not be as serious as at first it
seems, and would seem to lend additional support to the analysis of
commitment and deception so far developed.
Taking the issue of guilt first, it is helpful to begin by considering the
dynamics of guilt as understood by psychoanalytic theory. Freud held that:
An interpretation of the normal, conscious
sense of guilt (conscience) presents no
difficulties; it is based on the tension between
the ego and the ego-ideal and it is the expression
of the condemnation of the ego by its critical
agency (1923, S.E.19 pp.50-51).
Following my earlier discussion of the significance of the super-ego, this
analysis seems entirely plausible. If, as I have suggested, the super-ego is
understood to be the internalized standard of public acceptability, its
opposition to wishes which act against the interests of those it represents,
could reasonably be seen as a safeguard against their reproaches, which, as
discussed earlier, could outweigh the benefits of the enactment of any
such wishes by the withdrawal of their commitment. To fully
comprehend the significance of this observation, however, it is necessary
to bring into consideration Freud's relatively neglected concept of
idealization, or over-valuation of the object. He describes this
phenomenon as follows:
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Contemporaneously with this "devotion" of the
ego to the object, which is no longer to be
distinguished from a sublimated devotion to an
abstract idea, the functions allotted to the ego-
idea entirely cease to operate. The criticism
exercised by that agency is silent; everything that
the object does and asks for is right and
blameless. Conscience has no application to
anything that is done for the sake of the object;
in the blindness of love remorselessness is
carried to the pitch of crime. The whole
situation can be completely summarized in a
formula: The object has been put in the place of
the ego ideal (1921, S.E. 18,p.ll3, Freud's italics)
The notion that under such circumstances the critical functions of the ego-
ideal are ceded to the object quite evidently corresponds to the above
analysis of guilt: it is not merely some generalized standard of public
acceptability, based upon parental prototypes which regulates that which
is admitted to consciousness, but the interests of precisely the individual
whose acceptance the actor's actions must obtain if they are to succeed.
Thus unconscious wishes which are likely to contravene the interests of
the object - because they indicate a lack of commitment - will, if there is a
threat that they will be aroused by external events, be met with guilt; and
guilt, whilst a subjectively unpleasant emotion, is significantly less
harmful to fitness than the condemnation of the object which would
result were the desire or action which elicited the guilt enacted, or its
enactment continued. In other words, the concept of idealization and its
role in this analysis of guilt are explicable as a mechanism of pre-emption:
idealization, which must be based upon a genuinely high evaluation of
the object, means that actions which would be likely to lead to the
abandonment of the object's commitment are effectively made a source of
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unpleasure for the actor, and are therefore likely to be at least temporarily
suspended.
Where Freud's theory of guilt is again particularly interesting is in the fact
that it explains what might be regarded as both rational and irrational
guilt. By this I mean that it is able to explain not only instances of guilt
which follow conscious actions or wishes on the part of the actor, but also
those which do not seem to have any cause, at least of which the actor is
consciously aware. Freud frequently wrote of an "unconscious sense of
guilt" (e.g. 1923, S.E.19, pp.49-54; 1924, S.E. 19, p.166), which although some
may find paradoxical, refers merely to the fact that a tension between the
ego and super-ego need not be conscious; an observation which the
arguments I have advanced so far strongly endorses. Indeed the
distinction - which has obvious empirical support in both clinical and
everyday settings - seems to lend further support to the suggestions I have
already made about the deceptive deployment of cues of commitment. In
situations where guilt is elicited by unconscious wishes (and not overt
actions), the absence of the actor's awareness of its source will obviously
increase the chances of keeping its source from the object of commitment.
Under circumstances, however, when guilt follows the performance of
actions which obviously demonstrate the weakness of the actor's
commitment to his object, an awareness of its source will be advantageous
to the actor for the following reason: The action in question - an act of
infidelity for example - does not necessarily imply the inevitability of the
actor's transfer of commitment. We saw in the previous chapter that
there will be a period of time during which an actor, contemplating the
transfer of commitment to a new object, will be uncertain of the viability -
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in terms of the new object's commitment - of the transfer. This suggests
that the actor's initial interest in some superior characteristic of the new
object could go either way: either the object proves adaptively suitable for a
transfer of commitment, or they do not. In the first instance, we should
expect the commitment to the original object to be broken, and, according
to the above argument, the new object to be idealized. In the second
instance, however, the implication is that the original object is judged to
be superior to the new rival after all, and under such circumstances, it is
quite plausible for the actor to continue his commitment to the original
object. Since a sense of guilt indicates that the object is after all valued -
because their reproaches, and implied withdrawal of commitment is
implicitly deemed to be undesirable and hence maladaptive for the actor -
its display, following an act of infidelity which could be discovered, and
which did not lead to a transfer of commitment, would therefore be in the
evolutionary interests of the actor.
This latter point leads us conveniently into the consideration of another,
closely related issue: Freud's analysis of melancholia. For Freud, feelings
of melancholia - or in modern terms depression - are explicable as the
turning of an unconscious hostile wish towards an object, back onto the
subject's own ego. Thus he writes:
...the self reproaches are reproaches against a
loved object which have been shifted away from




The woman who loudly pities her husband for
being tied to such an incapable wife as herself is
really accusing her husband of being incapable,
in whatever sense she may mean this (Ibid,
Freud's italics).
Although this picture of the dynamics of melancholia seems partly
justified in that it at least prevents negative feelings towards an object
from becoming manifest, the question of why they should be turned back
onto the self remains open. After all, if the actor's claims to general
inadequacy and unworthiness are convincing, then there seems to be the
very real possibility that they will convince the object that this poor
individual really is as inadequate as they claim, and hence quite unworthy
of their commitment.
In answer to this, however, we must first of all consider the effects of a
statement of self-deprecation from the point of view of the actor's sexual
object. An issue which has run more or less implicitly throughout the
discussion so far has been the question of objective sexual value. By this I
mean that it follows with inescapable obviousness from evolutionary
theory that some physical and behavioural characteristics will be, in their
objective consequences, more evolutionarily successful than others, and
so evolution will favour individuals who prefer to form sexual
relationships with individuals in possession of these characteristics. Now
whilst, as I have already emphasised, and as critics of sociobiology never
seem to tire of pointing out, this fact does not, on the face of it, seem to
square with the facts of sexual variation, as a basic principle of evolution it
remains unassailable; writers such as Jeffrey Weeks (1986) who deny it as a
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matter of course, are simply ignorant of evolution3. It follows, therefore,
of necessity, that the commitment of some individuals will be more
desirable to more people than that of others. This suggests that each
individual should face a trade-off between the desirability of a partner, and
their expected level of commitment; in other words, since more desirable
individuals will have greater opportunity for adaptive transfers of
commitment, their commitment is less reliable than that of less desirable
individuals. This point has one important consequence for the present
argument: individuals who have good reason to believe that their
partner regards themself as less desirable than is in fact the case, can
reliably predict a high level of commitment from that partner.
Seen in this light, the exaggeration of the desirability of a partner which
results from the sort of self-deprecation we are discussing, can easily be
regarded as another strategy for the exaggeration of one's own
commitment. It is again particularly relevant that Freud saw the cause of
the phenomenon in the unconscious attitude of the actor towards the
object; the response to the pressure of this attitude is, once again, to
advertise the very thing its existence indicates: a lack of commitment.
Perhaps the most extreme of illustration of this problem of self-injury is
the phenomenon of sado-masochism as a sexual perversion. Like
melancholia and guilt, Freud regarded the masochistic element of the
orientation as the turning back of a sadistic wish towards an object, onto
the subject:
3 In fact, judging from this work, evolution is not all of which Weeks is ignorant; but that is
perhaps another matter.
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It can often be shown that masochism is nothing
more than an extension of sadism turned round
upon the subject's own self, which thus, to begin
with, takes the place of the sexual object (1905,
S.E.7, p.158).
This conclusion is given further support when we consider Freud's
observation that:
...the most remarkable feature of this perversion
is that its active and passive forms are habitually-
found together in the same individual. A
person who feels pleasure in producing pain in
someone else in a sexual relationship is also
capable of enjoying as a pleasure any pain which
he may himself derive from sexual relations
(Idid., p.159).
In view of this observation and the foregoing discussion, the explanation
of this problem may not be hard to find. Quite clearly, sexual sadism is a
desire to completely impose one's will upon the sexual behaviour of the
object, and as such, in the light of the discussion so far, it seems justifiable
to regard it as a desire to control the sexual commitment of the object. It
may well be, therefore, that a positive attitude towards a degree of sadism
in an object would evolve, since a desire to control the commitment of an
object would, for the reasons already given, indicate the potential
commitment of the actor. Of course the likelihood of any individual
being selected to yield to the sadism of just anyone, is very small, since, as
we have seen, commitment alone should not be a sufficient basis on
which to choose a sexual object. Nevertheless, an object who displays the
necessary attributes of desirability, together with an unmistakable desire to
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control one's commitment, could well be a better evolutionary choice
than one without such a desire.
Quite clearly, the potential commitment indicated by such a sadistic
attitude would not be actualized unless the sadistic individual could
guarantee the commitment of his object. This could be achieved in two
ways: either the sadist maintains such powerful physical control over his
object that transgression on their part is rendered physically impossible, or
the object of the sadism voluntarily and preferentially submits to the
sexual control of the sadist. Clearly the first possibility is highly unlikely,
since the sheer effort involved in maintaining this level of control would
effectively preclude any other activities, especially hunting. The second
possibility, however, seems more plausible, since it would clearly
demonstrate a selfishly motivated desire to be sexually dominated by the
individual in question, and therefore plausibly advertise sexual
commitment. Certainly, seen in this way, Freud's observation that sadism
and masochism are frequently found in the same individuals, and his
assertion that they share a common unconscious origin, seem quite
realistic: both sadism and masochism, although apparently quite different,
can be seen to advertise the same thing, that is, commitment.
It would of course be misleading to assume that sexual practices which can
be reasonably considered sado-masochistic are confined to the well-
documented practices of physical restraint and bondage. As two modern
commentators point out:
Alternatively...no physical or mental derogation
or attack is carried out: instead lovemaking is
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carried out via a stylized ritual of commands
and obeisances in which the enjoyment of one
partner is at least in theory assured because he or
she gets exactly what is desired, whilst the other
partner achieves pleasure by fulfilling those
desires (Gosselin & Wilson, 1984, p.95).
This observation clearly locates the more extreme and violent
manifestations of sado-masochistic behaviour in relation to evolutionary
hypothesis advanced above. Its emphasis on the sexual pleasure of the
dominant partner, as a source of pleasure for the masochistic actor, is
particularly revealing since it highlights the essentially intrerpersonal
nature of the passive attitude. Of course at first sight such a concern with
the pleasure of another individual may seem to be an example of altruism
par excellence; yet if my argument so far is accepted, it can clearly be seen
as an advertisement of concern over the commitment of the partner, and
thus as a plausible advertisement of one's own commitment.
Also of significance to this argument is the fact that in the early editions of
his Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality. Freud attributed masochism
to the phenomenon mentioned above, of sexual overvaluation of the
object:
One at least of the roots of masochism can be
inferred with equal certainty. It arises from
sexual overvaluation as a necessary psychical
consequence of the choice of sexual object (1905,
S.E.7, p.158).
This is important in two respects: first because it sees masochism in
relation to an object which has been "overvalued" and so, in terms of my
argument, one whose commitment the actor is interested in eliciting;
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secondly, however, because this overvaluation is seen as a necessary
psychical consequence of object choice. If it is indeed the case that a degree
of overvaluation can normally be expected to accompany object-choice, the
assumption that this phenomenon is related to the advertisement of
commitment seems to be well justified. This is particularly clear when we
consider:
It is only in the rarest instances that the
psychical valuation that is set on the sexual
object, as being the goal of the sexual instinct
stops short at its genitals. The appreciation
extends to the whole body of the sexual object
and tends to involve every sensation derived
from it. The same over-valuation spreads over
into the psychological sphere: the subject
becomes, as it were, intellectually infatuated
(that is his powers of judgement are weakened)
by the mental achievements and perfections of
the sexual object and he submits to the latter's
judgement with credulity. Thus the credulity of
love becomes an important, if not the most
fundamental source of authority (Idib. p.150,
Freud's italics).
The reason why this extension of interest beyond the genitals of the object
should be selected as an indicator of commitment is not hard to see.
Whilst genitalia are of obvious importance in determining the
evolutionary success of an individual, they are nevertheless a necessary
rather than a sufficient condition of that success. Thus, the most
evolutionarily successful object-choices will be those which take factors
besides the genitals of the object into account. Specifically, they will be
choices based upon such crucial adaptive criteria as parental potential and
likely commitment, but also on general physical and intellectual
condition. It would thus seem likely that since anyone interested in
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making a commitment to an object will be selected to choose that object on
the basis of such criteria, an individual in whom such an interest is being
taken might be selected to interpret that interest as an indicator of the
potential commitment of the interested individual. Therefore, an
individual who demonstrates a positive reaction to such features in
another could reasonably be expected to provide the necessary
commitment in the future, and might thus be expected to elicit a positive
response in terms of commitment from that object. If this is correct, then
it seems reasonable to surmise that a mechanism by which commitment is
advertised would be one which emphasised the actor's satisfaction with
these general fitness-related features, with greater levels of satisfaction
indicating greater levels of commitment.
In this light, then, the possibility, suggested by the concept of
overvaluation, that sexual desire might become attached to parts of the
object not directly related to reproduction begins to seem plausible. Sexual
arousal at the sight of an individual's eyes, lips, hair, indeed any part of
their body, could clearly be selected if these features reliably indicate
fitness. Yet at the same time, since this arousal will also indicate likely
commitment, it will be in the interests of the aroused individual to
exaggerate their evaluation of these characteristics, so as to deceptively
advertise their future commitment. This observation may go some way to
explaining Freud's contention that overvaluation of the object is
invariably accompanied by a decrease in the specifically genital orientation
towards the object. This is because a single-mindedly genital orientation
to an object would indicate a general indifference to the fitness qualities of
the object, and thus suggest a lack of future commitment. If however, the
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desire for genital union - which will obviously have to follow - is kept to a
minimum, in favour of a desire for the more generally adaptive
characteristics, future commitment is indicated.
It is with the foregoing discussion in mind that I wish finally to return to a
consideration of some of the apparent paradoxes in human sexual
behaviour which were alluded to at the beginning of the previous chapter,
and drawing on the theoretical argument with which this thesis has been
mainly concerned, offer some tentative answers to these problems.
Variation, Commitment and Deception: Some Conclusions
It will be recalled that the essence of the problem which was raised earlier
concerning variations in human sexual behaviour, is one of explaining
the existence of subjective preferences for sexual activities and objects
which are either less adaptive than they could be, or in some cases
positively devoid of any adaptive value. What I have tried to suggest in
the course of this and the preceeding chapter is that in view of the
arguments advanced earlier, we should subject to scrutiny the
evolutionary significance of the psychological mechanisms underlying
subjective sexual preference itself, and not merely attempt to find some
"adaptationist" explanation for such behaviour. In this connection I have
suggested that a decisive aspect of human sexual relations will be
commitment, and therefore that we can expect the evolution of complex
psychological mechanisms mediating the deceptive advertisement of
commitment and the corresponding detection of this deception. If we
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now apply these arguments to the problem in hand, a number of
difficulties can be resolved.
One important example of such problematic behaviour which I raised
earlier is sexual fetishism. Seen in the light of the above discussion of the
Freudian concept of sexual overvaluation as a strategy for the deceptive
advertisement of commitment, however, it is possible to see that it is not
as paradoxical as at first it seems. Freud wrote of fetishism:
Some degree of diminution in the urge towards
the normal sexual aim...seems to be a necessary
precondition in every case. The point of contact
with the normal is provided by the
psychologically essential overvaluation of the
sexual object, which inevitably extends to
everything associated with it. A certain degree
of fetishism is thus habitually present in normal
love, especially in those stages of it in which the
normal sexual aim seems unattainable or its
fulfillment prevented (1905, S.E.7, p. 153-4).4
The idea that fetishism might be related to a decrease in normal sexual
(genital) interest, is given further empirical support by North's analysis:
Normal sexual intercourse may be
unsatisfactory to him [ie. the fetishist] unless
accompanied by additional acts. Idiosyncratic
genital activity or activity seemingly remote
from genital intercourse may thus be more
satisfying to him (North 1970, p.42).
^Freud goes on to quote Goethe:
Get me a kerchief from her breast
A garter that her knee has pressed
204
In terms of the argument advanced here, then, fetishism might be seen as
the outcome of a mechanism for attaching sexual desire to fitness-related
(that is, not specifically genital) aspects of the object, in the interests of
displaying commitment. This suggestion may, in addition, shed some
light on what at first sight is generally regarded as one of Freud's more far¬
fetched clinical observations:
In every instance, the meaning and the purpose
of the fetish turned out, in analysis, to be the
same. It revealed itself so naturally and seemed
to me so compelling that I am prepared to expect
the same solution in all cases of fetishism.
When now I announce that the fetish is a
substitute for the penis, I shall certainly create
disppointment; so I hasten to add that it is not a
substitute for any chance penis, but for a
particular and quite special penis that had been
extremely imposrtant in early childhood but had
later been lost. That is to say, it should normally
have been given up, but the fetish is precisely
designed to preserve it from extinction. To put
it more plainly: the fetish is a substitute for the
woman's (the mother's) penis that the little boy
once believed in and - for reasons familiar to us
- does not want to give up (1927, S.E. 21, p.152-3).
Now whilst the details of this assertion may be open to further debate, the
fundamental observation that the fetish object is a gential substitute seems
to be exactly what the above analysis suggests. The point is that
commitment is advertised by an interest in parts of the body other than
the genitals: in other words genital substitutes. Of course, the examples of
fetish objects mentioned earlier - rubber and P.V.C. clothing, wet canvass
shoes, lingerie and so on - could hardly be regarded as fitness-related
aspects of the object; the very opposite in fact. But it should be
remembered, as I have emphasised at length in previous chapters, that
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since these objects would not have been present in the environment in
which the psychological mechanisms in question evolved, there is no
reason to expect the evolution of the means to distinguish between these
and those which would be adaptive. Indeed, in his analysis of fetishism,
Freud is quite explicit about the exact source of the ontogenetic emergence
of an individual's particular choice of fetish object:
One would expect that the organs or objects
chosen as substitutes for the absent female
phallus would be such as appear as symbols of
the penis in other connections as well. This
may happen often enough, but is certainly not a
deciding factor. It seems rather that when the
fetish is instituted some process occurs which
reminds one of the stopping of memory in
traumatic amnesia. As in this latter case, the
subject's interest comes to a halt half-way, as it
were; it is as though the last impression before
the uncanny and traumatic one is retained as a
fetish. Thus the foot or shoe owes its preference
as a fetish - or part of it - to the circumstance that
the inquisitive bot peered at the woman's
genitals from below, from her legs up; fur and
velvet - as has long been suspected - are a
fixation of the sight of the pubic hair, which
should have been followed by the longed-for
sight of the female member; pieces of
underclothing, which are so often chosen as a
fetish, crystallize the moment of undressing, the
last moment in which the woman could still be
regarded as phallic (Ibid., p. 155).
In this quotation we see a particularly striking example of Freud's
understanding of the relationship between phylogeny and ontogeny,
which clearly illustrates the earlier theoretical discussion of the possibility
of maladaptive behviour motivated in accordance with inclusive fitness
demands. Here Freud is saying that the fetish object actually chosen, is
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selected on the basis of two criteria: the phylogenetic tendency to choose a
genital substitute as a fetish object, and the ontogenetic selection of a
particular substitute on the basis of certain experiences. In this way, we
have a very good example of the effect of evolutionary time-lags which
was discussed in detail earlier: genital substitutes chosen according to the
ontogenetic criteria given in the quotation from Freud above, would, in
our evolutionary environment have been adaptively relevant, whereas
those chosen in today's environment on the same basis would not. The
motivation of the action is thus explicable, as the earlier theoretical
discussion insisted it must be, as evolutionarily determined in accordance
with inclusive fitness theory, whilst the outcome of the action is
recognised as maladaptive, and this is explained by environmental
change.
I wish now to broaden this discussion to consider the implications of the
arguments advanced so far for wider issue of "cultural" variation in ideals
of sexual attractiveness, which, as I pointed out earlier, is often taken by
supporters of conventional sociological approaches as being a prime
illustration of the biology-independence of human motivation.
Considered in the light of the view of human consciousness which I have
advanced, however, this analysis can be seen to be seriously flawed. The
main difficulty which can be identified with this approach is its reliance
upon the conscious, subjective preferences reported by actors: since actors
appear, systematically, to prefer to copulate with objects who diverge from
the expected standard of universal biological attractiveness, factors other
than biology - namely culture - must be responsible for these preferences.
Yet, as we have seen, from an evolutionary point of view, there is
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absolutely no reason why we should expect consciously held preferences to
correspond in any straightforward way to ultimate biological interests.
Indeed, in view of the importance which I have suggested must be placed
on the role of self-deception in human interaction, quite the reverse
should be expected.
To see exactly how this can explain the problem of variation in ideals of
sexual attractiveness it is necessary to begin by repeating the point, made
in the previous chapter, that ideals of sexual attractiveness need to be
relative to the objects available. In other words, since any actor will only
encounter a very small number of sexual objects both worthy of their
commitment, and who themseleves display a suitable level of
commitment towards the actor, it will not be in their interests to be
excessively discriminating. Yet where the foregoing argument greatly
extends the importance of this somewhat self-evident observation, is in
the importance given to the advertisement of commitment as a means of
eliciting commitment in an object. As I argued earlier, since the
commitment of the object will always be a crucial determinant of the
evolutionary success of an actor, then it follows that even where the
available object does not meet the theoretical adaptive ideal, the actor
should still be concerned to elicit their commitment. This suggests
therefore, that in the event of a less that ideal object being all that is
available to an actor, it will still be in their interests to display their own
commitment, and hence to mobilise the psychological mechanisms which
have been discussed earlier in this chapter. Thus, if we take the
mechanism of overvaluation, or idealisation, which, it will be recalled, I
suggested could be explained as a means of displaying a deceptively high
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level of commitment to an object, it is possible to see that the attribution
of ideal qualities to a variety of different objects reflects not the genuine
biologically determined subjective preference that the sociological critics
would wish to believe, but rather the evolutionarily determined need to
advertise commitment to any object - even those which are less than ideal
- whose commitment it is in one's interests to elicit.
Looked at in this way, then, the apparent problem posed by an individual
subjectively preferring a sexual object which departs from the theoretical
ideal, over and above one which comes closer to that ideal, can be
plausibly explained by the fundamental trade-off, referred to earlier,
between commitment and evolutionary desirability. According to this
argument, since desirability and commitment can be expected to be
negatively correlated (because the more objectively desirable an individual
- in evolutionary terms - the greater choice of sexual objects they must
have) there must exist for each individual an optimum point for their
sexual object on the commitment/desirability gradient. Since this will
vary from individual to individual, depending upon their own possession
of desirable characteristics, it follows that their choice of sexual object
should also vary accordingly. As, therefore, we can expect this systematic
variation in the desirability of objects from whom different individuals
can be expected to elicit commitment, we can, in view of the need to
advertise commitment, also expect a systematic variation in reported
sexual ideals.5
5Although necessarily speculative, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that Freud's
contention that parental prototypes form the basis of adult object-choices, might be
explicable in the light of this. If, as we must assume, there is ultimately a genetic basis to
the possession of desirable characteristics, then one's own parents could also be expected, in
general, to possess these characteristics. It may be, therefore, that the most reliable
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I have tried in this chapter to achieve two things: first and foremost I have
tried to illustrate the argument, advanced in the course of earlier chapters,
that evolutionary theory demands that we take an evolutionary
psychological approach to the analysis of apparently maladaptive
behaviour; secondly, however, I have tried to advance an analysis along
these lines of some quite specific aspects of human behaviour. Whilst it is
my belief that this analysis does offer a contribution to the substantive
issues in question, in the present context it is intended mainly as an
exemplification of the theoretical arguments advanced earlier. In the
conclusion which follows, therefore, I wish to draw together the various
strands of the earlier theoretical discussions, and shall use the examples
elaborated here as illsutrations of my conclusions.
indicator one has of the desirability one can reasonably expect in an object, is the
desirability of one's parent of the opposite sex.
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CONCLUSION
The central point which it has been my purpose to make in this thesis is
that the assumption of culture as an independent source of human
motivation which underlies conventional social theory cannot be
sustained in the light of modern evolutionary knowledge. I have tried to
demonstrate that instead, human action can only be legitimately
understood as motivated biologically, and in accordance with the
expectations of inclusive fitness theory. The chief difficulty which I have
suggested exists with this necessarily adopted position, is that it appears
not to be able to explain behavioural variation, and in particular
maladaptive variation. My suggestion has been that this paradox is
essentially the result of confusion over the level at which the
evolutionary analysis of behaviour should proceed: rather than treat the
currently observed behaviour of the organism as necessarily displaying
adaptive significance - as is generally done by human sociobiologists - it is
in fact necessary only to find an adaptive significance for behaviour which
the mechanisms underlying the currently observed behaviour would
have produced in the environment in which they evolved.
My argument has been that this observation - which is actually
fundamental to the evolutionary analysis of the characteristics of any
organism - suggests a very specific model of human behaviour which is in
essential respects different from that commonly assumed by social
theorists. To summarize the argument which I have developed to this
end, it is helpful to emphasise the implications of this approach for the
analysis of meaning, and its involvement in specifically human conduct.
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As I have already pointed out (see especially Ch.3 above) the apparently
uniquely meaningful nature of human conduct is generally taken as the
central justification for the separation of human behaviour from the
sphere of biology. Underlying this approach to the meaning of human
action is the fundamental assumption that the relationship between
human symbols and that which they signify is essentially arbitrary; that is,
human action beyond gross non-conscious biological functions is
significant, and hence explicable, to both actor and observer (and so is also
thereby motivated) entirely by dint of convention. I have I hope
demonstrated, in the preceding pages, that this conception of meaning is
not merely internally incoherent in its own terms, but more conclusively
can be shown to be utterly fallacious in the light of modern evolutionary
knowledge.
What instead is suggested by the analysis I have pursued, and which is
summarized briefly above, is that human symbols can never be considered
arbitrary in this sense, but must rather be motivated in accordance with
the principles of evolution; that is, the inclusive fitness of the organism.
The implication of this is that according to evolutionary theory, as with
conventional social theory, human actions must be considered
meaningful, but that in the case of the former the meaning of actions
must be considered evolutionarily relevant. Of central importance,
however, is the point, made at length in earlier chapters, that the
evolutionary meaning of an action need not be - and indeed often is not -
identical to its current evolutionary consequences. Of course, often these
two will coincide; but equally, they often will not. The crucial point,
however, is that evolutionary analysis forces us to the conclusion that
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whilst the manifest content of human actions are variable, with the effect
that so also are their current adaptive values, their underlying meanings
remain fixed, and their content explicable in terms of inclusive fitness
theory.
It has been my intention, following this observation, to explore the
relationship - revealed as crucial by this argument - between the
evolutionarily determined deep content of human actions, and their often
paradoxical, apparently maladaptive manifest content. In the course of
this exploration, I have suggested that the theory of human mind and
behaviour which comes closest to meeting the requirement of recognizing
this relationship is classical psychoanalysis. My reasons for reaching this
conclusion may be summarized by the following points: First, Freud
recognized that the current, conscious contents of the human mind, and
the actions to which these give rise, are in fact transformed
representations of some other unconscious motive. In this way the need
for a theory of the fixed nature of the deep contents of the mind is met.
Yet where Freud's formulation of this relationship differs from those
advanced by so many of his followers, is in its explicit recognition that the
fixed deep content in question is genuinely biologically determined by the
evolutionary process. Secondly, however, Freud's analysis attempts to
explicitly analyse the paths along which the fixed biologically determined
motives are transformed, as themselves biologically determined.
Although, as I have pointed out, Freud's own evolutionary biological
conclusions were incorrect, his insistence upon seeking ultimate
evolutionary explanations for mental contents and processes makes the
structure of his model uniquely relevant to the issues now raised by
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modern evolutionary theory. Thirdly, the fundamentally evolutionary
nature of Freud's thought led to a conception of the relationship between
internally originating instincts and objects in the external world which is
thoroughly compatible with modern evolutionary knowledge, and in fact,
as I hope I have shown, provides the form of a satisfactory solution to the
difficult theoretical problem of behavioural variation.
I have of necessity developed my argument at a high level of abstraction;
no doubt this will have lead, at times, to some difficulty for the reader in
conceptualising the concrete implications of what I have been saying.
Hopefully, however, the examples I have elaborated in the last two
chapters will do something to remedy this. To illustrate this, it is perhaps
worth devoting some time to the further elucidation of my argument in
terms of these examples.
Let us begin with the sense in which, for conventional social theory, an
individual's choice of sexual object is considered meaningful.' For social
scientists, human actions are considered meaningful in the sense that
their contents are explicable with reference to some theoretical reality
other than the action itself: actions, like words, refer to something which,
by definition, they are not, and like words are connected to these others in
a purely arbitrary fashion. Therefore, an individual's choice of sexual
object is considered by this approach to be arbitrary in the sense that there
' Of course, as I explained in chapter three, I concentrate on the respects in which
conventional social theories in general differ from the evolutionary biological approach,
and am thus ignoring what are usually regarded as fundamental differences between them;
the point I am making, therefore, is, I would claim, equally applicable to all such
approaches.
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is no necessary connection between it, and the other reality to which it
refers. It is also meaningful because it does refer to another reality which
it is not. Thus for example, feminists may - and in fact some do - argue
that the fact that the majority of human beings perform sexual acts with
members of the opposite sex, is first of all an arbitrary sign - they could
just as well copulate with members of their own sex, different species, or
even, logically, not perform sexual acts at all - and secondly that this
perfectly arbitrary sign in fact signifies some other reality - the patriarchal
infrastructure of society, culture, or some other abstract construct. What is
however denied, is that there is any respect in which the choice of sexual
object is necessary; and therefore that there is any limit to the range of
possible objects chosen, and actions performed with them. Indeed the
regularity with which phrases such as "social definition" and "cultural
construction" are used in social scientific "discourse", attests to the vast
underestimation of the extent to which these fundamental assumptions
can be said to constitute a sociological "paradigm". 2
Another way of putting this argument is to say that for the conventional
social theorist, those things which we call "sexual acts" are not so called -
and experienced - as a result of anything intrinsic to the acts, but as a result
of the arbitrary ascription of an externally determined significance. Of
course different schools of social thought would advance very different
explanations of the origins of the particular meanings which it is
considered are so ascribed, as well as projections of their likely future
2The degree to which these common features rest upon the naive assumption of an
uncomplicated unidirectional process of "socialization" is of course criticized in Wrong's
well-known paper (1964); although this paper is usually regarded as a classic, it is
surprising how limited have been its consequences.
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changes; the point however is that the definition of an act as
something which is crucially dependent upon other antecedent
definitions. As Weeks has summarized this argument:
..we must learn to see that sexuality is
something which society produces in complex
ways. It is a result of diverse social practices that
give meaning to human activities, of social
definitions and self-definitions, of struggles
between those who have power to define and
regulate, and those who resist, Sexuality is not
given, it is a product of negotiation, struggle and
human agency (Weeks, 1986,p.25).
My argument, however, following the central insights of evolutionary
biology, is that the meaning of sexual acts - and therefore their
explanation- cannot be held to lie in the collective sui generis realm of the
social. Sexual objects are not chosen because culture has drawn a line of
demarcation between the sexual and the non-sexual and ascribed some
objects a sexual significance and others not; objects are chosen and given a
sexual significnce because evolution has selected certain specific
behavioural patterns and not others, and objects of certain characteristics
have been selected as the objects of sexual arousal. Where this argument
is crucially different from that advanced by sociobiologists, however, is in
the recognition that the significance of currently observed sexual objects -
their meaning - whilst ultimately explicable as adaptive, need not
currently be observed in the consequences of choosing such objects. For
instance, a sociobiological explanation of the problem of sexual fetishism
would need to find some current adaptive value in the practice;
something which, for reasons detailed earlier, seems unlikely. According




means for the advertisement of sexual interest in parts of the object which
would indicate fitness, and hence is a means for advertising sexual
commitment to the object; this is the meaning of the fetish. I pointed out
however that the presence today of objects which were absent in the
environment in which we evolved, means that the objects actually chosen
today need not have adaptive consequences. Yet the central point here, is
that the meaning of the object remains the same, despite its lack of actual
adaptive significance; the object is not arbitrary, has a precise meaning and
is selected because of its possession of certain characteristics which would
have indicated adaptiveness in our primal environment, but which do
not today.
A criticism which has often been made of sociobiology is that it claims the
course of human action is rigidly determined by biology, and hence
contains within it a deeply pessimistic message for the future of human
societies. I pointed out in chapter two that such judgements about the
desirability of the consequences of scientific observations had absolutely
no place in the assessment of the validity of such observations;
nevertheless, this is certainly not to deny that one should be concerned
about such consequences. On the contrary, one should take them very
seriously indeed. It should be clear therefore, that the implications of
pessimism often attributed to sociobiology could hardly be applied to the
approach I Have developed in these pages. This is because although I have
insisted, in keeping with modern evolutionary theory, that human action
must be motivated in accordance with the inclusive fitness interests of the
individual, we have seen that the consequences of these actions can be
very different from those we must assume were produced under primal
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conditions. I am not of course suggesting that human behavioural variety-
is limitless - this would obviously contradict the entire argument so far -
but merely that as environments change, so must the consequences of our
biologically determined motivations. Precisely how this might happen is
clearly impossible to say, but the presence of so much apparently altruistic
behaviour - so readily assumed by social scientists to contradict
evolutionary insights and prove the benevolence of culture - suggests
that, in spite of evolution, things might not ultimately turn out as badly as
some would suppose.
I hope readers of this thesis will be convinced by the solution to he
problems raised by evolutionary biology for social theory I have offered. I
hope also that the specific analyses of the examples considered in the final
two chapters will prove of some value to the understanding of these
questions; it seems to me that a consideration of deception and the
advertisement of commitment must provide much of the solution to the
paradoxes of human sexual behaviour. My principal hope, however, is
that I have succeeded in demonstrating that the central assumptions of
modern social theory cannot be sustained when the realities of biological
evolution are considered, and that the challenge posed to social science by
these realities demands a solution of a genuinely radical kind. If I have
done so, then it is my further hope that the work contained in this thesis,
and that which will follow it, may make some contribution to this end.
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